Abstract
This paper proposes an approach to design behaviour-based double auction mechanisms that are adaptive to market changes under the Trading Agent Competition Market Design platform. Because of the dynamics of the market environment, it is not feasible to test a mechanism in all kinds of environments. Since the strategies adopted by traders are well classified and studied, we will analyse and utilise the behaviour of traders with each kind of strategy, design specific (trader-dependent) mechanisms for attracting them, and finally integrate these trader-dependent mechanisms to achieve adaptive mechanisms.
This research was supported by the Australian Research Council through Discovery Project DP0988750.
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Zhao, D., Zhang, D., Perrussel, L. (2011). How to Make Specialists NOT Specialised in TAC Market Design Competition? Behaviour-Based Mechanism Design. In: Huemer, C., Setzer, T. (eds) E-Commerce and Web Technologies. EC-Web 2011. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 85. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23014-1_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23014-1_11
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