Social Experiments and Computing

  • Dirk Helbing
Part of the Understanding Complex Systems book series (UCS)


Recent lab experiments by Traulsen et al. [5] for the spatial prisoner’s dilemma suggest that exploratory behavior of human subjects prevents cooperation through neighborhood interactions over experimentally accessible time spans. This indicates that new theoretical and experimental efforts are needed to explore the mechanisms offering fascinating explanations for a number of famous puzzles in the social sciences.


Behavioral Strategy Spatial Interaction Payoff Difference Cooperative Cluster Milgram Experiment 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dirk Helbing
    • 1
  1. 1.CLU E1ETH ZurichZurichSwitzerland

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