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In Search of a Proper Federal Balance Between the Two Orders of Government: The Case of German Federalism

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The Ways of Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain

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Abstract

There are, at present, a relatively large number of federal systems throughout the world, and the number is growing. Federal systems have a general common feature: they represent non-centralised and non-unitary political systems. However, they do not follow one uniform pattern; instead, they differ considerably, as concerns their specific form of political organisation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This has obviously been the premise of the project “Ways of Federalism”.

  2. 2.

    Watts (2008), p. 8.

  3. 3.

    This list identifying in a general way major institutional and procedural features of federal political systems has been given by Watts (2008), p. 9. Duchacek (1970) has submitted another list that he called “Ten Yardsticks of Federalism” (pp. 2007/2008); they help to distinguishing a loose confederation from a genuine federal political system.

  4. 4.

    The King of Prussia was at the same time German Emperor.

  5. 5.

    The Constituent Assembly met and worked in the city of Weimar.

  6. 6.

    Holste (2002) argues in favour of greater continuity of the German federal system.

  7. 7.

    The first clause did apply to the German South West, and was the legal basis for the establishment of the Land Baden-Württemberg in 1952 via fusion of three smaller Länder that had been formed by the allied powers in their respective (American and French) occupational zones without reference to historic tradition. The second clause does apply to the case of Berlin and Brandenburg; the first effort towards fusion, however, failed in the mid nineties.

  8. 8.

    This territory has remained under the control of France. Efforts to give the Saarland a special “European” status failed; in a popular referendum, held in 1955, the citizens voted (with a two-thirds majority against such a status) in favour of “returning” to Germany. The French government immediately accepted the vote.

  9. 9.

    With reunification, this article became obsolete. In connection with the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, a new Article 23 (the so-called “Europe-Article”) was included into the Basic Law.

  10. 10.

    The original version explicitly said “uniform living conditions”; the new formulation in an “official” translation wrongly says “equal” instead of “equivalent” (gleichwertig in the German original).

  11. 11.

    This is the actual situation. Before reunification, there were only three categories of Länder; with three, four or five votes.

  12. 12.

    Therefore, each Land government has to decide, prior to the Bundesrat meeting, how to vote. This may lead to a problem in case of coalition governments, if one government party would be in line with the political colour of the federal government, whereas another government party (or: other parties) would be in line with the opposition at federal level. In case, the coalition partners in a Land cannot reach agreement, the following “rule” has emerged and is practised: the Land would then abstain in the Bundesrat. Whenever a positive majority is required, abstentions have the effect of a “No-vote”.

  13. 13.

    Therefore, the effect of abstaining is a “No”.

  14. 14.

    This chapter will not deal with the financial constitution systematically, although financial arrangements always belong to the core issues in a federal system.

  15. 15.

    Hesse (1962).

  16. 16.

    The term “participatory federalism” (Beteiligungsföderalismus)—as a label for a basic feature of the German federal system—aims at characterising this constellation and these mechanisms.

  17. 17.

    The term has been coined by Fritz W. Scharpf (see Scharpf et al. 1976). Later, Scharpf has spoken of the so-called “Joint Decisions Trap” [see his article: Scharpf (1985), pp. 326–356].

  18. 18.

    The required qualified (two-thirds) majority for amending the constitution could not be achieved.

  19. 19.

    See as examples: Männle (1998); Benz (1999), pp. 135–153; Münch (2001), pp. 115–127; Fischer and Große Hüttmann (2001), pp. 128–142.

  20. 20.

    This has been described by Luthard (1999), pp. 12–23; and by Große Hüttmann (2000), pp. 277–297.

  21. 21.

    These two documents, together with other proposals, can be found in: Hrbek and Eppler (2003).

  22. 22.

    The major cleavage has always been the divide between “stronger” Länder—advocating greater autonomy—and “weaker” Länder—relying more on support from the federal level and financial solidarity from the richer Länder via equalisation mechanisms.

  23. 23.

    See the contributions of Renzsch et al. (2005); the contributions in Hrbek and Eppler (2005); furthermore: Sturm (2005), pp. 195–203; Benz (2005), pp. 204–214; Scharpf (2006).

  24. 24.

    A study elaborated by the scientific service of the Bundestag could confirm and support these expectations; the study did analyse the effect of the new provision if it would have been applied in the past (Bundestag 2006).

  25. 25.

    See for the following Hrbek (2011), pp. 191–210.

  26. 26.

    Until fall 2009 Germany was governed by a Grand Coalition; the timing for deciding on the second reform package has taken this into account.

  27. 27.

    Bertelsmann-Stiftung (2008). The project manager in the Bertelsmann Foundation that conducted this opinion poll project was Dr. Ole Wintermann.

  28. 28.

    See Roland Sturm on what have been the gains from the reform for democracy; Sturm (2007), S.34–45. In more detail, Sturm (2004).

  29. 29.

    Schavan (2011), pp. 17–26.

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  1. Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Tübingen, Melanchthonstr. 36, 72074, Tübingen, Germany

    Rudolf Hrbek

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  1. , Fac. Social Sciences and Communication, University of the Basque Country, Barrio Sarriena s/n, Leioa - Bizkaia, 48940, Spain

    Alberto López Basaguren

  2. , Fac. Social Sciences and Communication, University of the Basque Country, Barrio Sarriena s/n, Leioa - Bizkaia, 48940, Spain

    Leire Escajedo San Epifanio

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Hrbek, R. (2013). In Search of a Proper Federal Balance Between the Two Orders of Government: The Case of German Federalism. In: López Basaguren, A., Escajedo San Epifanio, L. (eds) The Ways of Federalism in Western Countries and the Horizons of Territorial Autonomy in Spain. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27720-7_23

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