Modalities of Criminal Liability in the Jurisprudence of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals

Marchuk, Iryna

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28246-1_6

Iryna Marchuk²

1676 Accesses

Abstract

The discipline of international criminal law deals with the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, for which the responsible individuals shall bear criminal responsibility. Being firmly entrenched in substantive laws of national legal jurisdictions, the principle is not novel in international criminal law and is traceable to the celebrated Nuremberg Judgment. At the outset of the trial in Nuremberg, it was challenging to argue that the precedent of individual criminal responsibility for core international crimes, which called for the universal condemnation, a priori existed. In his renowned opening statement, Robert Jackson laid down his arguments as to the relevance and necessity of the principle of individual criminal responsibility in international law:

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Notes

1.
Glaser submits that the IMT Charter has done nothing more than to consecrate the principle of individual criminal responsibility previously recognised by public international law. He cited in support Article 3 of the Washington Treaty of 1922 and Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles. For more, consult: Glaser (1948).
2.
IMT, The Trial of German Major War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany (commencing 20 ^th November 1945): Opening Speeches of the Chief Prosecutors for the United States of America, the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (London: HMSO, 1946), pp. 149–150.
3.
Ibid., p. 150.
4.
Glaser in Mettraux (2008), pp. 66–67.
5.
Nuremberg Judgment, Part: The Accused Organisations, retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judorg.asp#general. See also: Donnedieu de Vabres in Mettraux (2008), pp. 251–258.
6.
Nuremberg Judgment, Part: The Law of the Charter, retrieved from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judlawch.asp.
7.
Jones and Powles (2003), p. 410.
8.
Low-ranking perpetrators are normally used as “insider” witnesses in international criminal proceedings, providing testimonies that assist to expose “masterminds” of international crimes.
9.
Ohlin (2007) at 88.
10.
Boas et al. (2007), p. 2 (original footnote omitted).
11.
Article 6 (1), ICTR Statute; Article 7 (1), ICTY Statute.
12.
The SCSL jurisprudence has largely focused on the construal of the JCE common purpose, more specifically whether a non-criminal goal may be pleaded as an ultimate purpose of JCE. For more: see Chap. 6.3.1.4 (The JCE Doctrine in the SCSL Jurisprudence). The ECCC re-affirmed the existence of the basic and systematic form of JCE but dismissed the customary law status of JCE III. See: Judgment, Kaing Guek Eav, alias Duch, Case File No: 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/TC, Trial Chamber, 26 July 2010, paras 504–513; Decision on the Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, Case File No: 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, Pre-Trial Chamber, 20 May 2010, paras 77–83. For academic discussion on the dismissal of JCE III as part of customary law, see: Gustafson (2010) at 1332.
13.
Werle (2007) at 974.
14.
Ashworth (2009), pp. 195–197.
15.
LaFave (2003b), pp. 664–665.
16.
StGB § 25 (Täterschaft) reads: “(1) Als Täter wird bestraft, wer die Straftat selbst oder durch einen anderen begeht.(2) Begehen mehrere die Straftat gemeinschaftlich, so wird jeder als Täter bestraft (Mittäter)”. See also: Bohlander (2008).
17.
Roxin (2006b). This is a leading authority on the applicability of the “control over the crime” approach (Tatherschaft) to principal liability (Täterschaft).
18.
See: Baumann et al. (2003), pp. 669–670; Lackner and Kühl (2004), pp. 178–179, 182–184; Tröndle and Fischer (2006), pp. 221–224.
19.
Strafeloven, § 23 provides: “Den for en lovovertrædelse givne straffebestemmelse omfatter alle, der ved tilskyndelse, råd eller dåd har medvirket til gerningen”. The term “gerningsmand” denotes a principal to a crime, whereas a broad term “medvirke” applies to all accomplices to a crime. For more, see: Vestergaard (1992), pp. 475–490.
20.
Article 121-4 (Le Code pénal) reads: “Est auteur de l'infraction la personne qui: (1) commet les faits incriminés; (2) tente de commettre un crime ou, dans les cas prévus par la loi, un délit”.
21.
Article 121-7 (Le Code pénal) sets forth: “Est complice d'un crime ou d'un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation. Est également complice la personne qui par don, promesse, menace, ordre, abus d'autorité ou de pouvoir aura provoqué à une infraction ou donné des instructions pour la commettre”.
22.
Van Sliedregt (2003a), p. 15.
23.
Van Der Wilt (2007) at 91. The author’s mainstream, albeit justified, critique of the JCE doctrine is directed at its inability to establish and account for co-responsibility where the lines of communication between the parties to a crime are diffuse or completely obliterated. See also: Ohlin (2007), a piece in which the author accentuates on the failure of the JCE doctrine to offer a sufficiently nuanced treatment of intentionality, foreseeability and culpability.
24.
Hamdorf (2007) at 208.
25.
§ 25 (2) of the German Criminal Code (Strafgezetzbuch) reads: “Begehen mehrere die Straftat gemeinschaftlich, so wird jeder als Täter bestraft (Mittäter)”. According to the German Federal Court (in BGH GA 85, 270), “[M]ittäterschaft ist anzunehmen, wenn und soweit das Zusammenwirken der mehreren Beteiligten auf gegenseitigem Einverständnis beruht, während jede rechtsverletzende Handlung eines Mittäters, die über dieses Einverständnis hinausgeht, nur diesem allein zuzurechnen ist”. Translation (unofficial): “Co-perpetration (Mittäterschaft) exists when the joint action of several participants is based on the reciprocal agreement (Einverständnis), however, any criminal offence of the participant (Mittäter) that goes beyond such agreement is attributable only to that participant”.
26.
The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Article 36 (Excess Perpetration) sets forth: “The commission of a crime that is not covered by the intent of other accomplices shall be considered as an excess of the perpetrator. Other accomplices to the crime shall not be subject to criminal responsibility for the excess of the perpetrator”.
27.
Vestergaard (1992), para. 23.
28.
Elliott (2001), pp. 90–91 citing in support, among others, the decision of 19 June 1984 in Bulletin des arrêts criminels de la Cour de Cassation 1984, no. 231.
29.
In R. v. Logan (1990) 2 SCR 731, it was held that “the words “or ought to have known” are inoperative when considering under s. 21(2) whether a person is a party to any offence where it is a constitutional requirement for a conviction that foresight of the consequences be subjective, which is the case for attempted murder. Once these words are deleted, the remaining section requires, in the context of attempted murder, that the party to the common venture knows that it is probable that his accomplice would do something with the intent to kill in carrying out the common purpose”.
30.
