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The Impact of European Developments on German Codetermination and German Corporate Law

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German Corporate Governance in International and European Context

Abstract

For more than a decade, developments originating from the European Union (EU) have considerably impacted on German corporate governance. First, there have been several leading decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) which, to a large extent, have established for companies the freedom of settlement within the EU. These decisions, secondly, have influenced the national laws of the EU Member States. Thirdly, the EU has adopted its European Council Regulation of 8 October 2001 for the establishment of the European company (Societas Europaea (SE)) accompanied by a Council Directive on employee codetermination of the same day. Unexpectedly, the SE has become a success story within the last years in an unprecedented way. It not only serves the needs of big companies, but – to the astonishment of many observers – is also accepted as a form of incorporation by medium-sized and small companies. That success, fourthly, has spurned the struggle for the introduction of a European private company (the Societas Privata Europaea (SPE)), which shall be tailored to meet the special needs of small and medium-sized companies. There are good reasons to believe that, within the foreseeable future, the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European private company will successfully pass the legislative bodies of the EU. Fifthly, the EU has adopted the Directive on Cross-Border Mergers of limited liability companies of 26 October 2005 which has been implemented by the insertion, in April 2007, of new statutory provisions into the German Transformation Statute (Umwandlungsgesetz). Another topic which has been hotly debated over recent years, is the topic of cross-border transfers of companies and here there are two types of transfers possible and relevant for our discussions, namely transferring of companies’ registered seats (place where a company was incorporated or formed and where it appears on the a country’s ‘Register of Companies’) and transferring of companies’ seats of administration (place where a company has its main administrative headquarters, also called real or actual seat). There is still considerable confusion about the exact legal rules applicable and their effect on companies when there are cross-border transfers of companies and these uncertainties apply to transfers of companies’ registered seats as well as to transfers of companies’ administrative seats.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See 6.2.

  2. 2.

    See 6.3.

  3. 3.

    See 6.4.

  4. 4.

    See 6.5.

  5. 5.

    See 6.6.

  6. 6.

    See Sect. 6.7.

  7. 7.

    See Sect. 6.8.

  8. 8.

    See Sect. 6.8.1 (first part).

  9. 9.

    See Sect. 6.8.1 (second part).

  10. 10.

    As to the basic policies behind that theory and as to its origins see Werner Ebke, ‘Der Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts auf das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht in Deutschland: Rezeption oder Abwehr?’, in: Werner Ebke, Siegfried Elsing et al. (eds), Das deutsche Wirtschaftsrecht unter dem Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a.M. 2011) 175 at 182.

  11. 11.

    That theory is followed, e.g. in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Austria, Portugal, Spain and Greece. Cf Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Jan Kropholler (ed) Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin 1998) paras 153 et seq; Peter Behrens, Die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung im internationalen und europäischen Recht (2nd ed de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin 1997) 4 et seq.

  12. 12.

    The German courts have applied that theory since the beginning of the twentieth century, and the majority of the German legal scholars applauded it. See Peter Kindler, ‘Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Hans-Jürgen Sonnenberger (ed), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch: Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, (vol 11, CH Beck Verlag, München 2006) paras 433 et seq, 493 et seq. See also Paul Rose, ‘EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities after CENTROS’ (2001) 11 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 126.

  13. 13.

    The historic origins and the policies behind that theory are elucidated by Werner Ebke, ‘Der Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts auf das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht in Deutschland: Rezeption oder Abwehr?’ in Werner Ebke, Siegfried Elsing et al. (eds), Das deutsche Wirtschaftsrecht unter dem Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a. M. 2011) at 181.

  14. 14.

    A plethora of German legal writings on that theory itself and on its shortcomings has emerged in recent years. A description of its basic rules may be found in some handbooks like Gerhard Kegel and Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (9th ed CH Beck Verlag, München 2004) 575 et seq; Christian von Bar, Internationales Privatrecht, (vol 1, CH Beck Verlag, München 1991) 449 et seq; Karl Firsching and Bernd von Hoffmann, Internationales Privatrecht (7th ed, CH Beck Verlag, München 2002) 268 et seq; Jan Kropholler, Internationales Privatrecht (5th ed, Mohr and Siebeck Verlag, Tuebingen 2004) 557 et seq; Kurt Siehr, Internationales Privatrecht (CF Müller Verlag, Heidelberg 2001) 304 et seq. For a more detailed description, see Bernhard Großfeld, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Jan Kropholler (ed) Staudinger, Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch (de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin 1998) paras 141 et seq; Peter Behrens, Die Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung im internationalen und europäischen Recht (2nd ed de Gruyter Verlag, Berlin 1997); Peter Kindler, ‘Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht’ in Hans-Jürgen Sonnenberger (ed), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch: Internationales Handels- und Gesellschaftsrecht, (vol 11, CH Beck Verlag, München 2006) paras 312 et seq.

  15. 15.

    See in particular Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, ‘Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa’ (1990) 154 ZHR 325.

  16. 16.

    The Treaty on the European Coal and Steel Community already had been entered into in 1951. It was joined, in 1957, by the Treaty on the European Economic Community and the Treaty on the European Atomic Energy Community. The two latter Treaties are summarised under the term ‘Treaties of Rome’.

  17. 17.

    They are the free movement of goods (Art 28 et seq TFEU), the free movement of workers (Art 45 et seq TFEU), the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State including that freedom of establishment for companies and firms (Art 49 et seq TFEU), the freedom to provide services within the Union (Art 56 et seq TFEU), and the freedom of movements of capital and payments between Member States and third countries (Art 63 et seq TFEU).

  18. 18.

    See its Arts 52, 58.

  19. 19.

    Some of them will be cited below in this chapter.

  20. 20.

