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Nash Bargaining and Proportional Fairness for Log-Convex Utility Sets

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Interference Calculus

Part of the book series: Foundations in Signal Processing, Communications and Networking ((SIGNAL,volume 7))

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Abstract

Interference calculus offers an analytical framework for modeling and optimizing utility tradeoffs between users (or players, agents). In this respect it is very similar to the game-theoretic approach. Game theory was originally introduced in the context of economics and social sciences. It is now a wellestablished tool for analyzing communication scenarios that would otherwise be too complex to be handled analytically [89–94]. Interference calculus complements existing concepts from game theory. It captures the essential properties of interference-coupled system, yet it is simple enough to be analytically tractable.

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Schubert, M., Boche, H. (2012). Nash Bargaining and Proportional Fairness for Log-Convex Utility Sets. In: Interference Calculus. Foundations in Signal Processing, Communications and Networking, vol 7. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24621-0_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24621-0_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24620-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24621-0

  • eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)

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