Under Australian law, the common purpose doctrine applies “where a venture is undertaken by more than one person acting in concert in pursuit of a common criminal design” (McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108, 113). The mental test for determining what comes within the “scope of the common purpose” is the subjective one (McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108). The evolution of the objective test to the subjective one is clearly expounded in the jurisprudence: “[i]nitially the test of what fell within the scope of the common purpose was determined objectively so that liability was imposed for other crimes committed as a consequence of the commission of the crime which was the primary object of the criminal venture, whether or not those other crimes were contemplated by the parties to that venture. However, in accordance with the emphasis which the law now places upon the actual state of mind of an accused person, the test has become a subjective one and the scope of the common purpose is to be determined by what was contemplated by the parties sharing that purpose” (McAuliffe v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 108, 114).
31.
LaFave (2003b), pp. 687–689. See also: People v Prettyman, 14 Cal.4^th 248, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013 (1996) (“natural and probable consequences” rule is a well-established rule); Mitchell v. State, 114 Nev. 1417, 971 P.2d 813 (1998) (“aiders and abettors are criminally responsible for all harms that are a natural, probable, and foreseeable result of their actions”) etc.
32.
Pursuant to Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 (as amended by s. 65(4) Criminal Law Act 1977), “whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender”.
33.
Brown and Isaac v The State [2003] UKPC 10 at 8.
34.
Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen [1985] AC 168 at 175.
35.
For more, see: Simester and Sullivan (2007), pp. 193–246; Ashworth (2009), pp. 420–426.
36.
R v Powell (Anthony), R v English [1999] 1 AC 1.
37.
Ibid., at 1–2, 17.
38.
Ibid., at 12.
39.
Ibid., at 12–13.
40.
Ibid., at 13.
41.
Ibid., at 31.
42.
Ibid., at 2.
43.
Ibid., at 28.
44.
Ibid., at 31.
45.
Ibid., at 30–31. See: R v Rahman and Others [2008] UKHL 45 at 16.
46.
R v Cunningham [1982] AC 566.
47.
Pursuant to § 25 of of the German Criminal Code (StGB), “[A]ls Täter wird bestraft, wer die Straftat selbst oder durch einen anderen begeht; (2) Begehen mehrere die Straftat gemeinschaftlich, so wird jeder als Täter bestraft (Mittäter)”.
48.
§ 26 of the German Criminal Code (StGB) reads: “[A]ls Anstifter wird gleich einem Täter bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einen anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat bestimmt hat”.
49.
§ 27 (1) of the German Criminal Code (StGB) sets forth: “[A]ls Gehilfe wird bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einem anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat Hilfe geleistet hat”.
50.
See also: Dubber (2007) at 983–984 where the author conducts comparative analysis of the complicity doctrine in American and German criminal law and clearly favours the MPC approach for purposes of international criminal law.
51.
For more, consult: Baumann et al. (2003), pp. 688–699. For more on co-perpetration and its constitutive legal elements in German criminal law, see: Lackner and Kühl (2004), pp. 182–186. The elements of co-perpetration as construed in the ICC are further analysed in Chap. 6.3.2.2.2 (Objective Commision (Actus Reus) for Joint Commision of a Crime).
52.
Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 220.
53.
Ibid., para. 222.
54.
See: Chap. 6.4.3.5 (Complicity in Group Crime Under Article 25 (3) (d) of the Rome Statute).
55.
Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 185.
56.
ICTY Statute, Article 1.
57.
Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 189.
58.
Ibid., para. 190.
59.
Ibid.
60.
Ibid.
61.
Ibid.
62.
Ibid.
63.
Ibid., para. 192.
64.
Ibid., para. 220.
65.
Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 227.
66.
Ibid., para. 228.
67.
For more, see: Badar and Marchuk (2013), § 3.6.3 (Dolus Eventualis as the Lowest Threshold for Intentional Crimes).
68.
Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 530; Prosecutor v Brđanin (IT-99-36-T), Decision on Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98bis, 28 November 2003, para. 57.
69.
Van Sliedregt (2007) at 203.
70.
Schabas (2009), p. 355.
71.
Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 102; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 75 (“[T]he acts of a participant in a joint criminal enterprise are more serious than those of an aider and abettor since a participant in a joint criminal enterprise shares the intent of the principal offender whereas an aider and abettor need only be aware of that intent”).
72.
Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
73.
Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 102.
74.
Kvočka Appeal Judgement, para. 97 (emphasis added).
75.
Ibid., para. 90.
76.
Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, Case No: IT-95-17/1, Indictment, 2 November 1995, paras 13–14.
77.
Prosecutor v Anto Furundžija, Case No: IT-95-17/1-PT, Amended Indictment, 2 June 1998, paras 16, 25–26.
78.
Ibid., para. 25.
79.
Ibid., para. 26.
80.
Furundžija Trial Judgement, para. 216.
81.
Ibid.
82.
Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 115 (original footnote omitted).
83.
Ibid.
84.
Ibid., para. 120.
85.
Prosecutor v Miroslav Kvočka, Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-98-30/1-PT, 26 October 2000, para. 19.
86.
Ibid., para. 6.
87.
Ibid., para. 9.
88.
Kvočka Trial Judgement, para. 397 (original footnote omitted).
89.
Ibid., para. 406.
90.
Ibid., para. 403 which reads: “[E]ven if a knowing participant in a criminal enterprise was unwilling to resign because it would prejudice his career, or he feared he would be sent to the front lines, imprisoned, or punished, the Trial Chamber emphasised that this did not serve as an excuse or a defence to criminal liability for participating in war crimes or crimes against humanity”.
91.
Ibid., para. 404.
92.
Ibid., para. 405.
93.
Ibid., para. 407.
94.
Ibid., para. 408.
95.
Kvočka Trial Judgement, paras 426–427.
96.
Ibid., para. 431 (original footnote omitted).
97.
Ibid., para. 439.
98.
Ibid., para. 456.
99.
Ibid., para. 457.
100.
Ibid., para. 463.
101.
Ibid., para. 464.
102.
Ibid., paras 475–476.
103.
Ibid., para. 485.
104.
Ibid., para. 489.
105.
Ibid., para. 496.
106.
Ibid., para. 499.
107.
Ibid., para. 500.
108.
Ibid., para. 517.
109.
Ibid., para. 518.
110.
Ibid., para. 538.
111.
Ibid., para. 546.
112.
Ibid., para. 566.
113.
Ibid., para. 610.
114.
Ibid., para. 672.
115.
Ibid., para. 681.
116.
Ibid., para. 682.
117.
Kvočka Appeal Judgement, para. 54.
118.
Ibid., para. 84 referring to Kvočka Trial Judgment, para. 268.
119.
Ibid., para. 86.
120.
Ibid., para. 99 (original footnote omitted).
121.
Ibid., para. 100 referring to the Appellants’ arguments in Kvočka Appeal Brief, paras 163–164 (“Kvočka did not have any important position in the camp. He had no authority and influence over guards”); Prcać Appeal Brief, paras 348, 352; Radić Appeal Brief, paras 57, 61–62 (“[T]he Trial Chamber erroneously objectifies existence of joint criminal enterprise and it mistakenly takes (sic) that if Omarska is a joint criminal enterprise it automatically means that the shift leader of the guard must be the co-perpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise, without finding it necessary to establish individual circumstance of possible involvement of the accused”); Radić Reply Brief, para. 36 (“[T]he authority is the key factor with which to determine the contribution to the joint criminal enterprise”).
