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The Game Analysis of the Reasons for Chinese Defeat in Iron Ore Negotiation——Based on the Bargain Model

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Book cover Innovative Computing and Information (ICCIC 2011)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 231))

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Abstract

Chinese needs of ironstone have been increased sharply since the new century. China has been the biggest buyer in the demanding market since 2003. But it’s puzzling that, the status of biggest buyer hadn’t given China sufficient authority of ironstone pricing since China entered the ironstone negotiation. The reasons are worth pondering. This paper will combine the related theory of bargain model to analyze the mechanism of ironstone negotiation and then to identify some of the reasons of defeat.

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References

  1. Shi, X.: Game Theory, pp. 166–168. Shanghai Finance University Press, Shanghai (2000)

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, P.R. China

    Xianyong Zheng & Hanmin Huang

Authors
  1. Xianyong Zheng
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  2. Hanmin Huang
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Suzhou University, No. 1, Shizi Street, 215006, Suzhou City, China

    Minli Dai

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Zheng, X., Huang, H. (2011). The Game Analysis of the Reasons for Chinese Defeat in Iron Ore Negotiation——Based on the Bargain Model. In: Dai, M. (eds) Innovative Computing and Information. ICCIC 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 231. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23993-9_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23993-9_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23992-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23993-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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