Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Mental Element Requirement

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability

  • 677 Accesses

Abstract

The modern structure of the mental element requirement has been widely accepted by most modern legal systems. This structure applies the fundamental principle of culpability in criminal law (nullum crimen sine culpa). The principle of culpability has two main aspects: positive and negative. The positive aspect (what needs to be in the offender’s mind in order to impose criminal liability) relates to the mental element, whereas the negative aspect (what should not be in the offender’s mind in order to impose criminal liability) relates to the general defenses. For example, imposition of criminal liability for manslaughter requires recklessness as mental element, but it also requires that the offender not be insane. Recklessness is part of the positive aspect of culpability, and the general defense of insanity is part of the negative aspect.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    For the fundamental principles of criminal law see above at paragraph 1.1.2.1.

  2. 2.

    Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 157–158, 202 (5th ed., 2006).

  3. 3.

    G.R. Sullivan, Knowledge, Belief, and Culpability, Criminal Law Theory—Doctrines of the General Part 207, 214 (Stephen Shute and A.P. Simester eds., 2005); Sunair Holidays, [1973] 2 All E.R. 1233, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1105; Beckett v. Cohen, [1973] 1 All E.R. 120, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1593. Compare: Stephen Shute, Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law, Criminal Law Theory—Doctrines of the General Part 171 (Stephen Shute and A.P. Simester eds., 2005).

  4. 4.

    Hans-Heinrich Jescheck und Thomas Weigend, Lehrbuch des Strafrechts—Allgemeiner Teil 297–300 (5 Auf., 1996).

  5. 5.

    See e.g., article 2.02(5) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 22 (1962, 1985), which provides: “When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly or recklessly. When recklessness suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts purposely”.

  6. 6.

    For the substantive provisions of mens rea see below at paragraph 5.3.1. For the substantive provisions of negligence see below at paragraph 5.3.2. For the substantive provisions of strict liability see below at paragraph 5.3.3.

  7. 7.

    Evans v. Bartlam, [1937] A.C. 473, 479, [1937] 2 All E.R. 646; Saik, [2006] U.K.H.L. 18, [2007] 1 A.C. 18; Da Silva, [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1654, [2006] 4 All E.R. 900, [2006] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 517; United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913 (2006); United States v. Ramon-Rodriguez, 492 F.3d 930 (2007); United States v. Murrieta-Bejerano, 552 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140 (2nd Cir. 1980); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir.1984); State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 376 S.E.2d 745 (1989); State v. LaFreniere, 240 Neb. 258, 481 N.W.2d 412 (1992); State v. Lewis, 263 Kan. 843, 953 P.2d 1016 (1998); Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Childress, 364 Md. 48, 770 A.2d 685 (2001); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Aguilar, 80 F.3d 329 (9th Cir.1996); United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Ladish Malting Co., 135 F.3d 484 (7th Cir.1998); United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916 (5th Cir.1998); United States v. Shannon, 137 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir.1998); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250 (3rd Cir.2000); United States v. Delreal-Ordonez, 213 F.3d 1263 (2000); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.1976); United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.1990); Robin Charlow, Wilful Ignorance and Criminal Culpability, 70 Texas L. Rev. 1351 (1992); Rollin M. Perkins, “Knowledge” as a Mens Rea Requirement, 29 Hastings L.J. 953 (1978).

  8. 8.

    See e.g., in Britain: article 8 of the Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c.80: “A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,- (a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of his actions by reason only of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions; but (b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear proper in the circumstances” (emphasis not in original); Skellett, (2004) S.C. 351; Robbins, [2004] E.W.H.C. 3373; Elm Milk Ltd., [2006] E.W.C.A. 164, [2006] I.C.R. 880, [2006] S.T.C. 792; Shaw, [2006] E.W.H.C. 3699, [2007] S.T.C. 1525; in Australia: Schonewille, [1998] 2 V.R. 625; Hannes, (2000) 36 A.C.S.R. 72, [2000] N.S.W.C.C.A. 503; Grant, [2002] N.S.W. 228; Collins, [2007] F.C.A.F.C. 152; in New Zealand: Cottle, [1958] N.Z.L.R. 999; Noel, [1960] N.Z.L.R. 212; Kamipeli, [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 610; in Canada: Hines, [2007] O.J. 539; Walker, [2007] S.J. 184, [2007] S.K.C.A. 48; Giroux, [2007] B.C.J. 2206; Khun-Khun, [2007] B.C.J. 2902, [2007] B.C.S.C. 1916; and in the United States: State v. Pereira, 72 Conn. App. 545, 805 A.2d 787 (2002); Thompson v. United States, 348 F.Supp.2d 398 (2005); Virgin Islands v. Joyce, 210 F. App. 208 (2006).

