Abstract
In this chapter, the nonpositivist conception of law is analysed in terms of its jurisprudential correctness and practical usefulness in the context of constructing an adequate, integrated conception of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law norms. The reflections begin with a discussion on some general methodological objections against the nonpositivist definitions of law proposed by Ralf Dreier and Robert Alexy. Then we analyse the specific objections, formulated from the perspective of legal theory and legal practice and referring to the method of constructing the nonpositivist definitions of law adopted by Dreier and Alexy. In light of the presented analyses, it is shown that nonpositivism does not offer any acceptable conception of legal validity. The undertaken criticism also results in the conclusion that the concept of legal validity should be defined in a detached and axiologically impartial way. It should be emphasised that this conclusion by no means constitutes a compromise between the standpoints of legal positivism and those of anti-positivists, in particular relating to natural law theories, but it allows us to go beyond their continuous disputes over the nature of law.
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Notes
- 1.
R. Dreier, ‘Der Begriff des Rechts’, op. cit., p. 896 and ‘Some Remarks on the Concept of Law’, op. cit., note 32 at pp. 123–124.
- 2.
See R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., p. 201 [English version, p. 127] and ‘A Definition of Law’, op. cit., p. 102.
- 3.
The concept of the persuasive definition was introduced by Ch.L. Stevenson, ‘Persuasive Definitions’, Mind 47 (1938), pp. 331–350. In the deliberations that follow, I rely on the analyses of persuasive definitions provided by T. Pawłowski, Tworzenie pojęć w naukach humanistycznych [Creation of Concepts in Humanistic Sciences], Warszawa 1986, pp. 149ff., as well as on more specialised jurisprudential analyses of these kinds of definitions, provided by Z. Ziembiński, Wstęp do aksjologii dla prawników, op. cit., pp. 35ff. and ‘Definicje perswazyjne w prawoznawstwie’ [Persuasive Definitions in Jurisprudence] in J. Pogonowski (ed.), Eufonia i Logos, Poznań 1995, pp. 673–680. It is worth mentioning that Ziembiński explicitly considers denying – as he puts it – “strikingly unjust norms of the written law” their attribute of law as a classic persuasive argument – see idem, ‘“Lex” a “ius” w okresie przemian’, op. cit., p. 5.
- 4.
See T. Pawłowski, ibidem, pp. 152ff.
- 5.
Ibidem, p. 149.
- 6.
R. Alexy, ‘Vorwort’ to Recht, Vernunft, Diskurs, op. cit, p. 10.
- 7.
For more on these types of definitions and the possible criteria of differentiating them see e.g., J. Kotarbińska, ‘Definicja’ [Definition] in eadem, Z zagadnień teorii nauki i teorii języka, Warszawa 1990, pp. 131ff. and K. Ajdukiewicz, ‘Trzy pojęcia definicji’, op. cit., pp. 296ff.
- 8.
It can be most clearly seen in Alexy’s position, who directly states that “Der Streit um den Rechtsbegriff ist ein Streit darüber, was Recht ist”– Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., p. 18 [English version, p. 5]. Cf. idem, O pojęciu i naturze prawa / On the Concept and the Nature of Law, op. cit., pp. 31, 35, 41ff. Let us still recall that this question is of a “global” character for Alexy – cf. Chap. 4 at pp. 183–184.
- 9.
R. Dreier, ‘Der Begriff des Rechts’, op. cit., p. 894. Cf. idem, ‘Zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion des Verhältnisses von Recht und Moral in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, op. cit., p. 67.
- 10.
- 11.
R. Alexy, O pojęciu i naturze prawa / On the Concept and the Nature of Law, op. cit., pp. 42–44. Cf. idem, ‘On Two Juxtapositions: Concept and Nature, Law and Philosophy’, op. cit., pp. 163ff. and ‘Hauptelemente einer Theorie der Doppelnatur des Rechts’, ARSP 95 (2009), pp. 151–166.
- 12.
