Asymmetry as an Element of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation Fifty Years Later—Readdress the Spanish Case

Abstract

Two essential and complementary parts are integrated in this article: a theoretical reflection about asymmetrical federalism and a pragmatic approach to the situation in Spain.

The former has sought to consolidate the key defining elements of asymmetry. Asymmetry for Constitutional Law is a form of state organization where territorial units with political autonomy enjoy a differentiated constitutional treatment, legitimized for the positive recognition of having different types of singularities (linguistic, juridical, fiscal) with respect to the other units of the State. Linked to asymmetry, we had proposed a neologism, dissymmetry, in an attempt to refine the concept. Dissymmetry will be applied to those situations where a proportional or symmetrical situation was broken in an anomalous or faulty way.

The latter has tried to cast some light on the Spanish situation through a series of dilemmas: We have paid attention to the transition from autonomism to federalism and the cohabitation between two types of federalism, a functional federalism and a nationalist federalism, that would result in an asymmetric federalism.

The tension between equality and asymmetry has put on the table the main problem of asymmetric federalism: not considering the differences as grievances. For that, our policies must distinguish what is really essential for citizens.

The last dilemma refers to the risk of emulating asymmetries by other territories, which united with a warning of avoiding a form of autistic federalism could illuminate our future—a future necessarily based on unity and solidarity.