Abstract
The shoddy commodities in the online has become a serious challenge for Chinese E-business. This paper employs the game theory and develops a dynamic model to analysis the commodity quality and price in e-business market. According to the results, it implies that shoddy will reduce the market efficiency. Meanwhile, even though the market does not contain shoddy commodities, the efficiency will also lower. In order to counterfeit the bad commodities to the good commodities, the sellers should pay the extra cost, it indicates that the government should strengthen the supervision and the consumers should collect more information about the commodities.
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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Zhongyan, W., Qingguo, L., Xiao, W. (2011). Price, Quality and the E-Business Market. In: Wu, Y. (eds) Computing and Intelligent Systems. ICCIC 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 233. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24010-2_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24010-2_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24009-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24010-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)