See K. Ajdukiewicz, ‘Trzy pojęcia definicji’, op. cit., pp. 305–307. However, it should be noted that in addition to the position that combines real definitions with the nominal ones, what seems more prevalent is the view on their extensional exclusion – for more on this subject (in the context of the definitions applied in legal sciences) see W. Patryas, Definiowanie pojęć prawnych [Defining Legal Concepts], Poznań 1997, pp. 103ff., and the references cited therein. Cf. Chap. 7, pp. 261ff.
- 13.
Of course, we can easily identify many other points of nonpositivist argumentation in which the considerations of German authors are similar to Dworkin’s antipositivist analyses. For example, the distinction – adopted by Alexy during the analysis of the argument from language (see Chap. 3 at pp. 46–47) – between “prima facie law” and “definite law” is broadly in line with Dworkin’s analyses concerning the existence of the Nazi law, in relation to which the claim of the existence of a “prima facie law” is of a pre-interpretative character, whereas nonpositivist thesis denying the Nazi law its nature of law belongs to the later stages of constructive interpretation (see R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, op. cit., pp. 101ff.).
- 14.
See R. Dworkin, ibidem, pp. 31ff.
- 15.
Ibidem, pp. 70–72, 90ff. Cf. idem, Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit., pp. 134ff.
- 16.
See Z. Pulka, ‘Hart–Dworkin – dwa warianty “wewnętrznego” postrzegania prawa’ [Hart–Dworkin: Two Versions of the “Internal” Comprehension of Law], AUW 2142 (1999), pp. 21–42. For more on the distinction between concepts and conceptions introduced by Ch. Perelman, see e.g., D. Buchwald, Der Begriff der rationalen juristischen Begründung. Zur Theorie der juridischen Vernunft, Baden-Baden 1990, pp. 52–54.
- 17.
It should be noted that I use here, as in other parts of the work, the term “conception” not in Dworkin’s understanding but in the everyday sense, referring in this way to a set of propositions differentiated on the basis of the subjective criterion (i.e., separated by identifying their authors) as well as the objective one. Obviously, conceptions understood in such way do not always meet the requirements for being considered as theories from the methodological point of view.
- 18.
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., pp. 156ff. and ‘Postscript’, op. cit., pp. 246–247.
- 19.
See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge (Mass.) 1971, pp. 5–6, 10, in particular note 1 at p. 5, which indicates Rawls’ reference to Hart’s ideas.
- 20.
This sentence directly corresponds to Dreier’s metatheoretical position – for more on this issue see Chap. 3 at p. 25 and his ‘Bemerkungen zur Rechtserkenntnistheorie’, op. cit., pp. 100ff. Alexy, on the other hand, repeatedly admits (albeit usually indirectly) to the existence of different concepts of law, analysing the various (juristic, sociological and ethical) concepts of the validity of law – see idem, Theorie der Grundrechte, op. cit., pp. 49ff. [English version, pp. 27ff.] and Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 139ff. [English version, pp. 85ff.].
- 21.
- 22.
- 23.
On integrative tasks of jurisprudence, and legal theory in particular, see K. Opałek, ‘Swoistość prawoznawstwa a problem integracji’ [Specific Character of Jurisprudence and the Problem of Integration], PiP 4–5 (1966), pp. 628–641 and ‘Law and Integration of Social Sciences’, AIC IV (1971), pp. 7–24.
- 24.
In this context, it is worth noting Dworkin’s passionate and emphatic appeal addressed to young legal philosophers to try to cultivate this discipline in an interesting way, not only for more abstract sciences than the philosophy of law, but primarily for lawyers and judges – see idem, ‘Hart’s Postscript and the Character of Political Philosophy’, op. cit., pp. 36–37.
- 25.
- 26.
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, op. cit., p. 88.
- 27.
Concerning the points of view adopted in legal theory and jurisprudential analyses, see Chap. 6 at pp. 226ff.
- 28.
E. Bulygin, ‘¿Hay vinculación necesaria entre derecho y moral?’, op. cit., pp. 217–218 and ‘Is There a Conceptual Connection between Law and Morality?’, op. cit., pp. 47–48. Another hard positivist – J. Raz – argues in a similar vein in ‘The Argument from Justice, or How Not to Reply to Legal Positivism’, op. cit., pp. 24–25.
