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Taking Mistakes Seriously: Equivalence Notions for Game Scenarios with off Equilibrium Play

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6953))

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Abstract

This paper investigates strategies for responding rationally to opponents who make mistakes. We identify two distinct interpretations of mistakes in the game theory literature: trembling hand and risk averse mistakes. We introduce the concept of an EFG Scenario, a game plus strategy profile, in order to probe the properties of these different types of mistake. An analysis of equivalence preserving transformations over EFG Scenarios reveals that risk averse mistakes are a form of rational play, while trembling hand mistakes are equivalent to moves by nature.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

    Alistair Isaac

  2. Educational Program for Gifted Youth, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

    Tomohiro Hoshi

  3. Logical Dynamics Lab, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA

    Alistair Isaac & Tomohiro Hoshi

Authors
  1. Alistair Isaac
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  2. Tomohiro Hoshi
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Sevilla, Camilo José Cela s/n, 41018, Sevilla, Spain

    Hans van Ditmarsch

  2. Université Paul Sabatier, IRIT, 118 Route de Narbonne, 31062, Toulouse Cedex 04, France

    Jérôme Lang

  3. Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, 510275, Guangzhou, China

    Shier Ju

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Isaac, A., Hoshi, T. (2011). Taking Mistakes Seriously: Equivalence Notions for Game Scenarios with off Equilibrium Play. In: van Ditmarsch, H., Lang, J., Ju, S. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6953. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24129-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24130-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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