    See Jean J. du Plessis and Otto Sandrock, ‘The Rise and the Fall of Supervisory Codetermination in Germany’ (2005) 16 Intl Company and Commercial L J 67–79.

  21. 21.

    The so-called Lisbon Treaty which entered into effect on 1 December 2009. It has completely remodeled the former Amsterdam (1997)- and Nizza (2001)-‘Treaty Establishing the European Community’ (EC-Treaty).

  22. 22.

    ECJ 9 Mar 1999 (Case C-212/97) Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR 1–1459, (1999) 54 BB 809.

  23. 23.

    ECJ 5 Nov 2002 (Case C-208/00) Ueberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), (2002) 57 BB 2402.

  24. 24.

    ECJ 30 Sept 2003 (Case C-167/01) Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, (2003) 58 BB 2195.

  25. 25.

    ECJ 11 Mar 2004 (Case C-9/02) Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, [2004] RIW 392.

  26. 26.

    See 6.2.2.5.

  27. 27.

    Among the great number of commentaries on this decision see Peter Kindler, ‘Niederlassungsfreiheit für Scheinauslandsgesellschaften?’ (2000) 53 NJW 1993; Heribert Hirte, ‘Die Entwicklung des Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrechts in Deutschland in den Jahren 1998 und 1999’ (2000) 53 NJW 3321; Horst Eidenmüller, ‘Wettbewerb der Gesellschaftsrechte in Europa’ (2002) 23 ZIP 2233; Christian Kersting, ‘Corporate Choice of Law―A Comparison of the United States and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive (2002) 28 Brooklyn J Intl L 1, 13 et seq; Marc-Philippe Weller, ‘Scheinauslandsgesellschaften nach Centros, Überseering und Inspire Art’ (2003) 23 IPRax 207; Peter Kindler, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Briefkastengesellschaft?’ (2003) 56 NJW 1073; Otto Sandrock, ‘Die Schrumpfung der Überlagerungstheorie’ (2003) 102 ZVglRWiss 447, 452 et seq.

  28. 28.

    As to the different national regimes established in the member states of the EU with regard to codetermination or employee participation at supervisory board level, see the collection of articles in Theodor Baums and Peter Ulmer (eds), Unternehmensmitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer im Recht der EU-Mitgliedstaaten/ Employees’ Co-Determination in the Member States of the European Union (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, Heidelberg 2004).

  29. 29.

    The Centros decision was open to several interpretations. See Paul Rose, ‘EU Company Law Convergence Possibilities after CENTROS’ (2001) 11 Transnat’l L & Contemp Probs 121.

  30. 30.

    Jens C Dammann, ‘The Future of Codetermination after CENTROS: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the US Model?’ (2003) 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 607, para 617 summarises the Centros judgment as follows: ‘It is contrary to Articles [43 (ex-Article 52)] and [46 (ex-Article 58)] of the EC Treaty for a Member State to refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State in which it has its registered office but in which it conducts no business where the branch is intended to enable the company in question to carry on its entire business in the State in which that branch is to be created, while avoiding the need to form a company there, thus evading application of the rules governing the formation of companies which, in that State, are more restrictive as regards paying of a minimum share capital.’

  31. 31.

    ECJ 9 Mar 1999 (Case C-212/97) Centros Ltd v Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 ECR 1–1459 no 27, (1999) 54 BB 809.

  32. 32.

    See, among others, Peter Kindler, ‘Niederlassungsfreiheit für Scheinauslandsgesellschaften?’ (2000) 53 NJW 1993; Peter Kindler, ‘Auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Briefkastengesellschaft?’ (2003) 56 NJW 1073.

  33. 33.

    ECJ 5 Nov 2002 (Case C-208/00) Ueberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), (2002) 57 BB 2402.

  34. 34.

    Published in (2000) 20 IPRax 423 and (2000) 46 RIW 555.

  35. 35.

    See the commentaries by Werner Ebke, ‘Überseering: Die wahre Liberalität ist Anerkennung’ (2003) 58 JZ 927; Daniel Zimmer, ‘Wie es Euch gefällt? Offene Fragen nach dem Überseering-Urteil des EuGH’ (2003) 58 BB 1; Erich Schanze and Andreas Jüttner, ‘Anerkennung und Kontrolle ausländischer Gesellschaften―Rechtslage und Perspektiven nach der Überseering-Entscheidung des EuGH’ (2003) 48 AG 30; Stefan Leible and Jochen Hoffmann, ‘Überseering und das (vermeintliche) Ende der Sitztheorie’ [2002] RIW 925; Wienand Meilicke, ‘Die Niederlassungsfreiheit nach ‘Überseering’ (2003) 94 GmbHR 793; Walter G Paefgen, ‘Auslandsgesellschaften und Durchsetzung deutscher Schutzinteressen nach ‘Überseering’ (2003) 56 DB 487.

  36. 36.

    ECJ 5 Nov 2002 (Case C-208/00) Ueberseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), no 92, (2002) 57 BB 2402.

  37. 37.

    Ibid.

  38. 38.

    ECJ 30 Sep 2003 (Case C-167/01) Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, (2003) 58 BB 2195.

  39. 39.

    See the commentaries on that decision by Christian Kersting and Clemens Ph. Schindler, ‘The ECJ’s Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its Effects on Practice’ (2003) 4 German L J 1277; Peter Behrens, ‘Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach dem Überseering-Urteil des EuGH und den Schlußanträgen zu Inspire Art’ (2003) 23 IPRax 193; Daniel Zimmer, ‘Nach ‘Inspire Art’: Grenzenlose Gestaltungsfreiheit für deutsche Unternehmen?’ (2003) 56 NJW 3585; Gerold Spindler and Olaf Berner, ‘Inspire Art―Der europäische Wettbewerb um das Gesellschaftsrecht ist endgültig eröffnet’ [2003] 49 RIW 949; Stefan Leible and Jochen Hoffmann, ‘Wie inspiriert ist ‘Inspire Art’?’ (2003) EuZW 677; Erich Schanze and Andreas Jüttner, ‘Die Entscheidung für Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung ‘Inspire Art’ (2003) 48 AG 661; Silja Maul and Claudia Schmidt, ‘Inspire Art―Quo vadis Sitztheorie?’ (2003) 58 BB 2297.