- 29.
This necessity is also perceived by Alexy – see idem, ‘The Nature of Legal Philosophy’, op. cit., pp. 65–66. However, he constantly stresses the supremacy of a nonpositivist vision of law, developed from the viewpoint of the participant, over the positivist conceptions of law, in his opinion created from the viewpoint of the observer – see e.g., idem, O pojęciu i naturze prawa / On the Concept and the Nature of Law, op. cit., pp. 50–51.
- 30.
See R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire, op. cit., pp. 43ff. Among the numerous, largely critical comments on this argument of Dworkin, it is worth examining J. Raz’s essay ‘Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison’ in J.L. Coleman (ed.), Hart’s Postscript, op. cit., pp. 11ff.
- 31.
See H.L.A. Hart, ‘Postscript’, op. cit., p. 246 and D. Sugarman, ‘Hart Interviewed: H.L.A. Hart in Conversation with David Sugarman’, JL&S 32/2 (2005), p. 287.
- 32.
R. Dreier, ‘Zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion des Verhältnisses von Recht und Moral in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland’, op. cit., p. 67. Cf. idem, ‘Der Begriff des Rechts’, op. cit., pp. 894ff.
- 33.
See R. Alexy, ‘Probleme der Diskurstheorie’, op. cit., pp. 87–88 or ‘Nachwort (1991): Antwort auf einige Kritiker’, op. cit., pp. 410–411.
- 34.
For more on the concepts of extension and intension used here, and on the indications – resulting from the above comments – concerning the structure of the analyses of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law see Chap. 6 at pp. 218ff.
- 35.
Cf. Chap. 2, pp. 20ff.
- 36.
See K. Twardowski, ‘Z logiki przymiotników’, op. cit.
- 37.
See W. Marciszewski, ‘Denotacja’ [Denotation] in idem (ed.), Mała encyklopedia logiki, 2nd ed., Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków/Gdańsk/Łódź 1988, p. 46.
- 38.
K. Opałek, ‘Der Begriff des positiven Rechts’, ARSP 68 (1982), p. 457.
- 39.
It should be added that this stands for the approval – yet to such a limited extent – of Kelsen’s standpoint, who argues that “[e]ine geltende Norm ist ein Pleonasmus. Eine nicht geltende, ungültige Norm ist eine contradictio in adjecto” – Allgemeine Theorie der Normen, op. cit., p. 137. As for legal positivists adopting the same point of view, see W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa, op. cit., pp. 212ff.
- 40.
- 41.
See J. Stelmach, ‘Obowiązywanie prawa w sensie absolutnym i relatywnym’ [Validity of Law in the Absolute and Relative Sense] in (teamwork ed.), Teoria prawa. Filozofia prawa, op. cit., p. 318.
- 42.
Cf. ibidem, pp. 322ff.; R. Sarkowicz, J. Stelmach, Teoria prawa, op. cit., pp. 135ff.; U. Neumann, ‘Problem obowiązywania prawa’, op. cit., p. 36.
- 43.
Naturally, the standpoint which identifies law with valid law is adopted by a number of contemporary positivists – see e.g., J. Raz, ‘Legal Validity’, op. cit., p. 339, who expresses it clearly: “A valid law is a law, an invalid law is not”, and O. Weinberger, ‘Ontologie, Hermeneutik und der Begriff des geltenden Rechts’, ARSP Bh. 27 (1985), p. 109, who claims: “Geltendes Recht ist Recht; ungültiges Recht ist kein Recht”. See also Kelsen’s statement quoted supra, note 39.
- 44.
For more about the correctness of this claim see Chap. 9 at pp. 506ff. At this point, I will confine myself to expressing the view that this claim is not falsified by the fact that in juristic language the sentence: “The court applied an invalid norm” is meaningful – yet only if we treat it as a peculiar and presumably inaccurate thought short-cut, referring to a relativised concept of legal validity and describing, for instance, the way an intertemporal legal problem is resolved by the judge.
- 45.
