Abstract
What does it mean for a legal norm to be valid? Does the validity of legal norms depend solely on their due enactment and social efficacy, or conceivably on their moral rightness as well? Does legal validity imply membership in the legal system, or perhaps applicability or observance within that system? In what way do we recognise that legal norms are valid? What are the structure and the layout of juristic argumentation concerning legal validity? Are the courts occasionally bound by valid positive law to apply invalid legal norms or provisions? These are some of the theoretical and practical questions that I aim to answer in this book.
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Notes
- 1.
S. Wronkowska, ‘O źródłach prawa i aktach normatywnych raz jeszcze’ [Once More on Sources of Law and Normative Acts] in A. Nowicka et al. (eds.), Prawo prywatne czasu przemian, Poznań 2005, p. 119.
- 2.
J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa [Some Problems in Analytical Legal Philosophy], Kraków 1980, p. 98.
- 3.
Cf. A. Grabowski, B. Naleziński, ‘Kłopoty z obowiązywaniem. Uwagi na tle orzecznictwa Trybunału Konstytucyjnego’ [Problems with Validity. Comments on the Basis of the Constitutional Tribunal Jurisdiction], SFP 1 (2001), pp. 219–257.
- 4.
W. Lang, Obowiązywanie prawa [Validity of Law], Warszawa 1962. Cf. idem, ‘Obowiązywanie normy prawnej w czasie w świetle logiki norm’ [Validity of a Legal Norm in Time in the Light of Logic of Norms], ZNUJ PP 7 (1960), pp. 47–88. Lang presented an updated version of his theory in ‘A Concept of the Validity of Law’, AIC XXIX–XXX (1996–1997), pp. 87–101.
- 5.
G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie. Studienausgabe, R. Dreier, St.L. Paulson (eds.), Heidelberg 1999, p. 117: “So ist es auch kein Wunder, daß jedes Zeitalter seine Rechtswissenchaft neu schreiben muß”.
- 6.
For more on the mentioned trends of analytical philosophy see J. Kotarbińska, ‘The Controversy over the Limits of Applicability of Logical Methods’, LA NS 29 (1965), pp. 178–207; J. Woleński, Z zagadnień analitycznej filozofii prawa, op. cit., pp. 33ff.; T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ‘Teoria prawa, filozofia języka, lingwistyka’ [Theory of Law, Philosophy of Language, Linguistics], SF 2–3 (1985), pp. 71ff.; Z. Ziembiński, ‘Deskrypcjonistyczna i rekonstrukcjonistyczna analiza języka w prawoznawstwie’ [Descriptionistic and Reconstructionistic Analysis of Language in Jurisprudence], SP 3–4 (1985), pp. 329–341.
- 7.
See e.g., T. Gizbert-Studnicki, ibidem, p. 75; Z. Ziembiński, ibidem, p. 341; K. Opałek, J. Wróblewski, Prawo. Metodologia, filozofia, teoria prawa [Law. Methodology, Philosophy, Legal Theory], Warszawa 1991, pp. 106–107.
- 8.
I would like to stress at this point that I aim to develop a regulative definition that only clarifies the meaning of this concept, and not a definition of a purely stipulative (synthetic) character, since it would be, due to its arbitrary nature, probably useless in practice. Cf. A. Bator’s comments on the definitions applied in legal studies, in ‘O konserwatyźmie językowym nauki prawa’ [On Linguistic Conservatism of the Science of Law] in H. Rot (ed.), Prawo i prawoznawstwo wobec zmian społecznych, Wrocław 1990, pp. 25ff.
- 9.
It does not mean that in this study I do not make any assumptions of an ontological or epistemological nature. Indeed, they will be indicated in the relevant parts of the text. Yet, at this point I can only add that if I were to define the philosophical (theoretical) standpoint which provides the basis for my views presented below, I would refer to it as moderately realistic – for more on this see Chap. 6 at pp. 224–225 (the fourth objective of clarification).
- 10.
“Assumptionlessness” (which is a provisional translation of the German Voraussetzungslosigkeit) is naturally associated with E. Husserl’s phenomenology. I do believe, though, that it may also be combined with par excellence analytical philosophy, as J. Szymura proves in his monograph Język, mowa i prawda w perspektywie fenomenologii lingwistycznej J.L. Austina [Language, Speech and Truth in the View of J.L. Austin’s Linguistic Phenomenology], Wrocław/Warszawa/Kraków/Gdańsk/Łódź 1982, pp. 18ff., 129ff.
- 11.
By adopting this assumption, which refers to the conceptual level, obviously I have not eliminated the possibility of the existence of acts of law, norms or legal provisions contained in a specific “transitional” category between validity and invalidity. I decided, nonetheless, that even if the scope of such a category is not empty, after all, the cases falling within it will be eventually (i.e., after careful consideration by a specially authorised organ or by a competent interpreter) included in terms of the extension of the concepts of either valid or invalid law. Tertium non datur. Indeed, as A. Bator accurately stresses (‘O konserwatyźmie językowym nauki prawa’, op. cit., pp. 24–25), in respect to the language of legal studies oriented at practical problems, the finding that the norm N is “to some extent” valid is not acceptable due to its practical uselessness. Let us add that many theoreticians and dogmatists of law assume such a dichotomous standpoint, thus not allowing for any gradability of legal validity – see e.g., J. Raz, ‘Legal Validity’, ARSP 63 (1977), p. 339; R. Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Baden-Baden 1985, p. 78 [English version: A Theory of Constitutional Rights, trans. J. Rivers, Oxford 2002, p. 49]; A. Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’ in J.L. Coleman, S.J. Shapiro (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford 2002, p. 106. It is worth quoting a vivid comparison proposed by A. Peczenik and S. Urbina in ‘Why Officials? On Legal Positivism Old and New’, RT 27 (1995), p. 142: “First of all, the concept ‘valid law’ according to its ordinary use, is like ‘pregnancy’: one is either pregnant or not, one cannot be pregnant to some extent”. Cf. a different opinion, provided by R.S. Summers, ‘Toward a Better General Theory of Legal Validity’, RT 16 (1985), pp. 72ff. and ‘Positivism, Natural Law and the Theory of Legal Validity’ in idem, Essays on the Nature of Law and Legal Reasoning, Berlin 1992, pp. 52ff. In his papers, Summers presents arguments supporting the thesis that the positivist conceptual dichotomy of validity and invalidity is too strict and must be changed. L.J. Wintgens argues similarly in ‘Legisprudence: Elements for a New Theory of Legislation’, AS 3 (1999), p. 203 ff. where he does not hesitate in suggesting that the concept of being pregnant (treated as an analogue to the concept of formal validity) has a classifying character only due to technological development, while the formal validity of norms is construed by him as a classifying term purely by means of adopting the external perspective. See also A. Ross’ standpoint, discussed in Chap. 7 at p. 316.
- 12.
- 13.
For further detail see Chap. 4 at pp. 63ff.
- 14.
I would like to stress that my intention is not to give an overall presentation and critical analysis of this conception, but I aim primarily at making use of some ideas put forward in it. In other words, it would be an over-interpretation if the Reader treated the first part of this study as a monograph on German nonpositivism. On the other hand, it was particularly in the third and fourth chapters that I decided to devise a more detailed description of the analysed conception and to also identify in the footnotes – besides source texts – a number of recommendable studies that may be useful for those interested in developing their knowledge about the contemporary German nonpositivist concept of law and its critique. These decisions undoubtedly influenced the volume of the book and also made it necessary to discuss many topics that are only loosely related to the juristic concept of legal validity. What is even worse is that these decisions of mine expose this study to a certain kind of objection, aptly formulated by Z. Ziembiński: “If I write in a review that a certain theoretical book includes 999 footnotes out of 777 bibliographic entries, it will be treated as the highest praise in the eyes of a scholar having the soul of a documentary, and as a scathing critique in the eyes of those who feel disgust for erudite exhibitionism” (Z. Ziembiński, Wstęp do aksjologii dla prawników [Introduction to Axiology for Lawyers], Warszawa 1990, p. 51). De gustibus non est disputandum. In any case, my only intention is to facilitate further studies for all those who are interested in the topics analysed in this work, as well as criticism for those who consider the theses and argumentation presented in this work as unfounded. Furthermore, a number of footnotes have the character of cross references, thus avoiding useless repetitions in the main text.
- 15.
L. Morawski, Co może dać nauce prawa postmodernism? [What Postmodernism Can Offer to Legal Science?], Toruń 2001, pp. 12ff.
- 16.
For more on this see Chap. 6 at p. 223 and Epilogue at pp. 539ff.
- 17.
In this book, I, consequently, use the terms “nonpositivist conception of law” and “nonpositivism” as the English equivalents to the terms “nichtpositivistische Konzeption des Rechts” and “Nichtpositivismus”; i.e., the names used in German-language jurisprudential literature in reference to the conception of law elaborated by R. Dreier and R. Alexy. By doing so, I follow the logical pattern of term creation – see e.g., Z. Ziembiński, Practical Logic, Warszawa/Dordrecht 1976, p. 33; cf. Chap. 4, pp. 70ff. The problem is that the terms usually used in the English jurisprudential literature: “non-positivist conception of law” and “non-positivism” are linguistically correct; however, they can easily give the wrong impression; namely, that Dreier’s and Alexy’s conception is the only non-positivist one. Arguably, the opposite is the case: the German nonpositivist conception of law is one of many non-positivist theories created in the legal theory of the second part of the twentieth century.
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Grabowski, A. (2013). Introduction. In: Juristic Concept of the Validity of Statutory Law. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27688-0_1
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