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Secret Key Leakage from Public Key Perturbation of DLP-Based Cryptosystems

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Cryptography and Security: From Theory to Applications

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6805))

Abstract

Finding efficient countermeasures for cryptosystems against fault attacks is challenged by a constant discovery of flaws in designs. Even elements, such as public keys, that do not seem critical must be protected. From the attacks against RSA [5,4], we develop a new attack of DLP-based cryptosystems, built in addition on a lattice analysis [26] to recover DSA public keys from partially known nonces. Based on a realistic fault model, our attack only requires 16 faulty signatures to recover a 160-bit DSA secret key within a few minutes on a standard PC. These results significantly improves the previous public element fault attack in the context of DLP-based cryptosystems [22].

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Berzati, A., Canovas-Dumas, C., Goubin, L. (2012). Secret Key Leakage from Public Key Perturbation of DLP-Based Cryptosystems. In: Naccache, D. (eds) Cryptography and Security: From Theory to Applications. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6805. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28368-0_16

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28368-0_16

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-28367-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-28368-0

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