As noted in a slightly different context by J. Stelmach, ‘Obowiązywanie prawa w sensie absolutnym i relatywnym’, op. cit., p. 324: “The concept of validity of law cannot simply be eliminated from both legal and juristic language, and the search for ‘synonyms’ only pretends to be the solution of this problem”.
- 46.
See J. Wróblewski, ‘Nieostrość systemu prawa’ [Vagueness of the Legal System], SPE XXXI (1983), pp. 7–24 and A. Peczenik, J. Wróblewski, ‘Fuzziness and Transformations: Towards Explaining Legal Reasoning’, Theoria LI (1985), pp. 26ff. A similar standpoint has been adopted by Z. Ziembiński, Szkice z metodologii szczegółowych nauk prawnych [Sketches on the Methodology of Particular Legal Sciences], Warszawa/Poznań 1983, p. 15, when writing about “the wobbled legal system”. This problem is analysed in Chap. 7 at pp. 277ff.
- 47.
See R. Dreier, ‘Recht und Moral’, op. cit., pp. 194ff., ‘Der Begriff des Rechts’, op. cit., p. 894, and ‘Neues Naturrecht oder Rechtspositivismus?’, op. cit., p. 376; R. Alexy, Begriff und Geltung des Rechts, op. cit., pp. 142ff. [English version, pp. 87ff.].
- 48.
More on the uselessness of Alexy’s nonpositivist definition of law, reinterpreted as a definition of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law norms, for legal dogmatics and legal practice see Chap. 7 at pp. 351ff.
- 49.
Of course, such label of Dworkin’s standpoint is borrowed from Hart – cf. idem, ‘American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream’, op. cit., pp. 125, 137ff. The question of whether such characteristics of Dworkin’s theory are accurate cannot be dealt with here.
- 50.
See R. Alexy, ‘The Special Case Thesis’, op. cit., pp. 383–384 and ‘Law and Correctness’, op. cit., pp. 217ff. [German version, pp. 14ff.].
- 51.
See W. van der Burg, ‘Two Models of Law and Morality’, AS 3 (1999), p. 77.
- 52.
For more on the relative character of the concept of correctness assumed in Alexy’s theory see Chap. 4 at pp. 87–88.
- 53.
See A. García Figueroa, Principios y positivismo jurídico, op. cit., p. 391 and ‘La tesis del caso especial y el positivismo jurídico’, op. cit., p. 217.
- 54.
In this dialogue, Socrates, when considering the problem of distinguishing between what is pious and what is impious, raises the following question (incidentally, anticipating a medieval dispute between “intellectuals” who consider that God may want only that which – regardless of his will – is good, and “voluntarists”, who recognise that something is good only because God wants it to be so): “Is the piety loved by the gods because it is piety, or is it piety because the gods love it?” – Plato, Euthyphro, section 10 a.
- 55.
Ibidem, section 11 a.
- 56.
A. Peczenik, ‘The Structure of a Legal System’, RT 6 (1975), p. 4 and A. Aarnio, The Rational as Reasonable. A Treatise on Legal Justification, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo 1987, p. 34.
- 57.
I address this issue in Chap. 6 at pp. 349ff.
- 58.
See A. Rojek, ‘Kilka uwag o obowiązywaniu prawa’ [Some Remarks on the Validity of Law] in M. Borucka-Arctowa et al. (eds.), Prawo – władza – społeczeństwo – polityka. Księga jubileuszowa profesora Krzysztofa Pałeckiego, Toruń 2006, pp. 148–149. She proposes defining the indicated possibilities of understanding the external validity of law as “individualism of validity” and “holism of validity”. For more on this issue see Chap. 7 at pp. 285ff.
- 59.
Cf. Chap. 3, p. 23.
- 60.
