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Economic Analysis on Executive Pay Control

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Information and Business Intelligence (IBI 2011)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 268))

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Abstract

Interest conflict is present between shareholder and executive, the multi-task agency model analysis indicates that the executive compensation decision mechanism exists inner impulse of over-incention, executive compensation control is not only reasonable but also necessary, government might control executive compensation by strengthening the right of shareholder decision in executive compensation, disclosing executive compensation information in detail, and setting up the institution of derivative action.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business Administration, Southern China University of Technology, Guangzhou, 510641, China

    Xin-gui Zhu & Le-ping Shen

  2. National Economics Research Center, Guangdong University of Business Studies, Guangzhou, 510320, China

    Xin-gui Zhu

Authors
  1. Xin-gui Zhu
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  2. Le-ping Shen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Hunan Institute of Engineering, 88 Fuxing Dong Road, 411104, Xiangtan, Hunan, China

    Xilong Qu

  2. Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 800 Dongchuan Road, Dianxinqunlou 1-401, 200240, Shanghai, China

    Yuhang Yang

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Cite this paper

Zhu, Xg., Shen, Lp. (2012). Economic Analysis on Executive Pay Control. In: Qu, X., Yang, Y. (eds) Information and Business Intelligence. IBI 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 268. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29087-9_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29087-9_43

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29086-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29087-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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