Abstract
Chinese needs of ironstone have been increased sharply since the new century. China has been the biggest buyer in the demanding market since 2003. But it’s puzzling that, the status of biggest buyer hadn’t given China sufficient authority of ironstone pricing since China entered the ironstone negotiation. The reasons are worth pondering. This paper will combine the related theory of bargain model to analyze the mechanism of ironstone negotiation and then to identify some of the reasons of defeat.
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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Zheng, X., Huang, H. (2011). The Game Analysis of the Reasons for Chinese Defeat in Iron Ore Negotiation——Based on the Bargain Model. In: Dai, M. (eds) Innovative Computing and Information. ICCIC 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 231. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23993-9_15
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23993-9_15
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23992-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23993-9
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