122.
Ibid., para. 101. See also: Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 96.
123.
Ibid., para. 105 (original footnote omitted).
124.
Ibid., para. 106. In the same vein, see: Jelesić Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 269; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 102.
125.
Ibid. See also: Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 100.
126.
Ibid., para 115 (original footnotes omitted).
127.
Kvočka Appeal Judgement para. 118. See also: Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 97.
128.
Prosecutor v Milomir Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-PT, Fourth Amended Indictment, 10 April 2002, para. 16.
129.
Ibid., paras 18–19.
130.
Ibid., para. 23.
131.
Ibid., para. 26.
132.
Ibid., para. 26. See also: paras 25, 27–29. The Trial Chamber noted that “[t]he Prosecution pleaded all three categories of joint criminal enterprise in relation to all the Counts charged in the Indictment” (Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 427).
133.
Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 438.
134.
Ibid.
135.
Ibid., para. 439.
136.
Ibid., para. 440.
137.
For more, see: Roxin (2006b), pp. 277–282.
138.
Ibid., p. 278 (“Der Beteiligte kann allein nichts ausrichten […] nur wenn der Komplice mitmacht, funktioniert der Plan”). The author brings forward an example of bank robbery where none of the parties are able to achieve the result unless each person performs his assigned role. The intimidation of bank employees with a gun by one of the participants does not actually result in bank robbery, since the contribution of another party is required to accomplish the crime.
139.
Ibid. (“Sie konnen nur, indem sie gemeinsam handeln, ihren Plan verwirklichen, aber jeder einzelne kann, indem er seinen Tatbeitrag zuruckzieht, den Gesamtplan zunichtemachen. Insofern hat er die Tat in der Hand”).
140.
Ibid. (“Diese Art der” Schlusselstellung “jedes Beteiligten umschreibt genau die Struktur der Mittäterschaft”).
141.
Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 441 (original footnote omitted).
142.
Ibid.
143.
Ibid., para. 442.
144.
Ibid., para. 469.
145.
Ibid., paras 470–471.
146.
Ibid., paras 472–477.
147.
Ibid., paras 478–489.
148.
Ibid., paras 490–491.
149.
Ibid., paras 492–494.
150.
Ibid., para. 496.
151.
Ibid., paras 497–498.
152.
Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 62.
153.
Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 62 citing in support Kvočka Appeal Judgement, para. 79; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 95; Krstić Appeal Judgement, paras 79–134; Ojdanić Decision on Jurisdiction, paras 20, 43; Furundžija Appeal Judgement, para. 119; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement paras 29–32; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 366; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 220; Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, Case No: IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Form of Further Amended Indictment and Prosecution Application to Amend, 26 June 2001, para. 24; Babić Judgement on Sentencing Appeal, paras 27, 38, 40.
154.
Ibid., paras 73–85.
155.
Ibid., para. 98.
156.
Ibid., paras 99–103 (original footnote omitted).
157.
Chapter 6.3.2 (Modes of Principal Liability in the International Criminal Court).
158.
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Third Amended Indictment, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 27 February 2009, para. 2.
159.
Ibid., para. 3.
160.
Ibid., para. 5.
161.
Ibid., para. 6.
162.
Ibid., paras 9–14.
163.
Ibid., paras 15–19.
164.
Ibid., paras 20–24.
165.
Ibid., paras 25–29.
166.
Ibid., para. 8.
167.
Prosecutor v Radovan Karadžić, Decision on Six Preliminary Motions Challenging Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-95-5/18-PT, 28 April 2009 (“Karadžić Jurisdiction Decision”).
168.
Ibid., para. 33.
169.
Ibid., paras 33, 45.
170.
Ibid., para. 56.
171.
Ibid., para. 55.
172.
Indictment para. 10; Karadžić Jurisdiction Decision, paras 50, 56.
173.
Karadžić Jurisdiction Decision, para. 57.
174.
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion Appealing Trial Chamber’s Decision on JCE III Foreseeability (“Jurisdiction Appeal Decision), Case No. IT-95-5/18-AR72.4, 25 June 2009, para. 7.
175.
Ibid. (original footnote omitted).
176.
Ibid., para. 9.
177.
Ibid., para. 18.
178.
Ibid., para. 30.
179.
Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 101; Brđanin Appeal Judgement, paras 365, 411; Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 65; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 33; Martić Appeal Judgement, para. 168; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 32; Kvočka Appeal Judgement, para. 83.
180.
Karadžić Jurisdiction Appeal Decision, paras 18–19.
181.
Prosecutor v. Radovan Karadžić, Decision on Accused’s Motion to Strike JCE III Allegations as to Specific Intent Crimes, Case No IT-95-5/18-T, 8 April 2011, para. 2.
182.
Ibid.
183.
Ibid., para. 3 (original footnote omitted).
184.
Ibid., para. 4 (original footnote omitted).
185.
Ibid., para. 5 (original footnote omitted).
186.
The Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngirumpatse, Joseph Nzirorera, André Rwamakuba, Decision on the Preliminary Motions by the Defence of Joseph Nzirorera, Édouard Karemera, André Rwamakuba and Mathieu Ngirumpatse Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Joint Criminal Enterprise (“Karemera JCE Decision”), Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, 11 May 2004.
187.
Ibid., paras 1–6, 13–17.
188.
Ibid., paras 21–25.
189.
Ibid., paras 26–30.
190.
Ibid., para. 33.
191.
Ibid., para. 35.
192.
Ibid., para. 36.
193.
Ibid., paras 46–48.
194.
Seromba Trial Judgement, para. 312.
195.
Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 156 (original footnote omitted).
196.
Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, paras 59–61.
197.
Seromba Appeal Judgement, para. 171.
198.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Liu, para. 1.
199.
Ibid., para. 2.
200.
Ibid., para. 5.
201.
Ibid., para. 6.
202.
Ibid., paras 8–9 referring to Stakić Appeal Judgement, para. 62.
203.
Ibid., para. 16.
204.
Ibid., para. 18.
205.
Ibid., paras 17–18.
206.
For more, see: Giustiniani (2008) at 783–799. The author heavily criticises the approach undertaken by the Seromba Appeals Chamber as having “a perverse effect on the application of a hierarchy among various forms of liability with commission being the gravest one”. In the opinion of this book’s author, the central role of the commission liability does not in any case diminish the importance of secondary liability, which organically complements available legal tools of attribution in international criminal law.
207.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Public Consequential Submission in Support of Urgent Defence Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of JCE, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T-446, 31 March 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Prosecution Response to the Defence Consequential Submission Regarding the Pleading of the JCE”, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T-463, 10 April 2008; Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Public Urgent Defence Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution's Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of JCE, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T-752, 27 February 2009.
208.
Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Indictment, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, 18 February 2005 (“AFRC Indictment”), para. 33.
209.
Ibid., para. 34.
210.
Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Trial Judgment (“AFRC Trial Judgment”), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-T, 20 June 2007, paras 66–70.
211.
Prosecution Appeal Brief, paras 393–394.
212.
Ibid., para. 386.
213.
Ibid., para. 388.
214.
Ibid., paras 389, 391.
215.
Prosecutor v. Alex Tamba Brima, Brima Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu, Appeal Judgement (“AFRC Appeal Judgement”), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, 22 February 2008, para. 71 citing in support Brima Response Brief, para. 68; Kamara Response Brief, para. 115.
216.
Ibid., citing in support Kanu Response Brief, para. 4.24.
217.
Ibid., para. 76.
218.
Ibid., para. 84.
219.
Schabas (2007a), p. 217.
220.
Taylor Trial Judgment, paras 6894–6900.
221.
Prosecution Opening Statement, Trial Transcript, p. 282.
222.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Defence Final Trial Brief, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T-1248, 23 May 2011, para. 737.
223.
Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Second Amended Indictment, Case No 03-01-T, 29 May 2007, para. 33. See also: Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Defence Notice of Appeal and Submissions Regarding the Majority Decision Concerning the Pleading of JCE in the Second Amended Indictment (“JCE Appeal Decision”), Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, 1 May 2009.
224.
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Urgent Defence Motion Regarding a Fatal Defect in the Prosecution’s Second Amended Indictment Relating to the Pleading of JCE, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, 14 December 2007, paras 25–26.
225.
JCE Appeal Decision, paras 15, 25 (original footnote omitted).
226.
AFRC Appeal Judgement, para. 80.
227.
Defence Final Brief, paras 52–58.
228.
Ibid., para. 55.
229.
Ibid., para. 59.
230.
Taylor Trial Judgment, para. 6900.
231.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras 326–341.
232.
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 348.
233.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras 326–341; Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, paras 480–486; Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, para. 210; Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, paras 346–348.
234.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford, 14 March 2012; Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-02/12), Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 18 December 2012.
235.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para. 327.
236.
Ibid., paras 328, 333.
237.
Ibid., para. 329. Pre-Trial Chamber I notes that the concept of JCE or common purpose doctrine encompasses the subjective criterion in order to distinguish between principals and accessories to a crime.
238.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras 326–341. See also: Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 348.
239.
Roxin (2006b), pp. 277–282 (Chapter II. Die Mittaterschaft als funktionelle Tatherrschaft/Co-Perpetration as the Functional Control over the Crime).
240.
Ibid., p. 278 (“Der Beteiligte kann allein nichts ausrichten […] nur wenn der Komplice mitmacht, funktioniert der Plan”). The author provides an example of bank robbery where none of the parties are able to achieve the result unless each person performs his assigned role. The intimidation of bank employees with a gun by one of the participants does not actually result in the crime, as the contribution of another party is required to accomplish the crime.
241.
Ibid., p. 278 (“Sie konnen nur, indem sie gemeinsam handeln, ihren Plan verwirklichen, aber jeder einzelne kann, indem er seinen Tatbeitrag zuruckzieht, den Gesamtplan zunichtemachen. Insofern hat er die Tat in der Hand”).
242.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para. 330.
243.
Ambos (2007) at 173, 183.
244.
Manacorda and Meloni (2011) at 171.
245.
Ohlin (2011) at 745.
246.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford, 14 March 2012, paras 6, 10.
247.
Ibid., para. 12.
248.
Ibid., para. 11.
249.
Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-02/12), Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 18 December 2012, para. 6.
250.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 490 (original footnote omitted).
251.
Ibid., para. 492.
252.
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, paras 286, 288.
253.
Ibid., para. 289.
254.
Ibid.
255.
Ibid., paras 299, 302.
256.
Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 298.
257.
Statement by ICC Prosecutor on the notice to withdraw charges against Mr Muthaura, retrieved on 11 March 2013. http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/OTP-statement-11-03-2013.aspx.
258.
Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 4 March 2009, paras 212–216.
259.
Ibid., para. 222 (original footnote omitted).
260.
Ibid., para. 223. The Pre-Trial Chamber established reasonable grounds to believe that the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity were directly committed as part of the GoS (Government of Sudan) counter-insurgency campaign, by members of GoS forces, including the Sudanese Armed Forces and their allied Janjaweed Militia, the Sudanese Police Forces, the NISS (National Intelligence and Security Services) and the HAC (Humanitarian Aid Commission).
261.
Ibid., Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka, para. 104 (original footnote omitted).
262.
Gaddafi (ICC-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, 27 June 2011.
263.
Gaddafi (ICC-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest for Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 27 June 2011. The last arrest warrant was issued against Abdullah Al-Senussi, former Head of the Military Intelligence, who allegedly used his powers over the military forces, commanded the forces in Benghazi and directly instructed the troops to attack civilians during the uprising (indirect co-perpetrator within the meaning of Article 25 (3) (a) of the Rome Statute). See: Al-Senussi (ICC-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Warrant of Arrest for Abdullah Al-Senussi, 27 June 2011.
264.
Gaddafi (ICC-01/11-01/11), State Representatives, Application on behalf of the Government of Libya pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute, 1 May 2012.
265.
Gbagbo (ICC-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber III, Warrant of Arrest For Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, 23 November 2011, para. 10.
266.
Van Der Wilt (2009) at 312.
267.
Baumann et al. (2003), p. 670
268.
Roxin (2006b), p. 244.
269.
Kosachenko (2009), pp. 336–337.
270.
Simester and Sullivan (2007), pp. 197–199.
271.