See K. Opałek, ‘The Problem of the Validity of Law’, AIC III (1970), pp. 8–19; K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Zagadnienia teorii prawa [The Problems of Legal Theory], Warszawa 1969, pp. 114ff.; J. Stelmach, ‘Obowiązywanie prawa w sensie absolutnym i relatywnym’, op. cit. In the context of the undertaken criticism, it should be noted, however, that due to the increasing orientation of philosophers and theorists of law to legal practice and the dogmatics of law, that distinction seems to lose its original significance. The philosopher or the theorist of law, when formulating their definition of validity, must, on the one hand, deal with its absolute sense – undoubtedly primary in the context of the considerations that aim at developing the concept of the validity of law – but, on the other hand, they must also take into account the interests and needs of practising lawyers (in particular, judges) and the dogmatists of law who focus on the questions of relative (intra-systemic) legal validity. Therefore, in our further considerations we will leave the distinction of an absolute and relative legal validity aside, considering a less interpretatively controversial distinction between the external and the internal legal validity, as proposed by Peczenik and Aarnio, to be the basic one.
- 61.
“Axiological impartiality” does not prejudice the independence of the validity of law from moral issues, but it has to point at refraining from a definitional and, in this sense, a priori solution of the controversy between positivism and nonpositivism. Theoretically, this term could be replaced by “axiological neutrality”, which is nonetheless not undertaken by us because the term “an axiologically neutral concept of the validity of law” is already used in jurisprudential literature, in which it is very often applied to characterise the traditional position of legal positivism – see e.g., W. Lang, Prawo i moralność, op. cit., pp. 120ff. Using the analogy of a dispute over the existence of God, in short, we believe that “axiological impartiality” stands for an agnostic position (“We do not know whether there exist necessary conceptual relations between law and morality in the sphere of legal validity”) rather than hard positivist “atheism” (“There are no connections between law and morality in the sphere of validity”), which is indeed described (somewhat confusingly – cf. Chap. 4, note 81 at p. 82) as an “axiologically neutral position”. For more on the “atheism” of legal positivists, as expressed by the Neutrality Thesis, see e.g., V. Villa, ‘Legal Theory and Value Judgments’, L&Ph 16 (1997), pp. 449ff. and J. Morauta, ‘Three Separation Theses’, L&Ph 23 (2004), pp. 112, 128ff.
- 62.
Arguments in favour of axiological impartiality of the juristic concept of the validity of statutory law will be supplemented in later parts of the book – in particular, in Chap. 6 at pp. 234ff.
- 63.
Cf. Chap. 4, pp. 188ff.
- 64.
On the dominating role of so-called primordial legal positivism in the Polish legal culture, see M. Zirk-Sadowski, ‘Pozytywizm prawniczy a filozoficzna opozycja podmiotu i przedmiotu poznania’ [Legal Positivism and Philosophical Opposition of the Subject and the Object of Cognition], SFP 1 (2001), pp. 83 ff. and ‘Legal Culture and Epistemological Stressing’ in T. Biernat et al. (eds.), Stressing Legal Decisions, Kraków 2004, pp. 86ff.
- 65.
Cf. Chap. 4, in particular the studies referred to in note 494 at p. 190.
- 66.
T. Gizbert-Studnicki, T. Pietrzykowski, ‘Positivismo blando y la distinción entre Derecho y moral’, op. cit., pp. 64ff.
- 67.
In Polish jurisprudential literature, the role of moral argumentation in legal reasoning has been analysed by many authors – see e.g., Z. Ziembiński, ‘Argumentacje moralne stosowane przez prawników’ [Moral Arguments Applied by Lawyers], Etyka 2 (1967), pp. 95–108 and ‘Moralność jako czynnik kształtujący stosowanie prawa’ [Morality as a Factor That Shapes Law Application], Etyka 5 (1969), pp. 89–111; L. Leszczyński, ‘O aksjologii stosowania prawa’ [On the Axiology of Law Application] in B. Czech (ed.), Filozofia prawa a tworzenie i stosowanie prawa, Katowice 1992, p. 143–152; J. Wróblewski, ‘Oceny i normy moralne w wykładni prawa’ [Moral Evaluations and Norms in Law Interpretation], ZNUŁ NHS I/22 (1961), pp. 3–18.
- 68.