  40. 40.

    ECJ 30 Sep 2003 (Case C-167/01) Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, no 142, (2003) 58 BB 2195.

  41. 41.

    Para 1 of that Article provided: “The provisions of this Chapter and measures taken in pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.”

  42. 42.

    ECJ 11 Mar 2004 (Case C-9/02) Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, (2004) 50 RIW 392.

  43. 43.

    See the commentaries by Gerhard Kraft and Markus Müller, ‘Schlußfolgerungen aus der EuGH-Entscheidung zur französischen Wegzugsbesteuerung (Saillant) für die internationale Steuerberatungspraxis aus deutscher Sicht’ (2004) 50 RIW 366; Klaus Eicker, ‘Commentary’ (2004) 15 EWS 186. In Germany, the taxation of persons transferring their residence abroad is framed similarly. As a consequence of the ECJ decision, the EC has demanded the German Government to change its laws accordingly (FAZ 20 April 2004, 12).

  44. 44.

    Case C-41/03, [2005] ECR I-10805.

  45. 45.

    See 6.6 and, in particular 6.6.1.

  46. 46.

    In this context see also the decision of the ECJ in the matter of Cadbury Schweppes v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue dealing with a problem of taxation; Case C-196/04 [2006 I-07995].

  47. 47.

    Case C-81/87, [1988] ECR 05483.

  48. 48.

    See no. 19 of the decision.

  49. 49.

    See no. 23 of the decision.

  50. 50.

    See nos. 24 and 25 of the decision.

  51. 51.

    See, for example, the recent publication by Andreas Weng, ‘Die Rechtssache Cartesio – Das Ende Daily Mails?’, (2008) 19 EWS 261–272. As to earlier publications see Otto Sandrock and Andreas Austmann, ‘Das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht nach der Daily Mail-Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes: Quo vadis?’ (1989) 35 RIW 249–253; Brigitte Knobbe-Keuk, ‘Umzug von Gesellschaften in Europa’, (1990) 154 ZHR 325; Peter Behrens, ‘Die grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften in der EWG’, (1989) 9 IPrax 354 at 357–359.

  52. 52.

    Decision of 16 December 2008, Case C-210/05, [2008] ECR I-09641. See the rather exhausting analysis of that decision by Dirk Barthel ‘Die Niederlassungsfreiheit der Gesellschaften nach EuGH “Cartesio”’, (2010) 20 EWS 316–330.

  53. 53.

    See no. 21 of the decision.

  54. 54.

    See nos. 100, 119 of the decision.

  55. 55.

    See no. 24 of the decision.

  56. 56.

    See nos. 16, 17 of the decision.

  57. 57.

    See no. 20 of the decision.

  58. 58.

    Of 22 May 2008; available in the internet.

  59. 59.

    See no. 36 of the opinion sub (4).

  60. 60.

    See no. 27 of the opinion.

  61. 61.

    See no. 34 of the opinion sub (4).

  62. 62.

    See, for example, Christoph Behme and Nicolas Nohlen, ‘Entscheidung überraschend für die Praxis’, (2009) 64 BB 13,14; Heinz Kußmaul and Lutz Richter, ‘Grenzenlose Mobilität?! – Zum Zuzug und Wegzug von Gesellschaften in Europa’, (2008) 20 EWS 1–10; Stefan Leible and Jochen Hoffmann, Cartesio – fortgeltende Sitztheorie, grenzüberschreitender Formwechsel und Verbot materiellrechtlicher Wegzugbeschränkungen’, (2009) 64 BB 58–63; Andreas Weng, Die Rechtssache Cartesio – Das Ende Daily Mails?’ (2008) 19 EWS 264–272; Christoph Behme and Nicolas Nohlen, ‘Zur Wegzugsfreiheit von Gesellschaften’ (2008) 11 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (NGZ) 496–498.

  63. 63.

    Sub no. 4 of its rulings (para 125) the Court decreed:

    As Community law now stands, Articles 43 EC and 48 EC are to be interpreted as not precluding legislation of a Member State under which a company incorporated under the law of that Member State may not transfer its seat to another Member State whilst retaining its status as a company governed by the law of the Member State of incorporation.

  64. 64.

    See no. 109 of the opinion.

  65. 65.

    See, for example, Daniel Zimmer and Christoph Naendrup, ‘Das Cartesio-Urteil des EuGH: Rück- oder Fortschritt für das internationale Gesellschaftsrecht?’ (2009) NJW 545; Stefan Leible and Jochen Hoffmann, ‘Cartesio – fortgeltende Sitztheorie, grenzüberschreitender Formwechsel und Verbot materiellrechtlicher Wegzugsbeschränkungen’ (2009) 64 BB 58; Walter Bayer and Jessica Schmidt, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Sitzverlegung und grenzüberschreitende Restrukturierungen nach MoMiG, Cartesio und Trabrennbahn’ (2009) 173 ZHR 735 at 742–744; Philipp Bollacher, ‘Keine Verletzung der Niederlassungsfreiheit durch nationale Beschränkungen des Wegzugs von Gesellschaften’ (2009) 55 RIW 150; Peter Kindler, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht 2009: MoMiG, Trabrennbahn, Cartesio und die Folgen‘, (2009) 29 IPrax 189 at 190.