Jessberger and Geneuss (2008) at 866; Cryer et al. (2007), p. 303.
272.
Baumann et al. (2003), p. 670. See also: Kosachenko (2009), pp. 336–337.
273.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 499 (emphasis added).
274.
Van Sliedregt (2003a), p. 71.
275.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 498 citing in support Roxin (1963), pp. 193–207; Ambos (2005), p. 240.
276.
Ibid., para. 502 (original footnote omitted).
277.
Jerusalem District Court, The Attorney General v. Eichmann, Case No. 40/61, Judgement, 36 I.L.R. 5-14, 18-276, 12 December 1961, para. 197.
278.
Gacumbitsi Appeal Judgement, Separate Opinion of Judge Schomburg, paras 14–22; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 439.
279.
Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-02/12), Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 18 December 2012, paras 52–57.
280.
For critical appraisal of the concept of Organisationsherrshaft and its relevance for the ICC, see: Weigend (2011) at 109–110.
281.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 512.
282.
The “control over the organisation” element was inferred from the dominant position of the suspect (Mr. Ruto) who directed the organisation (“Network”) in the commission of crimes against its political opponents. See: Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 316. In the Muthaura decision, the Pre-Trial Chamber preliminary established to the requisite threshold that Mr. Muthaura and Mr. Kenyatta gained control over the Mungiki organisation for the purposes of the commission of the crimes charged. See: Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 408.
283.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 514 referring to Roxin (2006b), p. 245; BGHSt 40, 218 at 236.
284.
Roxin (2006b), p. 245 (“Der für die Begründung der Willensherrschaft in solchen Fällen entscheidende Faktor, der sie als eine gegenüber der Nötigungs- und Irrtumsherrschaft deutlich abgegrenzten dritte form mittelbarer Täterschaft erscheinen läßt, liegt also in der Fungibilität des Ausführenden”).
285.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 515 (original footnote omitted).
286.
Ibid., para. 516 (original footnote omitted).
287.
Ibid. (original footnote omitted).
288.
Roxin (2006b), p. 245 (“Der Ausführende ist, so wenig an seiner Handlungsherrschaft gerüttelt werden kann, doch gleichzeitig nur ein in jedem Augenblick ersetzbares Rädchen im Getriebe des Machtapparates, und diese doppelte Perspektive rückt den Hintermann neben ihn ins Zentrum des Geschehens”).
289.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, paras 516, 518.
290.
Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 409.
291.
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, paras 317, 320–332.
292.
Ormerod and Hooper (2009), pp. 295–296. For more, see: LaFave (2003a), p. 510.
293.
Supreme Court of Serbia, Sinan Morina, Case No. Kz. I RZ 1/08, 2nd Instance Verdict, 3 March 2009, p. 4; Belgrade District Court, Anton Lekaj, Case No. K.V. 4/05, 1st Instance Verdict, 18 Sept. 2006, p. 34.
294.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras 341–342 (original footnotes omitted).
295.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 521.
296.
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 350. In the same vein, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras 343–348; Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, paras 522–526; Stakić Trial Judgment, paras 440, 470–491.
297.
Ashworth (2009), p. 420; Ormerod and Hooper (2009), p. 341.
298.
See: German Criminal Code, section 25(2); Russian Criminal Code, Article 33(2).
299.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para. 344. The Pre-Trial Chamber also held that the “existence of the common plan” is satisfied (i) when perpetrators agreed to start to implement the common plan to achieve a non-criminal goal, and to commit crimes if certain conditions arise; and (ii) co-perpetrators are aware of the risk that implementing the common plan will result in the commission of the crime and accept such an outcome.
300.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para. 345; Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 301.
301.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 984.
302.
Ibid., para. 985.
303.
Kvočka Appeal Judgment, para. 46.
304.
Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Fourth Amended Indictment”, IT-04-84bis-PT, 21 January 201, para. 24.
305.
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 302. The same element of the common plan is pertinent to an accomplice form of liability under Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute.
306.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 525. In the same vein, Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, para. 347.
307.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 526; Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 308.
308.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 526; Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 310.
309.
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 311.
310.
Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, paras 404–406.
311.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 937.
312.
Ibid., para. 948.
313.
Ibid., para. 949 (original footnote omitted).
314.
Ibid., paras 950–955.
315.
Ibid., para. 994.
316.
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Prosecution’s submissions on the law of indirect co-perpetration under Article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute and application for notice to be given under regulation 55 (2) with respect to the accused’s individual criminal responsibility, ICC-01/09-02/11-444, 3 July 2012.
317.
Ibid., para. 12.
318.
Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, Defence Response to the “Prosecution’s submissions on the law of indirect co-perpetration under Article 25 (3) (a) of the Statute and application for notice to be given under regulation 55 (2) with respect to the accused’s individual criminal responsibility”, ICC-01/09-02/11-460, 25 July 2012, para. 3.
319.
Ibid., para. 36.
320.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 999.
321.
Ibid., paras 1000–1001.
322.
Ashworth (2009), p. 406.
323.
US Model Penal Code, § 2.06(7).
324.
People v. McCoy et al., 25 June 2001, 24 P.3d 1210, 1215-16.
325.
Russian Criminal Code, Article 34 (1).
326.
Brilliantov (2010), p. 109.
327.
German Criminal Code, § 29.
328.
Ambos (2012) at 142–143.
329.
Ngudjolo (ICC-01/04-02/12), Judgement pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 18 December 2012, paras 28, 30.
330.
Ambos in Cryer and Bekou (2004), p. 22.
331.
Badar and Marchuk (2013), § 3.6 (Intent).
332.
Pursuant to § 1.13(9) of the US Model Penal Code, an “element of an offence” means such conduct, attendant circumstances or results as is included in the description of the offence; or establishes the required kind of culpability; or negatives an excuse or justification for such conduct; or negatives a defence under the statute of limitations; or establishes jurisdiction or venue.
333.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras 351–352. Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 357 (original footnotes omitted). See also: Badar and Marchuk (2013), § 3.6 (Intent).