As noted by J. D. Goldsworthy, ‘The Self-Destruction of Legal Positivism’, op. cit., p. 467, the decision to apply ratio decidendi – previously identified by the court – to the settlement of the case or to apply the procedure of distinguishing, always requires applying a moral judgment concerning the issue as to whether the facts of the settled case require the application of this procedure. It must be a moral judgment, because the norms of positive law (i.e., the earlier precedents) do not regulate this issue – after all, the settlement concerns the issue of whether they should be applied or not, distinguishing the case under consideration from the earlier cases. Thus, according to Goldsworthy: “A moral judgment must be therefore made in every case at common law, even if it is made sub silentio”.
- 69.
See e.g., H.L.A. Hart, ‘Problems of the Philosophy of Law’, op. cit., p. 107.
- 70.
N. MacCormick, ‘Natural Law and the Separation of Law and Morals’, op. cit., pp. 120–121.
- 71.
See e.g., M.H. Kramer, ‘How Moral Principles Can Enter into the Law’, op. cit., p. 100.
- 72.
J. Raz, ‘The Problem about the Nature of Law’, in idem, Ethics in the Public Domain. Essays in the Morality of Law and Politics, Oxford 1994, p. 193. The interconnections of legal reasoning with moral reasoning have been broadly discussed by J. Raz in his paper ‘On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning’, in: ibidem, pp. 310–324. In this paper, Raz justifies, inter alia, a more complex thesis under which “Legal reasoning is an instance of moral reasoning” (p. 324).
- 73.
Cf. Chap. 4, note 243 at p. 125.
- 74.
See Chap. 4, pp. 128ff.
- 75.
See U. Neumann, ‘Positivistische Rechtsquellenlehre und naturrechtliche Methode’, op. cit., pp. 145ff.
- 76.
Ibidem, pp. 146–147.
- 77.
Even more so due to the fact that the research conducted on other empirical bases can lead to less clear-cut conclusions. For example, the analysis of the conflict between the values of legality and justice in the jurisdiction of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal shows that the Tribunal only sometimes rules that the legal provisions do not comply with the Constitution when they are legally enacted, but that they are unjust, thereby favouring justice over legality – see S. Tkacz, Rozumienie sprawiedliwości w orzecznictwie Trybunału Konstytucyjnego [Understanding Justice in the Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Tribunal], PNUŚ (2003), pp. 69ff., in particular pp. 79–82.
- 78.
N. MacCormick, ‘Argumentation and Interpretation in Law’, RJ 6 (1993), p. 29.
- 79.
As Hart wrote: “Rules cannot claim their own instances, and fact situations do not await the judge neatly labelled with the rule applicable to them. Rules cannot provide for their own application, and even in the clearest case a human being must apply them” – idem, ‘Problems of the Philosophy of Law’, op. cit., p. 106. Similar argumentation was put forward by K. Günther, ‘Critical Remarks on Robert Alexy’s “Special-Case Thesis”’, op. cit., p. 148.
- 80.
See K. Günther, Ein normativer Begriff der Kohärenz für eine Theorie der juristischen Argumentation, op. cit., pp. 167ff. [English version, pp. 156ff.].
- 81.
See Chap. 4, pp. 173ff. Cf. H.L.A. Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’, op. cit., p. 623, wherein Hart writes about the natural necessity of the fact that all legal systems coincide with morality at “such vital points” as the rules forbidding murder, violence and theft. Cf. idem, The Concept of Law, op. cit., pp. 199–200, wherein Hart concedes the existence of the necessary connection between law and morals, understood empirically as a correspondence of a number of legal institutions and the application of law with morals.
- 82.
As claimed by the hard legal positivist, J. Raz, there are values and reasons that unconditionally govern our thinking and some of them are moral, because morality includes the “background considerations” to which humans, as “rational animals”, that is “reasoning animals”, must resort – see idem, ‘On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning’, op. cit., pp. 313–314. Ultimately, as Raz writes: “Even judges are humans” – idem, ‘Incorporation by Law’, LT 10 (2004), pp. 2ff.
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Grabowski, A. (2013). The Nonpositivist Conception of Law and the Juristic Concept of the Validity of Law. In: Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0_5
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