Abstract
Unknowable paradox threatens any theory that entails the principle of knowability. In this paper, I argue that the propositional attitude “knowing” is a a state that is undergoing change when we know something that was unknown before. And the unknowable paradox is in fact a denial of this change by contradictions. There are consistent and inconsistent theories for modeling change. In a view of physicalism, we propose to relate this propositional attitude to the present time of possible worlds based on the fact that the tense of its definition in order to avoid a inconsistent theory of change. It shows that theorem 5 of Fitch turns out to be that if there is an unknown truth now then it is unknown now that it is unknown truth now. It is compatible with the principle of knowability because speaking specially, it is still possible that it is known in a future time that it is an unknown now.
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Liu, L. (2012). An Epistemic Logic Based on Change and the Paradox of Unknowability. In: Wu, Y. (eds) Software Engineering and Knowledge Engineering: Theory and Practice. Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing, vol 115. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25349-2_49
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25349-2_49
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