  9. 9.

    Sayce v. Coupe, [1953] 1 Q.B. 1, [1952] 2 All E.R. 715, [1952] W.N. 473; Chandler v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1964] A.C. 763, [1962] 3 All E.R. 142, [1962] 3 W.L.R. 694, 46 Cr. App. Rep. 347; Director of Public Prosecutions v. Majewski, [1977] A.C. 443, [1976] 2 All E.R. 142, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 623, 62 Cr. App. Rep. 262, 140 J.P. 315, 100 L.Q.R. 639; Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1975] A.C. 55, [1974] 2 All E.R. 41, [1974] 2 W.L.R. 607, 59 Cr. App. Rep. 91, 138 J.P. 374; Moloney, [1985] A.C. 905; Woollin, [1999] A.C. 82, [1998] 4 All E.R. 103, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 382, [1998] Crim. L.R. 890, [1997] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 97; State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 612 A.2d 923 (1992); State v. Smith, 170 Wis.2d 701, 490 N.W.2d 40 (App.1992); State v. Stewart, 663 A.2d 912 (R.I.1995); Article 2.02(2)(b)(ii) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 21 (1962, 1985) provides: “if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result”; Article 18(b)(ii) of The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, Vol. 1—Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill 51 (Law. Com. No. 177, 1989) provides: "'intentionally' with respect to—…(ii) a result when he acts either in order to bring it about or being aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events;"; Nicola Lacey, In(de)terminable Intentions, 58 Mod. L. Rev. 692 (1995); Cathleen M. Kaveny, Inferring Intention from Foresight, 120 L. Q. Rev. 81 (2004); Glanville Williams, Oblique Intention, 46 Camb. L. Rev. 417 (1987); Antony Robin Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability 112–114, 177 (1990).

  10. 10.

    For the factual element requirement in derivative criminal liability see above at Chap. 4.

  11. 11.

    Robert H. Skilton, The Mental Element in a Criminal Attempt, 3 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 181 (1937); Dan Bein, Preparatory Offences, 27 Isr. L. Rev. 185 (1993); Larry Alexander and Kimberly D. Kessler, Mens Rea and Inchoate Crimes, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1138 (1997).

  12. 12.

    For the derivative criminal liability characteristic of purposefulness see above at paragraph 2.1.1.3.

  13. 13.

    For the social endangerment of criminal attempts see above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  14. 14.

    Whybrow, (1951) 35 Cr. App. Rep. 141; Mohan, [1976] Q.B. 1, [1975] 2 All E.R. 193, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 859, 60 Cr. App. Rep. 272, [1975] R.T.R. 337, 139 J.P. 523; Pearman, (1984) 80 Cr. App. Rep. 259; Hayles, (1990) 90 Cr. App. Rep. 226; State v. Harvill, 106 Ariz. 386, 476 P.2d 841 (1970); Bell v. State, 118 Ga.App. 291, 163 S.E.2d 323 (1968); Larsen v. State, 86 Nev. 451, 470 P.2d 417 (1970); State v. Goddard, 74 Wash.2d 848, 447 P.2d 180 (1968); People v. Krovarz, 697 P.2d 378 (Colo.1985).

  15. 15.

    Donald Stuart, Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts, [1968] Crim. L.R. 647 (1968).

  16. 16.

    Morrison, [2003] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1722, (2003) 2 Cr. App. Rep. 563; Jeremy Horder, Varieties of Intention, Criminal Attempts and Endangerment, 14 Legal Stud. 335 (1994).

  17. 17.

    RG 16, 133; RG 65, 145; RG 70, 201; RG 71, 53; BGH 12, 306; BGH 21, 14; Mohan, [1976] Q.B. 1, [1975] 2 All E.R. 193, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 859, 60 Cr. App. Rep. 272, [1975] R.T.R. 337, 139 J.P. 523; State v. Ayer, 136 N.H. 191, 612 A.2d 923 (1992); State v. Smith, 170 Wis.2d 701, 490 N.W.2d 40 (App.1992); United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.1988); Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 111 S.Ct. 1854, 114 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991); United States v. Gracidas-Ulibarry, 231 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir.2000); Commonwealth v. Ware, 375 Mass. 118, 375 N.E.2d 1183 (1978).