334.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 29 January 2007, paras 349–360.
335.
Ibid., paras 361–365.
336.
Ibid., paras 366–367.
337.
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, paras 351, 370. In the same vein, Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 533; Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 410.
338.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 1012.
339.
Ibid.
340.
Mr. Lubanga was charged with enlisting, conscripting of children under the age of 15 years into armed forces and using them to participate actively in hostilities (Article (8) (2) (e) (vii) of the Rome Statute).
341.
Lubanga (ICC-01/04-01/06), Trial Chamber I, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 14 March 2012, para. 1013.
342.
Ambos (2012) at 149.
343.
Principles of the Nuremberg Charter and Judgment Formulated by the ILC, GA Res. 177A (II), Principle VII.
344.
For more, see: Report of the ILC on Its Second Session, 5 June to 29 July 1950, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Session, Supplement, No. 12 UN Doc. A/1316, Principle VII, pp. 377–378.
345.
Law. No. 10 of the Allied Control Council, Article 2(2).
346.
Perkins and Boyce (1982), pp. 766–769.
347.
Trial of Bruno Tesch and Two Others (The Zyklon B Case), British Military Court, reprinted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Vol. I, London: HMSO, 1947. p. 102.
348.
Ibid. Pleading in mitigation of sentence, counsel for Tesch submitted that although the defendant knew the use to which the gas was being put, and had consented to it, this happened only under enormous pressure from the S.S. In his evaluation, Tesch was merely an accessory before the fact, and even so, an unimportant one. Counsel for Weinbacher pleaded that in his capacity of a business employee the defendant might have thought that the ultimate use of the gas was Tesch’s responsibility; and that if he had refused to supply Zyklon B the S.S. would immediately have handed him over to the Gestapo. For duress as a defence in international criminal law, see: Chap. 7.4 (Duress and Necessity).
349.
United States v. Krauch and Twenty Two Others (The I.G. Farben Trial), United States Military Tribunal, reprinted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Volume X, London: HMSO, 1949, p. 24. The defendants were all officials of I.G. Farben, a large German conglomerate of chemical companies. Out of twenty four defendants, ten were acquitted on all counts. The thirteen convicted, including Carl Krauch, were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from seven to one and a half years.
350.
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries, text adopted by the ILC at its forty-eighth session, 6 May-26 July 1996, Article 2(3). The same legal provision also proscribes “attempts to commit a crime”.
351.
Ibid., p. 21 (12).
352.
Ibid., p. 21 (11).
353.
Ibid.
354.
Ibid.
355.
Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 531.
356.
Tadić Trial Judgment, para. 688.
357.
Ibid., para. 674.
358.
Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 480; Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 279; Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 386; Krstić Trial Judgment, para. 601.
359.
Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 473. The finding was also reaffirmed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber, see: Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26.
360.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26.
361.
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries, text adopted by the ILC at its forty-eighth session, 6 May-26 July 1996, Article 2(3), p. 21 (13).
362.
“Planner” is termed as “organiser” (организатор) in Russian criminal law. His role presupposes the organisation of the commission of crime(s); establishment of a criminal organisation; overall direction of the commission of crime(s) or activities of the criminal organisation etc. “Organiser” always acts with direct intent. See: Raroga (2010), pp. 209–211.
363.
Ashworth (2009), pp. 453–457. The author clarifies that the rationale behind the assignment of the highest mens rea standard to the crime of conspiracy is rooted in the nature of inchoate crimes, which are an extension of criminal sanction to more remote offences. This, according to him, calls for attribution of the higher degree of fault to justify criminalisation.
364.
LaFave (2003a), pp. 467, 471.
365.
Mettraux (2005), p. 244.
366.
Ibid.
367.
Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 268; Stakić Trial Judgement, para. 443; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 269.
368.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 26.
369.
Ibid.
370.
Bagilishema Trial Judgment, para. 30.
371.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 29, 31.
372.
Semanza Trial Judgment, para. 381; Ndindabahizi Trial Judgment, para. 456; Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgment, para. 386.
373.
StGB § 26 (Anstiftung) reads: “Als Anstifter wird gleich einem Täter bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einen anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat bestimmt ist”.
374.
Article 33 (4) of the Russian Criminal Code provides: “Подстрекателем признается лицо, склонившее другое лицо к совершению преступления путем уговора, подкупа, угрозы или другим способом”.
375.
Simester and Sullivan (2007), pp. 270–271. In English criminal law, incitement is treated as an inchoate crime.
376.
Ashworth (2009), pp. 457–463.
377.
Simester and Sullivan (2007), pp. 277–278.
378.
LaFave (2003b), p. 569.
379.
Ibid., p. 573.
380.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Akayesu Trial Judgment, paras 481–482; Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para. 38; Musema Trial Judgment, para. 120.
381.
Akayesu Appeal Judgment, para. 482; Kajelijeli Trial Judgement, para. 762.
382.
Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 534.
383.
Harun et al., (ICC-02/05-01/07), Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58(7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, para. 90 (original footnote omitted).
384.
Kony (ICC-02/04-01/05), Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony, 8 July 2005 as amended on 27 September 2005, paras 10, 42. An overview of charges levied against other suspects in the situation in Uganda may be found at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc%200204%200105/Pages/uganda.aspx.
385.
Otti (ICC-02/04), Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti, 8 July 2005, paras 10, 13.
386.
Schabas (2010), p. 433.
387.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 27; Gagumbitsi Appeal Judgement, para. 129.
388.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 29, 32.
389.
Blaškić Trial Judgment, para. 278; Bagilsihema Trial Judgment, para. 31.
390.
Cassese et al. (2002), p. 797.
391.
Ibid.
392.
In Russian criminal law, see: Raroga (2010), pp. 212–213; Kosachenko (2009), p. 344. In German criminal law, see: Baumann et al. (2003), p. 719.
393.
Kosachenko (2009), p. 343.
394.
Baumann et al. (2003), p. 731.
395.
Katanga et al. (ICC-01/04-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 30 September 2008, para. 517.
396.
LaFave (2003b), p. 569.
397.
Krstić Trial Judgment, para. 601; Rutaganda Trial Judgment, para. 39; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 28.
398.
Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, para. 28.
399.
1996 ILC Commentary, Article 2 (3) (b), at 20 (8).
400.
Blaškić Trial Judgment, para. 281.
401.
Ibid., para. 282.
402.
Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 176; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 361; Kamuhanda Appeal Judgement, para. 75.
403.
Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 515; Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 270.
404.
Strugar Trial Judgement, para. 332; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 273.
405.
Cassese et al. (2002), p. 797.
406.
1996 ILC Commentary, Article 2 (3) (b), at 20 (8).
407.
Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 282.
408.
Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 42; Galić Appeal Judgement, para. 152; Kordić and Čerkez Appeal Judgement, paras 29–30.
409.
Elliott and Quinn (2008), pp. 273–275.
410.
LaFave (2003a), p. 519.
411.
Akayesu Trial Judgment, para. 484.
412.
Blagojević Appeal Judgement, para. 127; Simić Appeal Judgement, paras 85–86; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 102; Blaškič Appeal Judgement, para. 45; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 229 (emphasis added).
413.
Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 48.
414.
Blagojević Trial Judgement, para. 731.
415.
CDF Appeal Judgement, para. 72.
416.
Orić Appeal Judgement, para. 43.
417.
Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 273; Orić Appeal Judgement, para. 42; Kayishema Appeal Judgement, paras 201–202.
418.
Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 337.
419.
Mrkšić and Šljivančanin Appeal Judgement, paras 97, 101; Orić Appeal Judgement, para. 43.
420.
Schabas (2010), p. 435.
421.
Brđanin Appeal Judgement, para. 484; Blaškič Appeal Judgement, para. 49; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 102; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 162; Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
422.
Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 518; Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 328; Tadić Trial Judgement, para. 676.
423.
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 162; Furundžija Trial Judgement, para. 245; Limaj Trial Judgement, para. 518; Brđanin Trial Judgement, para. 273; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 392.
424.
Furundžija Tria1 Judgment, para. 249; Musema Trial Judgment, para. 126; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 391.
425.
Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 229.
426.
Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgement, para. 501; Krstić Appeal Judgement, para. 140; Vasiljević Appeal Judgement, para. 142; Krnojelac Appeal Judgement, para. 52; Semanza Appeal Judgement, para. 316.
427.
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 162.
428.
Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 50; Simić Appeal Judgement, para. 86 (emphasis added).
429.
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 289.
430.
Cassese et al. (2002), p. 801.
431.
Ibid., p. 802.
432.
Tadić Appeal Judgement, para. 222.
433.
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 282 (original footnotes omitted).
434.
Harun et al., (ICC-02/05-01/07), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Prosecution Application under Article 58 (7) of the Statute, 27 April 2007, para. 76.
435.
Ibid., para. 88.
436.
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 291.
437.
Ibid., para. 292.
438.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sanji Mmasenono Monageng, para. 43.
439.
Ibid., para. 47.
440.
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 16 December 2011 entitled “Decision on the confirmation of charges”, 30 May 2012, para. 59 (original footnote omitted).
441.
Ibid., para. 60 (original footnote omitted).
442.
Ibid., paras 61–62 (original footnotes omitted).
443.
Ibid., para. 65.
444.
Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, para. 15.
445.
Ibid., para. 5.
446.
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 367.
447.
Muthaura et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, paras 420–427.
448.
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 271 (original footnote omitted).
449.
Ibid., para. 273 citing in Cassese (2008), p. 213.
450.
Ibid., paras 273–275.
451.
Ibid., para. 276.
452.
Ibid., para. 277 (original footnote omitted).
453.
Ibid., paras 278–279.
454.
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 354.
455.
Ibid.
456.
Ibid., para. 355.
457.
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 287 (emphasis added).
458.
Ibid., para. 288.
459.
Ibid., para. 289.
460.
Ruto et al. (ICC-01/09-01/11), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 23 January 2012, para. 364.
461.
Mbarushimana (ICC-01/04-01/10), Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 16 December 2011, para. 289.
462.
Cassese et al. (2002), p. 803.
463.
Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 290; Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 343; Kayishema Trial Judgement, para. 209.
464.
Martinez (2007) at 639.
465.
Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, United States Military Commission, Manila (8^th October-7^th December 1945), and the Supreme Court of the United States, Judgement, 4^th February 1946 (327 US 1, 66 S.Ct. 340, 90 L.ed. 499 (1946)), reprinted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Vol. IV, London: HMSO, 1948 at 35.
466.
Ibid., at 28–29.
467.
Ibid., at 35.
468.
Ibid., at 37.
469.
Ibid., at 43. The US Supreme Court invoked Article 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, Article 19 of the Hague Convention No. X, Article 26 of the 1929 Geneva Convention (for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armies in the field) and Article 43 of the Regulations annexed to The Hague Convention No. IV.
470.
Ibid.
471.
Ibid.
472.
Ibid.
473.
Ibid.
474.
Ibid.
475.
Judge Rutledge appended a dissenting opinion in which he contested the general’s conviction in the absence of proof of knowledge with respect to the crimes committed by his subordinates. See: ibid., at 59–61.
476.
Mettraux (2009), p. 8.
477.
United States v. List and Others (Hostage case), United States Military Tribunals sitting at Nuremberg, reprinted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Vol. VIII, London: HMSO, 1949.
478.
Ibid., at 89.
479.
Ibid. (emphasis added).
480.
Ibid., at 70.
481.
Ibid.
482.
United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., (High Command Case), United States Military Tribunal sitting in Nuremberg, reprinted in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, Selected and Prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, Vol. XII, London: HMSO, 1949.
483.
Ibid., at 75.
484.
Ibid.
485.
Ibid., at 75.
486.
Ibid., at 77.
487.
Bonafe (2007) at 612.
488.
ICTY Statute, Article 7 (3); ICTR Statute, Article 6 (3).
489.
Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 72; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 92; Kvočka Trial Judgement, para. 314; Krstić Trial Judgement, para. 604; Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 401; Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 395; Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 294.
490.
Article 28 of the Rome Statute reads:
1. (a)
  A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
  
