Abstract
The revenue between Dutch auction, American auction and hybrid auction can not be compared by auction theory. The paper establishes a statistical empirical model and uses the data of China’s treasury auction market to examine the revenue between Dutch auction, American auction and hybrid auction. The paper has three important conclusions and the hybrid auction can prevent the winner’s course and collusion. It is the better treasury auction format for the seller.
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Bai, Y., Zhang, Y. (2011). Empirical Study of Treasury Auction Formats. In: Zhou, Q. (eds) Advances in Applied Economics, Business and Development. ISAEBD 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 209. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23020-2_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23020-2_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23019-6
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