  66. 66.

    See no. 112 of the decision.

  67. 67.

    See, for example, Peter Kindler, ‘Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht 2009: MoMiG, Trabrennbahn, Cartesio und die Folgen’ (2009) 29 IPrax 189 at 191.

  68. 68.

    See the proviso in the last part of no. 112 of the decision.

  69. 69.

    See < http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/company/seat-transfer/2004-concult_en.htm>.

  70. 70.

    See Impact Assessment by the EC of December 2007, <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/seat-transfer/index_en.htm>.

  71. 71.

    See the Commission’s Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Statute for a European private company (COM (200) 396/3). That Proposal is in detail dealt with below sub 6.5.

  72. 72.

    See Chapter VII of the Commission’s Proposal for such Regulation of 2008 (COM (2008) 396/3). The German Study Group for Stock Corporation and Capital Markets Law (see 6.4.8) pleads, however, for the continuation of the Commission’s work on a Directive on the Transfer of Registered Seats quoting persuasive reasons for such an initiative, (2011) 14 NZG 98.

  73. 73.

    Antwort der Bundesregierung auf Kleine Anfrage, Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 16/12403 v.24. 3. 2009.

  74. 74.

    See 6.4.3.

  75. 75.

    The German rules on codetermination are however not regarded as part of the German ordre public (in the meaning of Art 9 para 2 of Regulation (EC) No. 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Official Journal L 177/6 of 4 July 2008) reading: “Nothing in this Regulation shall restrict the application of the overriding mandatory provisions of the law of the forum”). For further details see Otto Sandrock, ‘Gehören die deutschen Regelungen über die Mitbestimmung auf Unternehmensebene wirklich zum deutschen ordre public?’ (2004) 49 AG 57, 65; Martin Veit and Joachim Wichert, ‘Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung bei europäischen Kapitalgesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland nach “Überseering” und “Inspire Art”‘(2004) 49 AG 14–15, 17.

  76. 76.

    See further 6.3.1.2.

  77. 77.

    See (2005) 60 BB 1016 et seq; (2005) 58 NJW 1648 et seq; [2005] 51 RIW 542. The BGH was followed by the Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht) Hamm, (2006) 61 BB 24 which had extended the purview of the theory of incorporation even to companies from non-EU-States.

  78. 78.

    See Otto Sandrock, ‘Niederlassungsfreiheit und Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht’ [2005] 16 EWS 529.

  79. 79.

    Sub II 2 b of the reasons of the judgment.

  80. 80.

    Ibid.

  81. 81.

    (2002) 57 BB 2031.

  82. 82.

    The European Economic Area (EEA) is organised under an Agreement of 1993. It comprises the 27 Member States of the EU and the three EEA/EFTA States Liechtenstein, Iceland, Norway. Switzerland, however, is not a member.

  83. 83.

    Art 31 para 1 of that Treaty provides that there shall be no restrictions on the freedom of establishment of an EC Member State or an EFTA State in the territory of any other of these States.

  84. 84.

    European Free Trade Agreement of 1960 to which Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland are members.

  85. 85.

    The judgment has been thoroughly analysed by Werner Ebke, ‘Der Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts auf das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht in Deutschland: Rezeption oder Abwehr?’‘ in: Werner Ebke, Siegfried Elsing et al.(eds), Das deutsche Wirtschaftsrecht unter dem Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a. M. 2011) 175 at 196. For a thorough review of the German position vis-à-vis “third state” companies see the recent study by Werner Ebke, ‘Gesellschaften aus nicht privilegierten Drittstaaten im Internationalen Privatrecht’, in Michael Hoffmann-Becking, Peter Hommelhoff and Friedrich Graf von Westphalen (eds.), Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Hellwig (Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) 117–141.

  86. 86.

    (2002) 57 BB 3031.

  87. 87.

    As to the rather devastating effects on Swiss companies with their centers of administration in Germany see Werner Ebke, ‘Der Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts auf das Internationale Gesellschaftsrecht in Deutschland: Rezeption oder Abwehr?’, in: Werner Ebke, Siegfried Elsing et al. (eds), Das deutsche Wirtschaftsrecht unter dem Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Frankfurt a. M. 2011) 175 at 197.

  88. 88.

    But see the arguments in favour of the two sub-rules brought forward by Werner Ebke, ‘Gesellschaften aus nicht privilegierten Drittstaaten im Internationalen Privatrecht’, in Michael Hoffmann-Becking, Peter Hommelhoff and Friedrich Graf von Westphalen (eds.), Festschrift für Hans-Jürgen Hellwig (Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt Köln, 2010).

  89. 89.

    Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany 1956 Part II 488.

  90. 90.

    Judgment of 29 January 2003 (BGHZ 153, 353 = (2003) 49 RIW 473; judgment of 5 July 2004, (2004) 59 BB 1868 = (2004) 50 RIW 787; Judgment of 13 October 2004, (2004) 59 BB 2595.

  91. 91.

    Official Journal of the former “Reich” 1927 Part II 1088.

  92. 92.

    Translation by Otto Sandrock, one of the co-authors of this Chap. 6.

  93. 93.

    See Otto Sandrock, ‘Japanische Gesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland’ in Bernhard Großfeld et al. (eds), Probleme des deutschen, europäischen und japanischen Rechts (Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2006) 85.

  94. 94.

    Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany 1972 Part II 1042.

  95. 95.

    Translation by Otto Sandrock, one of the co-authors of this Chap. 6.

  96. 96.

    See Otto Sandrock, ‘Spanische Gesellschaften in Deutschland, deutsche Gesellschaften in Spanien: kollisionsrechtliche Probleme’ (2006) 52 RIW 658.

  97. 97.

    Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl. 1892, 477) (Official Journal of the former Reich, 1892 at 477).