  18. 18.

    People v. Harris, 72 Ill.2d 16, 17 Ill.Dec. 838, 377 N.E.2d 28 (1978); State v. Butler, 322 So.2d 189 (La.1975); State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 571 A.2d 1227 (1990); Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Crim.App.1982); Smallwood v. State, 106 Md.App. 1, 661 A.2d 747 (1995); Woollin, [1999] A.C. 82, [1998] 4 All E.R. 103, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 382, [1998] Crim. L.R. 890; Pearman, (1984) 80 Cr. App. Rep. 259; Mohan, [1976] Q.B. 1, [1975] 2 All E.R. 193, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 859, 60 Cr. App. Rep. 272, [1975] R.T.R. 337, 139 J.P. 523.

  19. 19.

    Bentham, [1973] 1 Q.B. 357, [1972] 3 All E.R. 271, [1972] 3 W.L.R. 398, 56 Cr. App. Rep. 618, 136 J.P. 761; Harvick v. State, 49 Ark. 514, 6 S.W. 19 (1887); People v. Connors, 253 Ill. 266, 97 N.E. 643 (1912); Commonwealth v. Richards, 363 Mass. 299, 293 N.E.2d 854 (1973); State v. Simonson, 298 Minn. 235, 214 N.W.2d 679 (1974); People v. Vandelinder, 192 Mich. App. 447, 481 N.W.2d 787 (1992).

  20. 20.

    Husseyn, (1977) 67 Cr. App. Rep. 131; Walkington, [1979] 2 All E.R. 716, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1169, 68 Cr. App. Rep. 427, 143 J.P. 542; Haughton v. Smith, [1975] A.C. 476, [1973] 3 All E.R. 1109, [1974] 3 W.L.R. 1, 58 Cr. App. Rep. 198, 138 J.P. 31; Easom, [1971] 2 Q.B. 315, [1971] 2 All E.R. 945, [1971] 3 W.L.R. 82, 55 Cr. App. Rep. 410, 135 J.P. 477.

  21. 21.

    George E. Dix, Criminal Responsibility and Mental Impairment in American Criminal Law: Responses to the Hinckley Acquittal in Historical Perspective, 1 Law and Mental Health: International Perspectives 1, 7 (Weisstub ed., 1986); State v. Hartley, 90 N.M. 488, 565 P.2d 658 (1977); Vann v. Commonwealth, 35 Va.App. 304, 544 S.E.2d 879 (2001); State v. Carney, 347 N.W.2d 668 (Iowa 1984); Isaac Ray, The Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity 263 (1838); Forbes Winslow, The Plea of Insanity in Criminal Cases 74 (1843); Sheldon S. Glueck, Mental Disorders and the Criminal Law 153, 236–237 (1925); Edwin R. Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 956, 961 (1952); Oxford, (1840) 9 Car. & P. 525, 173 E.R. 941; Burton, (1863) 3 F. & F. 772, 176 E.R. 354.

  22. 22.

    Pigg, [1982] 2 All E.R. 591, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 762, 74 Cr. App. Rep. 352, 146 J.P. 298; Khan, [1990] 2 All E.R. 783, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 813, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 29, 154 J.P. 805; G.R. Sullivan, Intent, Subjective Recklessness and Culpability, 12 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 380 (1992); John E. Stannard, Making Up for the Missing Element: A Sideways Look at Attempts, 7 Legal Stud. 194 (1987); J.C. Smith, Two Problems in Criminal Attempts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 422 (1957).

  23. 23.

    See above at paragraph 5.1.

  24. 24.

    Above at paragraph 3.3.2.

  25. 25.

    For the collective conduct concept see above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  26. 26.

    See e.g., United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir.1981); State v. Kendrick, 9 N.C.App. 688, 177 S.E.2d 345 (1970).

  27. 27.

    Above at paragraph 2.1.1.3.

  28. 28.

    For the conspiracy see above at paragraph 2.2.2.1.

  29. 29.

    Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 624 (1941); United States v. Childress, 58 F.3d 693 (D.C.Cir.1995); Bolton, (1991) 94 Cr. App. Rep. 74, 156 J.P. 138; Anderson, [1986] 1 A.C. 27, [1985] 2 All E.R. 961, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 268, 81 Cr. App. Rep. 253; Liangsiriprasert v. United States Government, [1991] 1 A.C. 225, [1990] 2 All E.R. 866, [1990] 3 W.L.R. 606, 92 Cr. App. Rep. 77; Siracusa, (1989) 90 Cr. App. Rep. 340. For the purposefulness of conspiracy see e.g., Blamires Transport Services Ltd. [1964] 1 Q.B. 278, [1963] 3 All E.R. 170, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 496, 61 L.G.R. 594, 127 J.P. 519, 47 Cr. App. Rep. 272; Welham v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] A.C. 103, [1960] 1 All E.R. 805, [1960] 2 W.L.R. 669, 44 Cr. App. Rep. 124; Barnett, [1951] 2 K.B. 425, [1951] 1 All E.R. 917, 49 L.G.R. 401, 115 J.P. 305, 35 Cr. App. Rep. 37, [1951] W.N. 214; West, [1948] 1 K.B. 709, [1948] 1 All E.R. 718, 46 L.G.R. 325, 112 J.P. 222, 32 Cr. App. Rep. 152, [1948] W.N. 136.

  30. 30.

    See above at paragraph 5.1.

  31. 31.

    Above at paragraph 4.3.1.3.

  32. 32.

    For the collective conduct concept see above at paragraph 4.2.2.

  33. 33.

    United States v. Tobon-Builes, 706 F.2d 1092 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408 (2nd Cir.1979).

  34. 34.

    Above at paragraphs 2.2.3 and 4.2.3.

  35. 35.

    Above at paragraph 2.1.1.3.

  36. 36.

    See above at paragraph 5.1.

  37. 37.

    Above at paragraph 4.3.1.3.

  38. 38.

    People v. Miley, 158 Cal.App.3d 25, 204 Cal.Rptr. 347 (1984).

  39. 39.

    Above at paragraph 4.2.4.

  40. 40.

    See e.g., article 26 of the German penal code, which provides: “Als Anstifter wird gleich einem Täter bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einen anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat bestimmt hat”; last part of article 121-7 of the French penal code, which provides: “Est également complice la personne qui par don, promesse, menace, ordre, abus d’autorité ou de pouvoir aura provoqué à une infraction ou donné des instructions pour la commettre”; and article 5.02(1) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 76 (1962, 1985), which provides: “A person is guilty of solicitation to commit a crime if with the purpose of promoting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would constitute such crime or an attempt to commit such crime or would establish his complicity in its commission or attempted commission”.

  41. 41.

    For the characteristic of purposefulness see above at paragraph 2.1.1.3.

  42. 42.

    Lynch v. Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland, [1975] A.C. 653, [1975] 1 All E.R. 913, [1975] 2 W.L.R. 641, 61 Cr. App. Rep. 6, 139 J.P. 312; Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1984] Q.B. 589; Janaway v. Salford Health Authority, [1989] 1 A.C. 537, [1988] 3 All E.R. 1079, [1988] 3 W.L.R. 1350, [1989] 1 F.L.R. 155, [1989] Fam. Law 191, 3 B.M.L.R. 137; Gordon, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 961; Rahman, [2007] E.W.C.A. Crim. 342, [2007] 3 All E.R. 396, but compare the American rulings of Mowery v. State, 132 Tex.Cr.R. 408, 105 S.W.2d 239 (1937); United States v. Hewitt, 663 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir.1981); State v. Kendrick, 9 N.C.App. 688, 177 S.E.2d 345 (1970).

  43. 43.

    Above at paragraph 4.2.5.

  44. 44.

    See e.g., article 27(1) of the German penal code, which provides: “Als Gehilfe wird bestraft, wer vorsätzlich einem anderen zu dessen vorsätzlich begangener rechtswidriger Tat Hilfe geleistet hat”; first part of article 121-7 of the French penal code, which provides: “Est complice d’un crime ou d’un délit la personne qui sciemment, par aide ou assistance, en a facilité la préparation ou la consommation”; article 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c.94 as amended by the Criminal Law Act, 1977, c.45, s. 65(4), which provides: “Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the commission of any indictable offence, whether the same be an offence at common law or by virtue of any Act passed, shall be liable to be tried, indicted, and punished as a principal offender”.

  45. 45.

    For the characteristic of purposefulness see above at paragraph 2.1.1.3.

  46. 46.

    State v. Harrison, 178 Conn. 689, 425 A.2d 111 (1979); State v. Gerbe, 461 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.1970).

  47. 47.

    Above at paragraph 5.1.

  48. 48.

    Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 70–77 (2nd ed., 1960, 2005); David Ormerod, Smith & Hogan Criminal Law 91–92 (11th ed., 2005); G., [2003] U.K.H.L. 50, [2004] 1 A.C. 1034, [2003] 3 W.L.R. 1060, [2003] 4 All E.R. 765, [2004] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 21, (2003) 167 J.P. 621, [2004] Crim. L. R. 369.

  49. 49.

    Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C. 132, [1969] 1 All E.R. 347, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 470, 133 J.P. 188, 53 Cr. App. Rep. 221, 209 E.G., 703, [1969] E.G.D. 123. See more at article 15 of the German penal code, which provides: “Strafbar ist nur vorsätzliches Handeln, wenn nicht das Gesetz fahrlässiges Handeln ausdrücklich mit Strafe bedroht”; first part of article 121-3 of the French penal code, which provides: “Il n’y a point de crime ou de délit sans intention de le commettre”; article 2.02(3) of The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code—Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 22 (1962, 1985).

  50. 50.

    Above at paragraph 5.2.1.

  51. 51.

    Sangha, [1988] 2 All E.R. 385, [1988] 1 W.L.R. 519, 87 Cr. App. Rep. 89, 152 J.P. 293; Khan, [1990] 2 All E.R. 783, [1990] 1 W.L.R. 813, 91 Cr. App. Rep. 29, 154 J.P. 805; Antony Robin Duff, Recklessness in Attempts (Again), 15 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 309 (1995); Huitt v. State, 678 P.2d 415 (Alaska App.1984); People v. Lopez, 166 Ill.2d 441, 211 Ill.Dec. 481, 655 N.E.2d 864 (1995); State v. Shannon, 258 Kan. 425, 905 P.2d 649 (1995); Ramos v. State, 95 Nev. 251, 592 P.2d 950 (1979); State v. Coble, 351 N.C. 448, 527 S.E.2d 45 (2000); State v. Lyerla, 424 N.W.2d 908 (S.D.1988).

  52. 52.

    In re Smith, 3 Cal.3d 192, 90 Cal.Rptr. 1, 474 P.2d 969 (1970); Larsen v. State, 86 Nev. 451, 470 P.2d 417 (1970); Hines v. State, 458 S.W.2d 666 (Tex.Cr.App.1970). Compare: United States v. Buffington, 815 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.1987). See more: People v. Matthews, 122 Ill.App.2d 264, 258 N.E.2d 378 (1970); Stackowitz v. State, 68 Md.App. 368, 511 A.2d 1105 (1986); State v. Dennis, 151 Vt. 223, 559 A.2d 670 (1989).

  53. 53.

    See above at paragraph 5.2.2. For the conspiracy as preparatory stage of joint-perpetration see above at paragraph 2.2.2.1.

  54. 54.

    State v. Henry, 253 Conn. 354, 752 A.2d 40 (2000).

  55. 55.

    State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426 (Tenn.2000); Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, 114 S.E. 504 (1922); Victor Tadors, The System of the Criminal Law, 22 Legal Stud. 448 (2002); RG 34, 327; BGH 34, 63; Curr, [1968] 2 Q.B. 944, [1967] 1 All E.R. 478, [1967] 2 W.L.R. 595, 51 Cr. App. Rep. 113, 131 J.P. 245.

  56. 56.

    Above at paragraph 5.2.4.

  57. 57.

    For the mental element of the criminal attempt see above at paragraph 5.2.1.

  58. 58.

    Claydon, [2005] E.W.C.A. Crim. 2827, [2006] 1 Cr. App. Rep. 339, [2006] Crim. L.R. 345, [2006] Crim. L.R. 241.

  59. 59.

    Invicta Plastics Ltd. v. Clare, [1976] R.T.R. 251, [1976] Crim. L.R. 131, 120 Sol. Jo. 62.

  60. 60.

    Keith John Michael Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law of Criminal Complicity (1991); Ackroyds Air Travel Ltd v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1950] 1 All E.R. 933, 48 L.G.R. 398; Thomas v. Lindop, [1950] 1 All E.R. 966, 48 L.G.R. 353, 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 1241, [1950] W.N. 227.

  61. 61.

    Robin Antony Duff, ‘Can I Help You?’ Accessorial Liability and the Intention to Assist, 10 Legal Stud. 165 (1990); Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, [1986] 1 A.C. 112, [1985] 3 All E.R. 402, [1985] 3 W.L.R. 830, [1986] 1 F.L.R. 224, [1986] Crim. L.R. 113, 2 B.M.L.R. 11.

