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The Regulation of Trade-Distorting Restrictions in Foreign Investment Law

An Investigation of China’s TRIMs Compliance

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European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2012

Part of the book series: European Yearbook of International Economic Law ((EUROYEAR,volume 3))

Abstract

Despite the relative lack of World Trade Organisation (WTO) coverage on investment, many WTO Members have seized on the WTO accession process as a lever to encourage prospective Members to go beyond the WTO agreements on investment and investment-related issues, and China is a very good case in point. To date the experience of China in the WTO, in relation to investment measures, can be described as a successful one. The Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) Agreement prohibits certain measures that violate the national treatment and quantitative restrictions requirements of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Prohibited TRIMs may include requirements to: achieve a certain level of local content; produce locally; export a given level/percentage of goods; balance the amount/percentage of imports with the amount/percentage of exports; transfer technology or proprietary business information to local persons; or balance foreign exchange inflows and outflows. These requirements may be mandatory conditions for investment, or they can be attached to fiscal or other incentives. As is suggested by the case law, China has been doing well because only a small number of disputes with China as the defending party include TRIMs measures. The absence of disputes does not however mean that all regulations are being fully complied with, and we identified a number of them which are good candidates for a prompt clarification.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    However, the extent to which BITs actually attract increased flows of foreign direct investment remains disputed. See Salacuse/Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, Harvard International Law Journal 46 (2005), pp. 67–127 (111).

  2. 2.

    From this dual perspective, China’s interests were on providing substantive protection for its investors abroad as well as opening new investment opportunities, while simultaneously consolidating through the undertaking of international obligations internal reforms conducive to promoting domestic market openings and a stable business environment. Given these interests, it may not come as a surprise that China also ranks high in the conclusion of bilateral investment agreements: China has signed 117 such treaties, outclassed only by Germany, which has a world-high of 133 BITs. These agreements negotiated outside of the WTO system, however, demonstrate China’s willingness to complement the commitments taken under the WTO in order to improve investment climate for foreign investors.

  3. 3.

    Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon, in: Herrmann/Terhechte (eds.), European Yearbook of International Economic Law (2010), 2010, p. 125.

  4. 4.

    On economic data, see e.g., Gugler/Chaisse, Patterns and dynamics of Asia’s growing share of FDI, in: Chaisse/Gugler (eds.), Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia: Strategic and Policy Challenges, pp. 4–7.

  5. 5.

    International investment regulation is an example par excellence for fragmentation in an important area of international economic law. See Boie/Chaisse/Gugler, The International Investment Framework – Regulatory Fragmentation Challenge in a Changing World Economy, in: Cottier/Delimatsis (eds.), The Prospects of International Trade Regulation – From Fragmentation to Coherence, 2011.

  6. 6.

    The “treatification” of international investment law shows the significant and quick recalibration of the law of international investment law over the last 20 years. Whereas in 1990 there were approximately 400 BITs negotiated worldwide, by 2010 the number of BITs negotiated globally stood at a staggering 2,740. However, as the number of bilateral investment treaties and regional agreements continues to expand, different standards and disciplines are beginning to be exerted over foreign investments. This might create confusion for MNEs operating on a global scale. See Salacuse, The Treatification of International Investment Law, Law and Business Review of the Americas 13 (2007), pp. 155–166.

  7. 7.

    Contemporary international of foreign direct investment is one of the fastest-growing areas of international economic regulation. Although national laws and policies still constitute the most concrete and detailed part of the legal framework of FDI, the current system has become increasingly dependent upon international treaties. Predictability may be enhanced when domestic policies and regulations are enshrined or locked into regional and bilateral treaties and agreements. See Xiao, Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties in the 21st Century, in: Chaisse/Gugler (eds), Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia: Strategic and Policy Challenges, 2009, pp. 4–7.

  8. 8.

    Three further agreements (the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM)) have only indirect effects on investment. The Agreement on Government Procurement deals with public procurements and services because GATS excludes public procurement services. The GPA requirements deal with investment once they apply to procurement of foreign products or services as well as to goods or services produced by locally established foreign suppliers. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures deals with subsidies. Because the Agreement includes in its definition of subsidies a number of commonly used investment incentives, it does not address this subject in terms of discrimination between foreign and domestic investment. For this reason, this Agreement tackles investment directly but it does not build up any significant incompatibility between foreign and domestic investment. Among them the TRIPs is the most interesting. It provides protection for intangible assets that form the basis of the activities of multinational corporations. It further requires that Members provide effective legal procedures and remedies for the enforcement of such rights.

  9. 9.

    To the extent that trade in services may require a commercial presence by a foreign service-provider in the territory of another state, the provider may enjoy certain investment rights under the GATS. In the GATS, China made specific commitments in nine out of the 12 large sectors contained in the classification list generally used by Members for GATS scheduling purposes. There are comprehensive commitments related to market access through commercial presence. China has passed laws and regulations which implement those commitments. For example, with regard to value-added, basic mobile voice and data services, Foreign Service providers were permitted to establish joint ventures with the foreign equity restricted to 30%, and the geographic restrictions of providing services were gradually eliminated. To regulate foreign investments in this sector, the ‘Provisions on Administration of Telecommunications Enterprises with Foreign Investment’ have been promulgated by the State Council in December 2001 and amended in September 2008 (Laws and regulations indicated in this article are available at: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/default.jsp?type=530). In April 2004, MOFCOM approved “Measure for the Administration on Foreign Investment in Commercial Field”, which permitted the establishment of foreign-funded commercial enterprises and cancelled the geographic restrictions as from 11th December, 2004. Similar foreign investment guidelines were issued by MOFCOM and other Ministries in service sectors, such as international maritime transportation (Provisions on the Administration of Foreign Investment in International Maritime Transportation, on 25th February, 2004) and advertising (Provisions on the Administration of Foreign-invested Advertising Enterprises, on 2nd March, 2004, amended on 22nd August, 2008).

  10. 10.

    As underscored by Pasha Hsieh, China “has become increasingly active in WTO rule-making by submitting proposals to revise WTO rules and by appointing Chinese nationals to WTO bodies”. But this movement has been reinforced by a significant shift “from having a passive attitude to acting preemptively in its litigation approach, as demonstrated by a series of complaints that China filed against the US and the European Union from 2007 to 2010”. See Hsieh, China’s Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity Building, Journal of International Economic Law 13 (2010) 4, p. 999.

  11. 11.

    China amended the Foreign Trade Law in 2004, which replaced the examination and approval procedures by a registration requirement for the right to trade in goods and technology. China has made efforts to improve transparency, e.g., publication of all foreign trade-related laws, regulations, and rules in the China Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Gazette, establishment of enquiry points and enquiry websites under the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), and regular notifications to the WTO (See also Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, People’s Republic of China, WT/TPR/S/161, 28th February, 2006).

  12. 12.

    Brewer/Young: Investment issues at the WTO: the architecture of rules and the settlement of disputes, Journal of International Economic Law 1 (1998) 3, p. 462.

  13. 13.

    Dunning, Multinational Enterprises and the Globalization of Innovatory Capacity, Research Policy 23 (1994) 1, pp. 67–88.

  14. 14.

    “As to which claims, those under Article III:4 of GATT or Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement, to examine first, we consider that we should firstly examine the claims under the TRIMs Agreement because the TRIMs Agreement is more specific than Article III:4 as far as the claims under consideration are concerned. A similar issue was presented in Bananas III, where the Appellate Body discussed the relationship between Article X of GATT and Article 1.3 of the Licensing Agreement and concluded that the Licensing Agreement being more specific it should have been applied first. This is also in line with the approach of the panel and the Appellate Body in the Hormones dispute, where the measure at issue was examined first under the SPS Agreement since the measure was alleged to be an SPS measure” (footnotes omitted). Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2nd July, 1998, para. 14.63.

  15. 15.

    Report of the Panel, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, 21st December, 2001, para. 7.158.

  16. 16.

    See Report of the Panel, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, 21st December, 2001, paras. 7.158–7.161. See Matsushita/Mavroidis/Schoenbaum, The World Trade Organization – Law, Practice and Policy, 2003, pp. 527–529.

  17. 17.

    “Under the principle of judicial economy, a panel only has to address the claims that must be addressed to resolve a dispute or which may help a losing party in bringing its measures into conformity with the WTO Agreement. The local content requirement aspects of the measures at issue have been addressed pursuant to the claims of the complainants under the TRIMs Agreement. We consider therefore that action to remedy the inconsistencies that we have found with Indonesia’s obligations under the TRIMs Agreement would necessarily remedy any inconsistency that we might find with the provisions of Article III:4 of GATT”. Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2nd July, 1998, para. 14.93.

  18. 18.

    Report of the Panel, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), L/5504 - 30 S/140, 7th February, 1984, p. 140.

  19. 19.

    Report of the Panel, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, 21st December, 2001, para. 7.157.

  20. 20.

    Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2nd July, 1998, para. 14.83.

  21. 21.

    Art. 5.2 TRIMs: “Each Member shall eliminate all TRIMs which are notified under paragraph 1 within two years of the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement in the case of a developed country Member, within five years in the case of a developing country Member, and within seven years in the case of a least-developed country Member”.

  22. 22.

    See Edwards/Lester, Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Stanford Journal of International Law 33 (1997), p. 169.

  23. 23.

    See Chaisse/Chakraborty, Implementing WTO Rules through Negotiations and Sanction: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 28 (2007) 1, pp. 153–186.

  24. 24.

    Chinese laws mentioned in this article are available at: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/ default.jsp?type = 530 (last visited on 15th March, 2011), most of which is also in an English version.

  25. 25.

    The comprehensive list of norms reviewed in this paper is provided in Annex 1: List of Chinese norms with Trade-distorting Restrictions in Foreign Investment Law. For an overview, see Wolff, Mergers and Acquisitions in China: Law and Practice, (3rd ed.) 2009, pp. 5–24.

  26. 26.

    The EJIL was adopted at the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress on 1st July, 1979. Under the Equity Joint Venture, the rights and obligations of the partners are divided in accordance with the equity/shares they possess.

  27. 27.

    The WFEL was adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth National People’s Congress on 12th April, 1986.

  28. 28.

    The CJVL was adopted at the First Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 13th April, 1988. Under the Contractual Joint Venture, everything, e.g., the investment or conditions for cooperation, the distribution of earnings, is defined by the joint venture contract between the partners.

  29. 29.

    They are the Regulations for the Implementation the Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture (hereafter the Implementation Regulations of the EJVL), promulgated by the State Council on 20th September, 1983; the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Law on Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprises (hereafter the Implementation Regulations of the WFEL), approved by the State Council on 28th October, 1990 and promulgated by the Ministery of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) on 12th December, 1990; and the Rules for the Implementation of the Law on Chinese–Foreign Contractual Joint Venture (hereafter the Implementation Regulations of the CJVL), approved by the State Council on 7th August, 1995 and promulgated by the MOFTEC on 4th September, 1995.

  30. 30.

    Accordingly, the Catalogue was promulgated in 2002, and the latest revision took place in 2007.

  31. 31.

    The latest revision in 2008.

  32. 32.

    To the point of view of the developing countries in this respect, see Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2004, p. 237.

  33. 33.

    The EJIL from 1979 was revised in 1990 and adopted at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress on 4th April, 1990.

  34. 34.

    The AB further affirms that “frequently the Legislator itself does not seek to control, through statute, all covered conduct. Instead it delegates to pre-existing or specially created administrative agencies or other public authorities, regulatory and supervisory tasks which are to be administered according to certain criteria and within discretionary limits set out by the Legislator. The discretion can be wide or narrow according to the will of the Legislator”. Report of the Panel, United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, 22nd December, 1999, para. 7.25.

  35. 35.

    Report of the Panel, United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, 22nd December, 1999, para. 7.24.

  36. 36.

    Paragraph 7.3 of the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23rd November, 2001. China’s major impact on WTO law stems from the special terms of the accession of this “gigantic transition economy”, many of which depart from the basic norms and principles of the WTO law, see: Qin, China, India, and the Law of the World Trade Organization, in: Sornarajah/Wang (eds.), China, India and the International Economic Order, 2010, p. 182.

  37. 37.

    It could be an interesting question whether the structure of those China’s commitments to TRIMs could contribute to the interpretation of the TRIMs Agreement, e.g., that export performance would be prohibited by the Agreement also, whereas technology transfers are not.

  38. 38.

    The Implementation Regulations of the CJVL were not subject to this revision, probably because they were promulgated in 1995, later than were the other basic investment laws, and they did not contain the prohibited TRIMs.

  39. 39.

    For a brief notification of this revision of the WTO by China, see Communication From China, G/TRIMS/W/27, 22nd October, 2002. Since then, China has made annual Communications, as follows: G/TRIMS/W/34 from 2003, G/TRIMS/W/40 from 2004, G/TRIMS/W/45 from 2005, G/TRIMS/W/51 from 2006, G/TRIMS/W/56 from 2007, G/TRIMS/W/59 from 2008, and G/TRIMS/W/64 from 2009. Except the Communication from 2008, other Communications did contain little, if any, new information.

  40. 40.

    Renumbered as Art. 10 of the EJVL (2001).

  41. 41.

    For a comprehensive description of this revision, see Shan, Towards a Level Playing Field of Foreign Investment in China, Journal of World Investment 3 (2002) 2, p. 327.

  42. 42.

    Ibid, p. 334.

  43. 43.

    Art. 8 of the 2005 Model BIT of the USA, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 117601.pdf (last visited on 20th January, 2011).

  44. 44.

    Art. 15.8 of the United States – Singapore Free Trade Agreement, available at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited on 20th January, 2011).

  45. 45.

    Art. 7 of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, available at: http://www.aseansec.org/ documents/FINAL-SIGNED-ACIA.pdf (last visited on 20th January, 2011).

  46. 46.

    Report of the Panel, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other Items, WT/DS56/R, 25th November, 1997, paras. 6.45–6.47. Regarding the same case, Report of the Appellate Body, Argentina – Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel and other items, WT/DS56/AB/R, 27th March, 1998, paras. 48–55. Also see Report of the Panel, Canada – Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R, 28th January, 2002, paras. 9.124 and 9.208, Report of the Panel, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, WT/DS34/R, 31st May 1999, para. 9.37.

  47. 47.

    Report of the Panel, United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R, 22nd December, 1999, para. 7.41.

  48. 48.

    National treatment is subject to a number of important exceptions, thus permitting differential treatment for various policy reasons. In the GATT 1994, the most common exceptions are stipulated in Art. III:8 (subsidisation and government procurement), Art. XVI (subsidies), Art. XIX (safeguard measures), Art. XX (general exceptions) and Art. XXI (security exceptions).

  49. 49.

    TRIMs Annex, para. 1.

  50. 50.

    TRIMs Annex, para. 1.

  51. 51.

    Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2nd July, 1998, para. 14.80.

  52. 52.

    Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2nd July, 1998, para. 14.82.

  53. 53.

    Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2nd July, 1998, paras. 14.89–14.91.

  54. 54.

    Report of the Panel, Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS55/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, 2nd July, 1998, para. 14.91.

  55. 55.

    TRIMs Annex, para. 2.

  56. 56.

    Report of the Panel, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, 21st December, 2001, para. 7.277.

  57. 57.

    Report of the Panel, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, 21st December, 2001, para. 7.278.

  58. 58.

    Report of the Panel, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector, WT/DS146/R, WT/DS175/R, 21st December, 2001, paras. 7.323–7.324.

  59. 59.

    Edwards/Lester, Towards a More Comprehensive World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, Stanford Journal of International Law 33 (1997), pp. 169 et seq.

  60. 60.

    Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a Problem?, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 24 (2003), p. 145.

  61. 61.

    China – Certain Measures Granting Refunds, Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments – Request for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS358/1, 7th February, 2007.

  62. 62.

    See also 2010 USTR Report to Congress on China’s WTO Compliance (hereafter the USTR Report), available at: http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2460 (last visited on 20th January, 2011), p. 68. The questionable Chinese measures discussed in this article are also noted by the USTR Report.

  63. 63.

    See for example Shan, Towards a Level Playing Field of Foreign Investment in China, Journal of World Investment 3 (2002) 2, p. 338.

  64. 64.

    See USTR Report, p. 67.

  65. 65.

    On this see Wolff, Mergers and Acquisitions in China: Law and Practice, (3rd ed.) 2009, p. 1.113.

  66. 66.

    Doubts have been expressed in 2008 by the EU delegation, see Committee on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Minutes of the Meeting Held on 23rd October, 2008, G/TRIMS/M/27, 29th October, 2008.

  67. 67.

    Report of the Panel, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, 18th July, 2008.

  68. 68.

    Report of the Panel, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, 18th July, 2008, paras. 3.1(a), 3.4(c), and 3.7(d). In addition, the United States claimed that the measures fell within paragraph 2(a) of the Illustrative List in Annex 1 to the TRIMs Agreement. (Report of the Panel, para. 3.4(c)).

  69. 69.

    Report of the Panel, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/R, WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, 18th July, 2008, paras. 8.2, 8.5, and 8.8. See also, Report of the Appellate Body, China – Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, WT/DS339/AB/R, WT/DS340/AB/R, WT/DS342/AB/R, 15th December, 2008.

  70. 70.

    UNCTAD, Recent Developments in International Investment Agreements (2008 – June 2009), IIA Monitor (2009) 3, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20098_en.pdf.

  71. 71.

    WTO, The Development Provisions, WT/WGT/W/119, available at: http://docsonline.wto.org.

  72. 72.

    But it did not provide for national treatment.

  73. 73.

    It is in the 1998 Sino-Barbadian BIT that for the first time China agreed to allow foreign investors to resort to international arbitral tribunals without specific consent from the Chinese government. See Hsieh, China’s Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity Building, Journal of International Economic Law, 13 (2010) 4, p. 1005.

  74. 74.

    China tended for many years to employ strategies of “dispute avoidance”, see Hsu, China, India and Dispute Settlement in the WTO and RTAs, in: Sornarajah/Wang (eds.), China, India and the International Economic Order, 2010, pp. 255–259.

  75. 75.

    See, for instance, China-Korea BIT, Art. 9.3. for a discussion, see Xiao, Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties in the 21st Century: Protecting Chinese Investment, in: Chaisse/Gugler (eds), Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia: Strategic and Policy Challenges, 2009, pp. 122–130.

  76. 76.

    The most usual procedural restrictions pertain to waiting periods and the exhaustion of local remedies. Both of these types of requirement are commonly found in Sino-Foreign BITs. Prior to the launch of the arbitration, foreign investors must hold negotiations with the host country’s authorities with a view to reaching an amicable settlement. Should these negotiations fail to bring the parties to a commonly agreed solution within a 6-month period, the investor may bring the claim to international arbitration. Whereas the great majority of Sino-Foreign BITs require a 6-month waiting period, a few agreements require somewhat shorter periods – i.e., 3 months: BITs with the Netherlands (2001), Germany (2003), and Finland (2004) – or, exceptionally, no waiting period at all – i.e., Ghana (1989).

  77. 77.

    For a detailed discussion to the new generation of Chinese BITs, see Xiao, Chinese Bilateral Investment Treaties in the 21st Century: Protecting Chinese Investment, in: Chaisse/Gugler (eds.), Expansion of Trade and FDI in Asia, 2009, p. 122. There are views that Chinese BITs should be divided into three generations, yet in different periods, see Cai, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, Journal of International Economic Law 12 (2009) 2, pp. 457 et seq. (462); Gallagher/Shan, Chinese Investment Treaties: Policies and Practice, 2009, pp. 35–43. Indeed, those changes which lead to the differentiation of three generations are also important. Nevertheless, the two-generations-analysis would be simpler and properly reflect the more significant and consistent improvements mentioned here.

