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A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality

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Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6953))

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Abstract

Epistemic game theory has shown the importance of informational contexts in understanding strategic interaction. We propose a general framework to analyze how such contexts may arise. The idea is to view informational contexts as the fixed-points of iterated, “rational responses” to incoming information about the agents’ possible choices. We show general conditions for the stabilization of such sequences of rational responses, in terms of structural properties of both the decision rule and the information update policy.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Tilburg Institute for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Netherlands

    Eric Pacuit

  2. Center for Mathematical Philosophy, LMU, Germany

    Olivier Roy

Authors
  1. Eric Pacuit
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  2. Olivier Roy
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Sevilla, Camilo José Cela s/n, 41018, Sevilla, Spain

    Hans van Ditmarsch

  2. Université Paul Sabatier, IRIT, 118 Route de Narbonne, 31062, Toulouse Cedex 04, France

    Jérôme Lang

  3. Institute of Logic and Cognition, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University, 510275, Guangzhou, China

    Shier Ju

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Pacuit, E., Roy, O. (2011). A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality. In: van Ditmarsch, H., Lang, J., Ju, S. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6953. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24130-7_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24129-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24130-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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