  62. 62.

    Bogdanov v. State, 941 P.2d 247 (Colo. 1997); Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 14 S.Ct. 144, 37 L.Ed. 1137 (1893); People v. Beeman, 35 Cal.3d 547, 199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318 (1984); State v. Grebe, 461 S.W.2d 265 (Mo.1970); People v. Molano, 253 Cal.App.2d 841, 61 Cal.Rptr. 821 (1967); Wilson v. People, 103 Colo. 441, 87 P.2d 5 (1939); Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351 (Del.1996); State v. Bridgewater, 823 So.2d 877 (La.2002); State v. Taylor, 70 Vt. 1, 39 A. 447 (1898); Commonwealth v. Hogan, 379 Mass. 190, 396 N.E.2d 978 (1979); Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky.2000); Commonwealth v. Bachert, 499 Pa. 398, 453 A.2d 931 (1982); Johnson v. Youden, [1950] 1 K.B. 544, [1950] 1 All E.R. 300, 48 L.G.R. 276, 155 E.G., 181, 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 395, 114 J.P. 136, 215 L.T. 4, [1950] W.N. 58; United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir.1938); RG 11, 87; RG 15, 315; RG 17, 377; RG 31, 35; RG 59, 245; RG 60, 23; RG 72, 20; BGH 2, 279; BGH 3, 65.

  63. 63.

    Above at paragraph 5.2.5.

  64. 64.

    For the mental element of the criminal attempt see above at paragraph 5.2.1.

  65. 65.

    State v. Cronin, 142 Wash.2d 568, 14 P.3d 752 (2000); United States v. Hill, 55 F.3d 1197 (6th Cir.1995); United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038 (9th Cir.1979); United States v. Gregg, 612 F.2d 43 (2nd Cir.1979); People v. Lewis, 277 A.D.2d 1010, 716 N.Y.S.2d 204 (2000); State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wash.2d 472, 886 P.2d 138 (1994); State v. Davis, 101 Wash.2d 654, 682 P.2d 883 (1984); State v. Ivy, 119 Wis.2d 591, 350 N.W.2d 622 (1984).

  66. 66.

    Accessoryship to commit negligence offenses is discussed below at paragraph 5.3.2.5 and accessoryship to commit strict liability offenses is discussed below at paragraph 5.3.3.5.

  67. 67.

    United States v. Giovannetti, 919 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir.1990); G.R. Sullivan, Knowledge, Belief, and Culpability, Criminal Law Theory—Doctrines of the General Part 214 (Stephen Shute and A.P. Simester eds., 2005); Stephen Shute, Knowledge and Belief in the Criminal Law, Criminal Law Theory—Doctrines of the General Part 171 (Stephen Shute and A.P. Simester eds., 2005); Roberts, [1997] R.T.R. 462.

  68. 68.

    Bryce, [2004] Crim. L.R. 936, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 1231, [2004] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 592.

  69. 69.

    United States v. Winston, 687 F.2d 832 (6th Cir.1982); Clark v. United States, 293 F.2d 445 (5th Cir.1961); Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir.1942); Roy v. United States, 652 A.2d 1098 (D.C.App.1995); Commonwealth v. Raposo, 413 Mass. 182, 595 N.E.2d 773 (1992); State v. Ramsey, 368 S.W.2d 413 (Mo.1963); State v. Gladstone, 78 Wash.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 (1970); State v. Wade, 200 W.Va. 637, 490 S.E.2d 724 (1997); Baruch Weiss, What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer under Federal Law, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1341 (2002). Compare: United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 570 (1st Cir.1970); Commonwealth v. Harvard, 356 Mass. 452, 253 N.E.2d 346 (1969); Jones v. State, 481 P.2d 169 (Okla.Crim.App.1971); Commonwealth v. Flowers, 479 Pa. 153, 387 A.2d 1268 (1978); State v. Mansir, 440 A.2d 6 (Me.1982); United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241 (8th Cir.1973); United States v. Snow, 537 F.2d 1166 (4th Cir.1976); United States v. Marquez, 511 F.2d 62 (10th Cir.1975); State v. Allen, 633 N.W.2d 752 (Iowa 2001).

  70. 70.

