Abstract
The logic of scientific justification is a central problem in the philosophy of science. Bayesianism is usually taken as the leading theory in this area. After a brief review of Bayesian account of scientific justification and learning theorists’ objection against Bayesianism, this paper proposes an argument defending Bayesianism. It is shown that Bayesian conditionalization has the necessary equipment to capture the idea of elimination induction, which functions as an indispensible component in a satisfactory account of scientific justification.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Earman, J.: Bayes or Bust. Bradford-MIT, Cambridge, MA (1992)
Kelly, K., Glymour, C.: Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Justification. In: Hitchcock, C. (ed.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, pp. 94–114. Blackwell, Malden (2004)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Yang, R., Tang, M. (2011). Bayesianism, Elimination Induction and Logical Reliability. In: van Ditmarsch, H., Lang, J., Ju, S. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6953. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_35
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_35
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24129-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24130-7
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)