  98. 98.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. 1965 I 1089) (Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1965, Part I at 1089).

  99. 99.

    Sec. 4a was inserted into the GmbHG by a statute of 22 June 1998 (Gesetz zur Neuregelung des Kaufmanns- und Firmenrechts und zur Änderung anderer handels- und gesellschaftsrechtlicher Vorschriften, Handelsrechtsreformgesetz – HRefG, BGBl. 1998 I 1471). In Germany, there is no central register of companies since such registers are administered by the local courts in each judicial district. Companies had sought to be registered in judicial districts far away from their creditors and, if possible, with lax registration practices. The new section sought to forestall such abuses by prescribing the registration in districts to which the companies were factually connected.

  100. 100.

    Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl. 2008 I 2026; Official Journal of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2008, Part I at 2026).

  101. 101.

    S 25 MoMiG.

  102. 102.

    That provision was already contained in the version in which the AktG had been amended in 1937.

  103. 103.

    Elke Bohl, ‘Die Mitbestimmung irritiert die ausländischen Investoren’ FAZ 20 Sept 2003, 14. See also Martin Veit and Joachim Wichert, ‘Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung bei europäischen Kapitalgesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland nach “Überseering” und “Inspire Art”’(2004) 49 AG 17 (fn 39); Peter Ulmer, ‘Editorial: Paritätische Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat von Großunternehmen—noch zeitgemäß?’ (2002) 166 ZHR 271, 273–274; Hans-Christoph Hirte, ‘Germany: The German Corporate Governance Code: Co-determination and Corporate Governance Reforms’ (2002) 23 Company Lawyer 349, 355.

  104. 104.

    See Volker Triebel and Christopher Horton, ‘Will more English plcs take off in Germany?’ [2006] Intl Financial L Rev 35; FAZ 18 Aug 2006, 14; FAZ 13 Sept 2006, 22.

  105. 105.

    Ibid.

  106. 106.

    See 6.4.

  107. 107.

    Jens C Dammann, ‘The Future of Codetermination after CENTROS: Will German Corporate Law Move Closer to the US Model?’ (2003) 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 607 paras 685–86 argues that there are possibilities by which the German legislature could circumvent the negative consequences of the Centros decision on codetermination.

  108. 108.

    See Otto Sandrock, ‘Gesellschafter- und Geschäftsführerlisten von englischen Limiteds im deutschen Rechtsverkehr’, (2011) 57 RIW 1–12, in particular ibid. under I, 2 in footnotes 2, 3 and 4. Under the provisions of German company law relating to the registrations of foreign firms, these Ltds. are obliged to file for registration with the German registers maintained with the different German local courts. This obligation is even sanctioned by a fine. But despite of such sanction, only one third of these Ltds. are estimated to be registered in the German registers of companies.

  109. 109.

    See Otto Sandrock, ‘Gesellschafter- und Geschäftsführerlisten von englischen Limiteds im deutschen Rechtsverkehr’ (2011) 57 RIW 1–12.

  110. 110.

    The minimum capital is € 25,000 (see S 5 para 1 of the GmbHG). But when the officers of the company file for registration, only one fourth of that sum must have been paid in (see S 7 para 2 GmbHG).

  111. 111.

    There is a vast literature on this topic in Germany. Among many others see Klaus J. Müller, ‘Die englische Limited in Deutschland—für welche Unternehmen ist sie tatsächlich geeignet?’ (2006) 61 BB 837; Jochen Dierksmeyer, ‘Die englische Ltd in Deutschland—Haftungsrisiko für Berater’ (2006) 61 BB 1516, 1518; Gerhard Wegen/Johannes Schlichte, ‘GmbH oder EU-inländische Gesellschaft—die Qual der Wahl für Unternehmer und Berater in der Praxis’ (2006) 52 RIW 801.

  112. 112.

    Different rates of depreciation, for example.

  113. 113.

    See Jochen Dierksmeyer, ‘Kapitalgesellschaften aller Länder willkommen! Die deutsche GmbH im internationalen Wettbewerb der Rechtsformen 2010’, in Ebke / Elsing / Großfeld / Kühne, Das deutsche Wirtschaftsrecht unter dem Einfluß des US-amerikanischen Rechts, (Frankfurt a. M. 2011) 205–216 with further references.

  114. 114.

    The German co-author of this Chapter, Otto Sandrock, has been a member of that Committee.

  115. 115.

    Both Proposals with the reasons attached to them by the Commission are published in (2006) 52 RIW, Beilage 1 to issue 4, April 2006.

  116. 116.

    It provides that, inter alia, the following shall be determined by the law in effect at the place of incorporation: a company’s legal nature and legal capacity; its formation, reorganisation, and dissolution; its name or company name; its organisational and financial constitution; the power of representation of its bodies.

  117. 117.

    ‘Referentenentwurf Gesetz zum Internationalen Privatrecht der Gesellschaften, Vereine und juristischen Personen’ - see Rolf Wagner / Birte Timm, ‘Der Referentenentwurf eines Gesetzes zum Internationalen Privatrecht der Gesellschaften, Vereine und juristischen Personen’, (2008) 28 IPrax 81–90.

  118. 118.

    Jean J. du Plessis and J. Dine, ‘The Fate of the Draft Fifth Directive on Company Law: Accommodation instead of Harmonisation’ (1997) JBL 23 et seq.

  119. 119.

    See Judith Marychurch, ‘Harmonisation or Proliferation of Corporations Law in the European Union?’ (2002) Australian Intl L J 80, 82–83 and 94.

  120. 120.

    Council Regulation (EC) 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), 8 Oct 2001 OJ L 294/1.

  121. 121.