    In Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, [1932] All E.R. 208, [1933] 1 K.B. 205, 101 L.J.K.B. 679, 147 L.T. 404, 48 T.L.R. 546 the term “reasonable person” has been described as “[t]he person concerned is sometimes described as ‘the man in the street’, or ‘the man in the Clapham omnibus’, or, as I recently read in an American author, ‘the man who takes the magazines at home, and in the evening pushes the lawn mower in his shirt sleeves’”.

  71. 71.

    Lamb, [1967] 2 Q.B. 981, [1967] 2 All E.R. 1282, [1967] 3 W.L.R. 888, 51 Cr. App. Rep. 417, 131 J.P. 456; State v. Bunkley, 202 Conn. 629, 522 A.2d 795 (1987); State v. Evans, 134 N.H. 378, 594 A.2d 154 (1991).

  72. 72.

    Courtney Stanhope Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law 65 (19th ed., 1965).

  73. 73.

    Donald Stuart, Mens Rea, Negligence and Attempts, [1968] Crim. L.R. 647 (1968).

  74. 74.

    For the criminal attempt as stage towards the commission of the offense see above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  75. 75.

    State v. Almeda, 189 Conn. 303, 455 A.2d 1326 (1983); People v. Reagan, 99 Ill.2d 238, 75 Ill.Dec. 701, 457 N.E.2d 1260 (1983); State v. Moore, 82 Hawaii 202, 921 P.2d 122 (1996); Rhode v. State, 181 Ind.App. 265, 391 N.E.2d 666 (1979); Sacchet v. Blan, 353 Md. 87, 724 A.2d 667 (1999); State v. Howard, 405 A.2d 206 (Me.1979); State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730 (Minn.1982); Bailey v. State, 100 Nev. 562, 688 P.2d 320 (1984); People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150, 278 N.Y.S.2d 603, 225 N.E.2d 200 (1967); People v. Brown, 21 A.D.2d 738, 249 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1964); State v. Melvin, 49 Wis.2d 246, 181 N.W.2d 490 (1970); State v. Grant, 418 A.2d 154 (Me.1980).

  76. 76.

    Creamer, [1966] 1 Q.B. 72, [1965] 3 All E.R. 257, [1965] 3 W.L.R. 583, 49 Cr. App. Rep. 368, 129 J.P. 586; United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir.1938).

  77. 77.

    People v. Marshall, 362 Mich. 170, 106 N.W.2d 842 (1961); State v. Gartland, 304 Mo. 87, 263 S.W. 165 (1924); State v. Etzweiler, 125 N.H. 57, 480 A.2d 870 (1984); People v. Kemp, 150 Cal.App.2d 654, 310 P.2d 680 (1957); State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 P. 481 (1928); State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 522 A.2d 277 (1987); State v. Garza, 259 Kan. 826, 916 P.2d 9 (1996); Mendez v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).

  78. 78.

    For the definition of the incitement see above at paragraph 2.2.4.

  79. 79.

    For the definition of the perpetration-through-another see above at paragraph 2.2.3.

  80. 80.

    See above at paragraph 5.2.5.

  81. 81.

    People v. Marshall, 362 Mich. 170, 106 N.W.2d 842 (1961); State v. Gartland, 304 Mo. 87, 263 S.W. 165 (1924); State v. Etzweiler, 125 N.H. 57, 480 A.2d 870 (1984); People v. Kemp, 150 Cal.App.2d 654, 310 P.2d 680 (1957); State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 P. 481 (1928); State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 522 A.2d 277 (1987); State v. Graza, 259 Kan. 826, 916 P.2d 9 (1996); Mendez v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1979).

  82. 82.

    Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342 (D.C.Cir.1926); Lewis v. State, 220 Ark. 914, 251 S.W.2d 490 (1952); Ex Parte Liotard, 47 Nev. 169, 217 P. 960 (1923); Eager v. State, 205 Tenn. 156, 325 S.W.2d 815 (1959); Stacy v. State, 228 Ark. 260, 306 S.W.2d 852 (1957); People v. Marshall, 362 Mich. 170, 106 N.W.2d 842 (1961); State v. Foster, 202 Conn. 520, 522 A.2d 277 (1987); State v. DiLorenzo, 138 Conn. 281, 83 A.2d 479 (1951); People v. Turner, 125 Mich.App. 8, 336 N.W.2d 217 (1983); State v. McVay, 47 R.I. 292, 132 A. 436 (1926); Creamer, [1966] 1 Q.B. 72, [1965] 3 All E.R. 257, [1965] 3 W.L.R. 583, 49 Cr. App. Rep. 368, 129 J.P. 586; Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 369 (1997).

