Skip to main content

Trade Credit and Bank Lending under Asymmetric Information

  • Conference paper
  • 1286 Accesses

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 233))

Abstract

In trade credit, supplier allows retailer delay payment with some interest rate, which has become another financing resource just as bank lending. For retailers have private information, supplier and bank should provide different contracts to retailers with respect to their type. We analysis the trade credit and bank lending contract under the condition that the supplier and the bank can observe imprecise signal of the retailers’ type, and give the contracts which the supplier and bank should provide respectively.

This work is partially supported by the Foundation of Shanghai Maritime University #20100109 and Shanghai Association of Higher Funds #ZCGJ137-09.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Raghuran, R., Zingales, L.: What do We Know about Capital Structures? Some Evidence from International Data. Journal of Finance 50, 1421–1460 (1995)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  2. Petersen Mitchell, A., Rajan, R.: The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from small business Data. Journal of Finance 49, 3–37 (1994)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Fisman, R.: Trade Credit and Productive E.ciency in Developing Countries. World Development 29(2), 311–321 (2001)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  4. Santos, J.A.C., Longhofer, S.D.: The Paradox of Priority. Financial Management 32(1), 69–82 (2003)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  5. Mian Shehzad, L., Clifford, W., Smith, J.R.: Accounts Receivables Management Policy: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Finance 47, 169–200 (1992)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Cunat, V.: Trade Credit: Suppliers as Debt Collectors and Insurance Providers. Review of Financial Studies 20(2), 491–527 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  7. Lin Peter, W.-S., Mei Albert, K.-C.: The internal performance measures of bank lending: a value-added approach. Benchmarking: An International Journal 13(3), 272–289 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  8. Sherman, H.D., Gold, F.: Bank branch operating efficiency: evaluation with data envelopment analysis. Journal of Banking & Finance 9(2), 297–315 (1985)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  9. Cowling, M., Westhead, P.: Bank lending decisions and smallfirms: does size matter? International Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour & Research 2(2), 52–68 (1996)

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Ma, Z., He, J. (2011). Trade Credit and Bank Lending under Asymmetric Information. In: Wu, Y. (eds) Computing and Intelligent Systems. ICCIC 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 233. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24010-2_14

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24010-2_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-24009-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-24010-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics