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Revocation of Direct Anonymous Attestation

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Trusted Systems (INTRUST 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6802))

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Abstract

Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) is a special type of anonymous digital signatures, used by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) for the purpose of computer platform attestation whilst preserving platform anonymity. Like any other anonymous cryptographic primitives, how to efficiently revoke an existing member who is no longer legitimate, is an important and challenging subject for DAA. In this paper, we first explain two general DAA revocation approaches and a number of different DAA revocation degrees. We then present a variety of revocation mechanisms, which enable us to achieve these approaches and degrees in the existing three types of DAA schemes. Some of these mechanisms have already been shown in the literature and others are newly proposed in this paper.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Hewlett-Packard Laboratories, UK

    Liqun Chen

  2. Intel Labs, USA

    Jiangtao Li

Authors
  1. Liqun Chen
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  2. Jiangtao Li
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Hewlett-Packard Labs, Long Down Avenue, Stoke Gifford, BS34 8QZ, Bristol, UK

    Liqun Chen

  2. Google Inc. and Department of Computer Science, Columbia University, USA

    Moti Yung

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Chen, L., Li, J. (2011). Revocation of Direct Anonymous Attestation. In: Chen, L., Yung, M. (eds) Trusted Systems. INTRUST 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6802. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25283-9_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25283-9_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25282-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-25283-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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