  83. 83.

    For the distinction between accessoryship and perpetration-through-another see above at paragraph 2.3.2.4.

  84. 84.

    Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 55, 56 (1933).

  85. 85.

    Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd. v. Attorney-General of Hong Kong, [1985] 1 A.C. 1, [1984] 2 All E.R. 503, [1984] 3 W.L.R. 437, 80 Cr. App. Rep. 194, 26 Build L.R. 159; B v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [2000] 2 A.C. 428, [2000] 1 All E.R. 833, [2000] 2 W.L.R. 452, [2000] 2 Cr. App. Rep. 65, [2000] Crim. L.R. 403; Richards, [2004] E.W.C.A. Crim. 192. In Australia see Proudman v. Dayman, (1943) 67 C.L.R. 536. In Canada see City of Sault Ste Marie, (1978) 21 N.R. 295, which ruled: “The correct approach, in my opinion, is to relieve the Crown of the burden of proving mens rea, having regard to … the virtual impossibility in most regulatory cases of proving wrongful intention. In a normal case, the accused alone will have knowledge of what he has done to avoid the breach and it is not improper to expect him to come forward with the evidence of due diligence. … This involves consideration of what a reasonable man would have done in the circumstances. The defence will be available if the accused reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps to avoid the particular event”.

  86. 86.

    For the presumption of mens rea see Sweet v. Parsley, [1970] A.C. 132, [1969] 1 All E.R. 347, [1969] 2 W.L.R. 470, 133 J.P. 188, 53 Cr. App. Rep. 221, 209 E.G., 703, [1969] E.G.D. 123.

  87. 87.

    State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d 666 (Tenn.2001); People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602, 535 N.Y.S.2d 580, 532 N.E.2d 86 (1988); People v. Miller, 87 N.Y.2d 211, 638 N.Y.S.2d 577, 661 N.E.2d 1358 (1995).

  88. 88.

    For mens rea attempts see above at paragraph 5.3.1.1.

  89. 89.

    For the criminal attempt as stage towards the commission of the offense see above at paragraph 2.2.1.

  90. 90.

    Gardner v. Akeroyd, [1952] 2 Q.B. 743, [1952] 2 All E.R. 306, [1952] W.N. 364; People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602, 535 N.Y.S.2d 580, 532 N.E.2d 86 (1988); State v. Chhom, 128 Wash.2d 739, 911 P.2d 1014 (1996).

  91. 91.

    State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wash.2d 472, 886 P.2d 138 (1994); Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part 395 (2nd ed., 1961).

  92. 92.

    For the definition of the incitement see above at paragraph 2.2.4.

  93. 93.

    For the definition of the perpetration-through-another see above at paragraph 2.2.3.

  94. 94.

    See above at paragraph 5.2.5.

  95. 95.

    Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 14 S.Ct. 144, 37 L.Ed. 1137 (1893); State v. Dorby, 217 Iowa 858, 250 N.W. 702 (1933); State v. Silva-Baltazar, 125 Wash.2d 472, 886 P.2d 138 (1994); Johnson v. Youden, [1950] 1 K.B. 544, [1950] 1 All E.R. 300, 48 L.G.R. 276, 155 E.G., 181, 66 T.L.R. (Pt. 1) 395, 114 J.P. 136, 215 L.T. 4, [1950] W.N. 58.

  96. 96.

    For strict liability homicide see Douglas Husak, Strict Liability, Justice, and Proportionality, Appraising Strict Liability 81, 84–85 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005, 2007); Antony Robin Duff, Strict Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence, Appraising Strict Liability 125, 143–144 (A. P. Simester ed., 2005, 2007); Jerome Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 547 (2nd ed., 1960, 2005).

  97. 97.

    Carter v. Mace, [1949] 2 All E.R. 714, 113 J.P. 527; Davies, Turner & Co. Ltd. v. Brodie, [1954] 3 All E.R. 283, [1954] 1 W.L.R. 1364, 52 L.G.R. 558, 118 J.P. 532; Bowker v. Premier Drug Co. Ltd., [1928] 1 K.B. 217.

  98. 98.

    For the distinction between accessoryship and perpetration-through-another see above at paragraph 2.3.2.4.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College, Kiryat Ono, Israel

    Professor Gabriel Hallevy

Authors
  1. Professor Gabriel Hallevy
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Hallevy, G. (2012). The Mental Element Requirement. In: The Matrix of Derivative Criminal Liability. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28105-1_5

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation