Abstract
This paper deals with the incentive and restrictive mechanism based on the principal-agent relationship between the fund companies and fund managers. Through the establishment of multi-phase dynamic game model, we analyzed and compared the excitations under explicit contract mechanisms with and without considering the reputation effect. We have come to the conclusion that reputation has better incentive and restriction effect on fund managers’ behavior and will improve the economic efficiency. On this basis, we analyzed the internal mechanism of the long-term incentive role which the reputation effect plays, and then made a number of recommendations on how the reputation effect can operate to motivate fund managers effectively.
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Liu, C., Zhou, Y. (2011). Reputation-Based Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms for Fund Managers. In: Zhou, Q. (eds) Advances in Applied Economics, Business and Development. ISAEBD 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 209. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23020-2_26
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23020-2_26
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23019-6
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23020-2
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