Abstract
The notion of non-manipulability (or: strategy-proofness) used in the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem is too strong to make useful distinctions between voting rules.We explore alternative definitions and suggest how these can be used to classify voting rules.
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van Eijck, J.: A geometric look at manipulation. In: Leite, J., et al. (eds.) CLIMA XII 2011. LNCS(LNAI), vol. 6814, pp. 92–104. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Gibbard, A.: Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 41, 587–601 (1973)
Satterthwaite, M.: Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory 10, 187–217 (1975)
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van Eijck, J., Sietsma, F., Simon, S. (2011). Reflections on Vote Manipulation. In: van Ditmarsch, H., Lang, J., Ju, S. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6953. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_30
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_30
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24129-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24130-7
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