Acknowledgements

The present article is part of the research entitled “the evolving international investment regime” led by Dr. Julien Chaisse at the Faculty of Law of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and which aims to investigate the evolution of investment law across relevant agreements and to discern patterns of congruence and divergence across key issue areas, substantive disciplines and countries and regions (See: http:www.law.cuhk.edu.hk). The author would like to thank Christian BELLAK, Ming DU, Pasha HSIEH, Xinjie LUAN and Jun XIAO for helpful comments. Different elements of this paper were presented at the Annual Conference of the Asian Law and Economics Association (AsLEA), Beijing, 23–24 August 2010. The author would also like to thank the conference participants for their discussion regarding the theoretical and policy implications of this research. Thanks also are due to Ms Yaling ZHANG from CUHK Faculty of Law for the background research and for producing the information synthesized in Table 1 and Annex 1.

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Annex 1: List of Chinese Norms with Trade-Distorting Restrictions in Foreign Investment Law

Available at: http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/ default.jsp?type = 530 (last visited on 15th March, 2011).

Annex 1: List of Chinese Norms with Trade-Distorting Restrictions in Foreign Investment Law

Law

  • Law on Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture, 2001; (PRC Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, Second Revision) Adopted in 1979, first amended in 1990

  • PRC Sino-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law Implementing Rules, adopted in 1983, revised in 1986, 1987 and 2001

  • PRC Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law, adopted in 1988, revised in 2000

  • PRC Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law Implementing Rules, adopted in 1988, revised in 2000

  • PRC Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law, adopted in 1986, revised in 2000

  • PRC Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises Law Implementing Rules, adopted in 1990, revised in 2001

  • Regulations on the Implementation of Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2008

  • Rules for the Implementation of the Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China for Enterprises with Foreign Investment and Foreign Enterprises, adopted in 1991. repealed

Regulations and Measures

  • Changes in Equity Interest of investors in Foreign-Invested Enterprises Several Provisions, 1997

  • Asset Reorganization by State-Owned Enterprises Using Foreign Investment Tentative Provisions, 1998

  • Investment within China by Foreign-Invested Enterprises Tentative Provisions, 2000

  • Merger and Division of Foreign-Invested Enterprises Provisions (Revised), 2001

  • Issues Relevant to the Transfer of State-Owned Shares and Legal Person Shares in Listed Companies to Foreign Investor Circular, 2002

  • Using Foreign Investment to Reorganize State-Owned Enterprises Tentative Provisions, 2003

  • Decision of the State Council on Reforming Foreign Investment System, 2004

  • Administration of Equity Investment of Overseas Financial Institutions in Chinese-Funded Financial Institutions Procedures, 2004

  • Measures for the Administration on Foreign Investment in Commercial Fields, 2004

  • Supplementary Provisions on the Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Provisions (or Supplementary Provisions on the Establishment of Investment Companies by Foreign Investors), 2006

  • Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Provisions, 2004

  • Supplementary Provisions to the Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions, 1999

  • Establishment of Companies with an Investment Nature by Foreign Investors Tentative Provisions, 1995

  • Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors Procedures, 2005

  • Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (Amended in 2007)

  • The Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (Amended in 2004)

  • Administration of the Takeover of listed Companies Procedures, 2007

  • Guidelines for the Administration of Entry of Foreign Investments, 2008

  • Provisions of State Council on Declaration Threshold for Concentration of Business Operators, 2009

  • Catalogue of Dominant Industries for Foreign Investments in Central and Western China, 2009

  • Provisions on Merger and Acquisiton of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, adopted in 2003, revised in 2006, 2009

  • Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Launching the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 2011

  • Interim Provisions on Issues Related to the Implementation of the Security Review System for Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors, 2011

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Chaisse, J. (2012). The Regulation of Trade-Distorting Restrictions in Foreign Investment Law. In: Herrmann, C., Terhechte, J. (eds) European Yearbook of International Economic Law 2012. European Yearbook of International Economic Law, vol 3. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23309-8_5

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