Abstract
This paper has built a pay off matrix of earnings management game between shareholders and managers, in which we analyzed the factors, including managerial risk preferences that impact the game, by solving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. With the analysis, we provide some suggestions for corporate governance about earnings management.
National Natural Science Foundation of China (70772087), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (DUT10ZD107), Supported by Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University(NCET-10-0281).
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Shuotong, X., Yanxi, L. (2012). Game Analysis of Earnings Management Considered Managerial Risk Preferences. In: Zhang, Y. (eds) Future Communication, Computing, Control and Management. Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering, vol 142. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27314-8_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27314-8_23
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