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Budget-Balanced and Nearly Efficient Randomized Mechanisms: Public Goods and beyond

  • Mingyu Guo
  • Victor Naroditskiy
  • Vincent Conitzer
  • Amy Greenwald
  • Nicholas R. Jennings
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7090)

Abstract

Many scenarios where participants hold private information require payments to encourage truthful revelation. Some of these scenarios have no natural residual claimant who would absorb the budget surplus or cover the deficit. Faltings [7] proposed the idea of excluding one agent uniformly at random and making him the residual claimant. Based on this idea, we propose two classes of public good mechanisms and derive optimal ones within each class: Faltings’ mechanism is optimal in one of the classes. We then move on to general mechanism design settings, where we prove guarantees on the social welfare achieved by Faltings’ mechanism. Finally, we analyze a modification of the mechanism where budget balance is achieved without designating any agent as the residual claimant.

Keywords

Competitive Ratio Budget Balance Incentive Compatibility Total Utility Valuation Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mingyu Guo
    • 1
  • Victor Naroditskiy
    • 2
  • Vincent Conitzer
    • 3
  • Amy Greenwald
    • 4
  • Nicholas R. Jennings
    • 2
  1. 1.Computer Science DepartmentUniversity of LiverpoolUK
  2. 2.School of Electronics and Computer ScienceUniversity of SouthamptonUK
  3. 3.Department of Computer ScienceDuke UniversityUSA
  4. 4.Department of Computer ScienceBrown UniversityUSA

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