Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games

  • Conference paper
Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 6982))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

Weakly-acyclic games – a superclass of potential games – capture distributed environments where simple, globally-asynchronous interactions between strategic agents are guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. We explore the class of routing games in [4, 12], which models important aspects of routing on the Internet. We show that, in interesting contexts, such routing games are weakly acyclic and, moreover, that pure Nash equilibria in such games can be found in a computationally efficient manner.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Log in via an institution
Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Babaioff, M., Kleinberg, R., Papadimitriou, C.H.: Congestion games with malicious players. In: MacKie-Mason, J.K., Parkes, D.C., Resnick, P. (eds.) ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 103–112. ACM, New York (2007)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Eliaz, K.: Fault tolerant implementation. Review of Economic Studies 69, 589–610 (2002)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  3. Fabrikant, A., Jaggard, A.D., Schapira, M.: On the structure of weakly acyclic games. In: Kontogiannis, S., Koutsoupias, E., Spirakis, P.G. (eds.) Algorithmic Game Theory. LNCS, vol. 6386, pp. 126–137. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Fabrikant, A., Papadimitriou, C.H.: The complexity of game dynamics: BGP oscillations, sink equilibria, and beyond. In: Teng, S.-H. (ed.) SODA, pp. 844–853. SIAM, Philadelphia (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Feigenbaum, J., Ramachandran, V., Schapira, M.: Incentive-compatible interdomain routing. In: Feigenbaum, J., Chuang, J.C.-I., Pennock, D.M. (eds.) ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 130–139. ACM, New York (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  6. Gao, L., Griffin, T., Rexford, J.: Inherently safe backup routing with BGP. In: INFOCOM, vol. 1, pp. 547–556. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2001)

    Google Scholar 

  7. Gao, L., Rexford, J.: Stable internet routing without global coordination. IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 9(6), 681–692 (2001)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Goemans, M., Mirrokni, V., Vetta, A.: Sink equilibria and convergence. In: FOCS, pp. 142–151. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  9. Goldberg, S., Halevi, S., Jaggard, A.D., Ramachandran, V., Wright, R.N.: Rationality and traffic attraction: Incentives for honest path announcements in BGP. In: Bahl, V., Wetherall, D., Savage, S., Stoica, I. (eds.) SIGCOMM, pp. 267–278. ACM, New York (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Gradwohl, R.: Fault tolerance in distributed mechanism design. In: Papadimitriou, C., Zhang, S. (eds.) WINE 2008. LNCS, vol. 5385, pp. 539–547. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  11. Jaggard, A.D., Schapira, M., Wright, R.N.: Distributed computing with adaptive heuristics. In: ICS, pp. 417–443. Tsinghua University Press, Beijing (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Levin, H., Schapira, M., Zohar, A.: Interdomain routing and games. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) STOC, pp. 57–66. ACM, New York (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  13. Marden, J.R., Young, H.P., Arslan, G., Shamma, J.S.: Payoff-based dynamics in multi-player weakly acyclic games. SIAM J. on Control and Optimization 48, 373–396 (2009)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  14. Milchtaich, I.: Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions. Games and Economic Behavior 13, 111–124 (1996)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  15. Monderer, D., Shapley, L.S.: Potential games. Games and Economic Behavior 14(1), 124–143 (1996)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  16. Nisan, N., Schapira, M., Valiant, G., Zohar, A.: Best-response mechanisms. In: ICS, pp. 155–165. Tsinghua University Press, Beijing (2011)

    Google Scholar 

  17. Rosenthal, R.W.: A class of games possessing pure-strategy nash equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory 2, 65–67 (1973)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

  18. Young, H.P.: The evolution of conventions. Econometrica 61(1), 57–84 (1993)

    Article  MathSciNet  MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa, 32000, Israel

    Roee Engelberg

  2. Department of Computer Science, Princeton University, NJ, USA

    Michael Schapira

Authors
  1. Roee Engelberg
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Michael Schapira
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni Università di Salerno, 84084, Fisciano, SA, Italy

    Giuseppe Persiano

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Engelberg, R., Schapira, M. (2011). Weakly-Acyclic (Internet) Routing Games. In: Persiano, G. (eds) Algorithmic Game Theory. SAGT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6982. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_26

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_26

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24828-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24829-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation