Advertisement

The Price of Civil Society

  • Russell Buehler
  • Zachary Goldman
  • David Liben-Nowell
  • Yuechao Pei
  • Jamie Quadri
  • Alexa Sharp
  • Sam Taggart
  • Tom Wexler
  • Kevin Woods
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7090)

Abstract

Most work in algorithmic game theory assumes that players ignore costs incurred by their fellow players. In this paper, we consider superimposing a social network over a game, where players are concerned with minimizing not only their own costs, but also the costs of their neighbors in the network. We aim to understand how properties of the underlying game are affected by this alteration to the standard model. The new social game has its own equilibria, and the price of civil society denotes the ratio of the social cost of the worst such equilibrium relative to the worst Nash equilibrium under standard selfish play. We initiate the study of the price of civil society in the context of a simple class of games. Counterintuitively, we show that when players become less selfish (optimizing over both themselves and their friends), the resulting outcomes may be worse than they would have been in the base game. We give tight bounds on this phenomenon in a simple class of load-balancing games, over arbitrary social networks, and present some extensions.

Keywords

Social Network Nash Equilibrium Civil Society Social Cost Congestion Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Ashlagi, I., Krysta, P., Tennenholtz, M.: Social Context Games. In: Proc. Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, pp. 675–683 (2008)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Awerbuch, B., Azar, Y., Epstein, A.: The Price of Routing Unsplittable Flow. In: Proc. Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 57–66 (2005)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Caragiannis, I., Flammini, M., Kaklamanis, C., Kanellopoulos, P., Moscardelli, L.: Tight Bounds for Selfish and Greedy Load Balancing. In: Bugliesi, M., Preneel, B., Sassone, V., Wegener, I. (eds.) ICALP 2006. LNCS, vol. 4051, pp. 311–322. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Chen, P.-A., Kempe, D.: Altruism, Selfishness, and Spite in Traffic Routing. In: Proc. Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 140–149 (2008)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E.: On the Price of Anarchy and Stability of Correlated Equilibria of Linear Congestion Games. In: Brodal, G.S., Leonardi, S. (eds.) ESA 2005. LNCS, vol. 3669, pp. 59–70. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Christodoulou, G., Koutsoupias, E.: The Price of Anarchy of Finite Congestion Games. In: Proc. Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 67–73 (2005)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Fotakis, D., Kontogiannis, S., Spirakis, P.: Selfish Unsplittable Flows. Theoretical Computer Science 348(2), 226–239 (2005)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Gairing, M., Lücking, T., Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B., Rode, M.: Nash Equilibria in Discrete Routing Games with Convex Latency Functions. Journal of Computer Systems Science 74(7), 1199–1225 (2008)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Hayrapetyan, A., Tardos, É., Wexler, T.: The Effect of Collusion in Congestion Games. In: Proc. Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 89–98 (2006)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Kothari, A., Suri, S., Tóth, C.D., Zhou, Y.: Congestion Games, Load Balancing, and Price of Anarchy. In: Proc. Workshop on Combinatorial and Algorithmic Aspects of Networking (2004)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Koutsoupias, E., Papadimitriou, C.H.: Worst-Case Equilibria. In: Proc. Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, pp. 404–413 (1999)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Lücking, T., Mavronicolas, M., Monien, B., Rode, M.: A New Model for Selfish Routing. Theoretical Computer Science 406(3), 187–206 (2008)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Meier, D., Oswald, Y.A., Schmid, S., Wattenhofer, R.: On the Windfall of Friendship: Inoculation Strategies on Social Networks. In: Proc. Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 294–301 (2008)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Monderer, D., Shapley, L.S.: Potential Games. Games and Economic Behavior 14, 124–143 (1996)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Putnam, R.: Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. Simon & Schuster (2000)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Rosenthal, R.W.: A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory 2, 65–67 (1973)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Roughgarden, T., Tardos, É.: How Bad is Selfish Routing? Journal of the ACM (2002)Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Silk, J.: Cooperation Without Counting: The Puzzle of Friendship. In: Hammerstein, P. (ed.) Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, pp. 37–54. MIT Press (2003)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Suri, S., Tóth, C.D., Zhou, Y.: Selfish Load Balancing and Atomic Congestion Games. Algorithmica 47(1), 79–96 (2007)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Watts, D.J., Strogatz, S.H.: Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks. Nature 393, 440–442 (1998)CrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Russell Buehler
    • 1
  • Zachary Goldman
    • 2
  • David Liben-Nowell
    • 1
  • Yuechao Pei
    • 2
  • Jamie Quadri
    • 3
  • Alexa Sharp
    • 3
  • Sam Taggart
    • 3
  • Tom Wexler
    • 3
  • Kevin Woods
    • 3
  1. 1.Carleton CollegeNorthfieldUSA
  2. 2.Denison UniversityGranvilleUSA
  3. 3.Oberlin CollegeOberlinUSA

Personalised recommendations