    See George F. Thoma and Dieter Leuering, ‘Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft—Societas Europaea’ (2002) 55 NJW 1449; Johannes Gruber and Marc-Philippe Weller, ‘Societas Europaea: Mitbestimmung ohne Aufsichtsrat?’ (2003) 6 NZG 297.

  122. 122.

    Official Journal of the European Union no. 294 of 10 Nov 2001, 22–33.

  123. 123.

    See SE Employees’ Dir Art 17.

  124. 124.

    See SE Employees’ Dir Art 16.

  125. 125.

    (BGBl. 2004 I 3675) which contains two Articles. In its Art 1 the SEEG is promulgated. Its Art 2 contains the SEBG.

  126. 126.

    See Art s 9 of the SEBG (see fn. 126).

  127. 127.

    See 6.4.5.

  128. 128.

    As to a general survey on the SE Directive see Andreas Kellerhals and Dirk Trüten, ‘The Creation of the European Company’ (2002) 17 Tulane European and Civil Law Forum 71; Peter Hommelhoff, ‘Einige Bemerkungen zur Organisationsverfassung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft’ (2001) 46 AG 279; Günter Christian Schwarz, ‘Zum Statut der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft’ (2001) 22 ZIP 1847; Hartwin Bungert and Constantin H Beier, ‘Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft’ (2002) EWS 1; Heribert Hirte, ‘Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft’ (2002) 5 NZG 1; Christoph Teichmann, ‘Die Einführung der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft―Grundlagen der Ergänzung des Europäischen Statuts durch den deutschen Gesetzgeber’ (2002) 31 ZGR 383; George F. Thoma and Dieter Leuering, ‘Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft—Societas Europaea’ (2002) 55 NJW 1449.

  129. 129.

    Art 8 para 2.

  130. 130.

    Art 8 para 3.

  131. 131.

    Art 8 para 4.

  132. 132.

    Art 8 para 5

  133. 133.

    Art 8 para 6 as well as Art 59 of the SE Regulation.

  134. 134.

    Art 8 para 8.

  135. 135.

    Art 8 para 9.

  136. 136.

    Art 8 para 13.

  137. 137.

    See further 6.4.4.

  138. 138.

    See < http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/sebg/gesamt.pdf >.

  139. 139.

    See also Jürgen Oechsler in Bruno Kropff, Johannes Semler et al. (eds), Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz (vol. 9b, 2nd ed, München 2006), EWG VO 2157/2001, Art 8 at marginal note 12 who even thinks it “worth of discussion” whether the principles on a frustration of the contract would be applicable here.

  140. 140.

    Official Journal of the European Union no. 294 of 10 Nov 2001, 22–33.

  141. 141.

    The agreement could apparently be to exclude any form of codetermination, which will probably be the case with most non-German SEs, but it will hardly be possible for a dominant German company to escape a German-type of codetermination as it is unlikely that the Trade Unions will agree that codetermination be excluded completely. Klaus J Hopt, ‘Unternehmensführung, Unternehmenskontrolle, Modernisierung des Aktienrechts—Zum Bericht der Regierungskommission Corporate Governance’ in Peter Hommelhoff, Marcus Lutter, Karsten Schmidt, Wolfgang Schön, Peter Ulmer (eds) Corporate Governance: Gemeinschaftssymposion der Zeitschriften ZHR/ZGR (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft GmbH, Heidelberg 2002) 42 argues that this may once again give dominant German SEs a disadvantage in comparison with other SEs in the European Union.

  142. 142.

    For further information on codetermination in the SE see Hellmuth Wissmann, Mitbestimmung nach europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht, Europäische Gesellschaft in Reinhard Richardi, Hellmuth Wissmann et al. (eds), Münchener Handbuch zum Arbeitsrecht, vol 2, Kollektivarbeitsrecht /Sonderformen (3rd ed, C. H. Beck Verlag, München 2009) 3. Buch: Kollektives Arbeitsrecht, Achter Abschnitt: Vertretung der Arbeitnehmer in Unternehmensorganen, 5. Kapitel: Mitbestimmung nach europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht; Meinhard Heinze, ‘Die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft’ (2002) 31 ZGR 66; Sorika Pluskat, ‘Die neuen Vorschläge für die Europäische Aktiengesellschaft’ (2001) EuZW 524; Ebba Herfs-Röttgen, ‘Arbeitnehmerbeteiligung in der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft’ (2001) NZA 424; Manfred Weiß, ‘Arbeitnehmermitwirkung in Europa’ (2003) NZA 177.

  143. 143.

    Friedrich Kübler, ‘Leitungsstrukturen der Aktiengesellschaft und die Umsetzung des SE-Statuts’ (2001) 165 ZHR 224 characterises these provisions as ‘mit einer die Grenzen der Skurrilität streifenden Akribie festgelegt’.

  144. 144.

    For further details see SE Employees’ Directive Art 7 para 1 sub-para 2.

  145. 145.

    See generally Martin Veit and Joachim Wichert, ‘Unternehmerische Mitbestimmung bei europäischen Kapitalgesellschaften mit Verwaltungssitz in Deutschland nach “Überseering” und “Inspire Art”’(2004) 49 AG 19.

  146. 146.

    See Jens Wagner, ‘Praktische Erfahrungen mit der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft’ (2005) 16 EWS 548 et seq. See also FAZ 2 Feb 2005, 23; and 5 Aug 2005, 11.

  147. 147.

    Including the Austrian Province of Tirol.

  148. 148.

    In the first edition of this book (2007), the following companies were mentioned: (i) from Germany: Zoll Pool Hafen Hamburg (the customs authority at the seaport of Hamburg); Go-East-Invest Co: the large Allianz AG as the holding of its many insurance subsidiaries; the Fresenius AG (a worldwide provider of medical services); (ii) from Austria: the STRABAG AG (a holding of construction companies); the Neumann Partners AG (a management consulting company); (iii) from Scandinavia: the Nordea (a finance company) and the Alfred Berg (ABN Amro) (a bank); from (iv) France: The Mazars company (an accounting company); (v) from Great Britain: the Schering Plough Clinical Trials (a pharmaceutical company); (vi) from the Netherlands: the MPIT Structure Financial Services; and (vi) from Finland: the Elocteq Network Corporation (an electrical equipment company). See FAZ 5 Aug 2005, 11.

  149. 149.

    Since SEs do not have to – and cannot register – on a European level, but in the national registers of the Member States only, the EC is not able to publish reliable numbers on all incorporations in SEs. But see the website of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI): <http://worker-participation.eu/european_company>.

  150. 150.

    I.e. about 85 are registered in Germany; see <http://worker-participation.eu/European-Company/SE-COMPANIES/News/Facts-and-Figures>.

  151. 151.

    ‘Empty SEs’ are SEs that have organs like shareholders meeting and a board of directors, but no employees. That may be the case, for example, in the counselling business where a few shareholders who at the same time are board members advise their clients without employing anybody else. See also <http://www.worker-participation.eu/European-Company/SE-COMPANIES-News/SE-Factsheets/News-on-European-Companies-March-2011 and <http://www.seeurope-network.org/homepages/seeurope/file_uploads/sefactsheetsglance0506.pdf>.

  152. 152.

    It was impossible to find out the exact number of German SEs which have opted for a monistic board. See the website of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI): <http://worker-participation.eu/european_company>.

  153. 153.

    See Art 4 para 2 of the SE Regulation. Para 3 of that provision adds that the laws of a Member State requiring a greater subscribed capital for companies carrying on certain types of activity shall apply to SEs with registered offices in that Member State.

  154. 154.

    Albert Schröder in Gerhard Manz, Barbara Mayer, and Albert Schröder, Europäische Aktiengesellschaft SE (2nd ed, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 2010), Teil A Vorbemerkungen at IX.

  155. 155.

    Albert Schröder in Gerhard Manz, Barbara Mayer, and Albert Schröder, Europäische Aktiengesellschaft SE (2nd edn, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden 2010) Teil A Vorbemerkungen at VIII, with further references.

  156. 156.

    See SE-Ausführungsgesetz-SEAG – see < http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  157. 157.

    The affinity of that regulation to the respective regulation of the German supervisory board is evident.

  158. 158.

    See Nico Raabe, Die Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat (Erich Schmidt Verlag, Berlin 2010) at 315–325. As Raabe (ibid 205, 206) reports the majority of the SEs registered in Germany seems however not to have reduced the size in members of their supervisory boards.

  159. 159.

    See its S. 16 sentence 2 and its S.17 para 2.

  160. 160.

    See again 5.2.3.

  161. 161.

    SE-Ausführungsgesetz-SEAG see <http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  162. 162.

    See the ‘Gesetz über die Beteiligung der Arbeitnehmer in einer Europäischen Gesellschaft―SE-Beteiligungsgesetz (SEBG)’ – see <http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  163. 163.

    See S 23 para 2 and S 24 para 2 of the German statute.

  164. 164.

    Since SEs do not have to – and cannot register – on a European level, but in the national registers of the Member States only, the EC is not able to publish reliable numbers on all incorporations in SEs. But see the website of the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) <http://worker-participation.eu/european_company>.

  165. 165.

    I.e. about 85 are registered in Germany; see <http://worker-participation.eu/European-Company/SE-COMPANIES/News/Facts-and-Figures>.

  166. 166.

    See no. 20 of the introductory remarks to the SE Regulation as well as its Art 3 para 1.

  167. 167.

    The origins of these frictions are well indicated in the “Study on the Operation and the Impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE) of 9 December 2009 – 2008/S 144-192482” submitted by Ernst & Young at p. 26 et seq. That study explains, for example, at 26: “Even though the SE Regulation includes many uniform and directly applicable provisions, it also refers to national legislation which is sometimes not harmonised (especially in the field of corporate governance). Furthermore it contains a certain number (32) of options, which are left to the discretion of the Member States (with regard to the appropriateness and methods of implementation). The options given by the SE Regulation refer to (i) the formation of the SE, (ii) the transfer of the registered office, (iii) the organisation and management of the SE and (iv) miscellaneous items.”

  168. 168.

    Report drawn up by Ernst & Young following call for tender from the European Commission – 2008/S 144-192482) at 2.1.

  169. 169.

    See in particular 5.2.3.2–5.2.3.4.

  170. 170.

    Study on the Operation and the Impacts of the Statute for a European Company (SE) of 9 December 2009 – 2008/S 144-192482.

  171. 171.

    As to the meaning of these terms see 6.4.5.

  172. 172.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The application of Council Regulation 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), COM (2010) 1391. The Commission also published a “Commission Staff Working Document” accompanying its Report, COM (2010) 676.

  173. 173.

    Ibid at 3.

  174. 174.

    Ibid at 6.

  175. 175.

    Ibid at 9.

  176. 176.

    At 4.

  177. 177.

    See Matthias Casper, ‘Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Gesellschaftsrechtliche Reformvorschläge‘, (2009) 173 181–221; Roger Kiem, ‘Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Entwicklungsstand‘, (2009) 173 ZHR 156–180; Martin Henssler, ‘Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Mitbestimmungsrechtliche Reformvorschläge‘, (2009) 173 ZHR 222–249. These publications represented papers which had been submitted to a conference with an ensuing discussion. As to the results of the discussion see Tobias Beuchert, ‘Diskussionsbericht‘, (2009) 173 ZHR 250–254.

  178. 178.

    One of its members was Matthias Casper, who is one of the co-authors of this book.