  (i)
  That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
  
  (ii)
  That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
491.
Article 28 of the Rome Statute continues:
1. (b)
  With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
  
  (i)
  The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
  
  (ii)
  The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and control of the superior; and
  
  (iii)
  The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
492.
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 406.
493.
Ibid., para. 429. See also: Saland in Lee (1999), p. 206.
494.
Ibid., para. 407.
495.
Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 370.
496.
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 196–198.
497.
Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 378; Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 69.
498.
Kunarac Trial Judgement, paras 399, 628. The Trial Chamber found that the Prosecutor failed to prove that Kunarac exercised effective control over the soldiers (which were under his command on a temporary ad hoc basis) at the time they committed the offences.
499.
Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 354.
500.
Blaškić Trial Judgement, paras 300–301.
501.
Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 69; Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, para. 76.
502.
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 408 (original footnote omitted).
503.
Ibid., para. 409.
504.
Ibid., para. 412.
505.
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 222; Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 383.
506.
Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, paras 427–428; Čelebići Trial Judgement, paras 383, 386.
507.
Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, paras 427–428.
508.
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, paras 223–226.
509.
Mettraux (2009), p. 199.
510.
Akayesu Trial Judgement, paras 488–489.
511.
Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 322.
512.
Blaškić Appellant’s Brief, p. 136
513.
Ibid.
514.
Ibid., pp. 136–139.
515.
Blaškić Appeal Judgement, para. 62; Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 226.
516.
Orić Trial Judgement, para. 293; Halilović Trial Judgement, para. 54.
517.
Nerlich (2007) at 682. See also: Meloni (2007) at 633–637.
518.
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 427.
519.
Ibid., para. 427 citing for the opposite viewpoint the latest ICTY and SCSL jurisprudence, inter alia, Orić Appeal Judgment, paras 57–60; Milutinović Trial Judgment, para. 120; RUF Trial Judgement, para. 309.
520.
Akayesu Trial Judgement, para. 691.
521.
Kayishema Trial Judgement, paras 473–475.
522.
Mettraux (2009), pp. 226–228.
523.
Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 335; Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 395; Schabas (2009), p. 363.
524.
Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 443; Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 335; Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 395; Blaškić Appeal Judgment, para. 72.
525.
Čelebići Appeal Judgement, para. 226; Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 95.
526.
Kordić and Čerkez Trial Judgement, para. 446; Blaškić Trial Judgement, para. 302.
527.
Čelebići Trial Judgement, para. 394.
528.
Bemba (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, 15 June 2009, para. 437 citing in support Delić Trial Judgment, para. 72.
529.
Ibid., para. 439 (original footnote omitted).
530.
Ibid. (original footnote omitted).
531.
Ibid., para. 440.
532.
Schabas (2009), p. 365.

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Faculty of Law, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark
Iryna Marchuk

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Marchuk, I. (2014). Modalities of Criminal Liability in the Jurisprudence of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals. In: The Fundamental Concept of Crime in International Criminal Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28246-1_6

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