Abstract
In a distributed oblivious transfer (DOT) the sender is replaced with m servers, and the receiver must contact k (k ≤ m) of these servers to learn the secret of her choice. Naor and Pinkas introduced the first unconditionally secure DOT for a sender holding two secrets. Blundo, D’Arco, Santis, and Stinson generalized Naor and Pinkas’s protocol, in the case that the sender holds n secrets, in the first so-called (k, m)-DOT-\(\binom{n}{1}\) protocol. Such a protocol should be secure against a coalition of less than k parties. However, Blundo et al. have shown that this level of security is impossible to achieve in one-round polynomial-based constructions.
In this paper, we show that if communication is allowed amongst the servers, we are able to construct an unconditionally secure, polynomial-based (k, m)-DOT-\(\binom{n}{1}\) protocol with the highest level of security. More precisely, in our construction, a receiver who contacts k servers and corrupt up to k − 1 servers (not necessarily from the set of the contacted servers) cannot learn more than one secret.
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Corniaux, C.L.F., Ghodosi, H. (2011). Scalar Product-Based Distributed Oblivious Transfer. In: Rhee, KH., Nyang, D. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology - ICISC 2010. ICISC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6829. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_23
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