  179. 179.

    See its proposals: Study Group for German Stock Corporation and Capital Markets Law (ed), ‘The Eight Most Important Recommendations for Modification of the SE Regulation’, (2000) 10 European Business Law Organization Law Review 285–289; Arbeitskreis Aktien- und Kapitalmarktrecht (AAK) (ed), ‘Die 8 wichtigsten Änderungsvorschläge zur SE-VO’, (2009) 31 ZIP 698, 699 together with the reasons supporting them in: Arbeitskreis Aktien- und Kapitalmarktecht (AAK) (ed), Vorschläge zur Reform der Mitbestimmung in der Societas Europea‘, (2009) 31 ZIP 2221–2228.

  180. 180.

    Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, The application of Council Regulation 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European Company (SE), COM(2010) 1391.

  181. 181.

    Ibid at p. 4, 5.

  182. 182.

    That assessment was prepared by Jan Cremers, Norbert Kluge and Michael Stollt under the title ‘Worker Participation: a “burden” on the European Company (SE)’.

  183. 183.

    See 6.4.8.

  184. 184.

    See also Ulrich Ziegler and Annika Gey, Arbeitnehmermitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat der Europäischen Gesellschaft (SE) im Vergleich zum Mitbestimmungsgesetz, (2009) 64 BB 1750–1758.

  185. 185.

    Roger Kiem, ‘Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Entwicklungsstand’, (2009) 173 ZHR 156.

  186. 186.

    See in particular Martin Henssler, ‘Erfahrungen und Reformbedarf bei der SE – Mitbestimmungsrechtliche Reformvorschläge’, (2009) 173 ZHR 222.

  187. 187.

    Tobias Beuchert, ‘Diskussionsbericht’, (2009) 173 ZHR 250–252.

  188. 188.

    See Volker Rieble in Reinhard Bork and Carsten Schäfer (eds), ‘GmbHG - Kommentar’ (RWS Verlag, Köln 2010), S 52 marginal note 74–75, with further references.

  189. 189.

    See, for example, ‘“Europa GmbH” soll Kosten sparen’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) (a nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 4 March 2009 at p. 21: Christian Steinberger, ‘Europäische Privatgesellschaft / Weniger Kosten, mehr Rechtssicherheit und gut für den Mittelstand’, (2008) 63 BB issue 30 of 1 July 2008, Die Erste Seite; (without author) ‘Europäische Rechtsform für den Mittelstand’ in FAZ of 1 July 2008 at p. 17.

  190. 190.

    European Parliament, Report with recommendation to the Commission of the European private company statute of 29 November 2006, 2006/2013 (INI).

  191. 191.

    COM (2008) 396/3.

  192. 192.

    Commission Legislative and Work Programme 2008, COM (2007) 640.

  193. 193.

    Similar to the struggle on the implementation of the codetermination of employees within the SE, the implementation of such codetermination within the SPE was one of the most debated obstacles to the presentation of the Proposal for an SPE. See (without author) ‘Mitbestimmungsstreit behindert Europa GmbH’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 4 November 2008 at 21.

  194. 194.

    For a general survey, see Silja Maul and Victoria Röhricht, ‘Die Europäische Privatgesellschaft – Überblick über eine neue supranationale Rechtsform’, (2008) BB 63 BB 1574–1579; Wüllrich Peters, ‘Grenzenlose gesellschaftsrechtliche Flexibilität – die Societas Privata Europea’, (2008) 11 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 807–812; Heribert Anzinger, ‘Die Europäische Privatgesellschaft – vom Vollstatut zum tragfähigen Kompromiss’, (2009) 64 BB 2606–2612.

  195. 195.

    In contrast to the SE which can be organised only under some restrictive criteria (see Art 2 of the SE Regulation: merger between two companies from different EU Member States; formation of a holding by companies from different EU Member States; formation of a subsidiary SE by parent companies from different EU Member States; transformation into an SE of a company which has a subsidiary in another Member State), Art 5 of the Proposal does not restrict the manner in which an SPE can be created. It can even be set up ex nihilo.

  196. 196.

    See Art 4 of the Proposal.

  197. 197.

    It is with good reason that the “Memorandum” preceding the text of the Proposal points out (in its Chapter IV) that creditors nowadays look rather at aspects other than capital, such a cash flow, which are more relevant to solvency; that director-shareholders of small companies often offer personal guarantees to their creditors (e. g. to banks); and that suppliers also use other methods to secure their claims, e. g. providing that ownerships of goods only passes upon payment.

  198. 198.

    See 6.4.2.

  199. 199.

    See Art 26 para 2 of the Proposal.

  200. 200.

    See Annex I Chapter V (Organisation of the SPE).

  201. 201.

    See Art 26 par. 1 sentence 2.

  202. 202.

    See Annex I Chapter V (Organisation of the SPE).

  203. 203.

    See Annex I Chapter V (Organisation of the SPE).

  204. 204.

    See Peter Hommelhoff, ‘SPE-Mitbestimmung: Strukturen, Wertungen und rechtspolitische Kompromisslinien’, (2011) 19 Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) 7 – 40.

  205. 205.

    See 6.2.4.2.

  206. 206.

    The next para of Chapter VII mentions that the transfer procedure would be inspired by the provisions on the transfer of the registered office of the SE Regulation. See 6.4.3.

  207. 207.

    See Press release, reference no. 20090309IPR51336.

  208. 208.

    See Sects. 6.4.8 and 6.4.9.

  209. 209.

    With good reasons, the Group approves of the absence of a cross-border element for the formation of an SPE; see no. 20 of the Study.

  210. 210.

    No. 21 of the Study.

  211. 211.

    See nos. 39, 40.

  212. 212.

    For further critique see Jens Bormann and David König, ‘Der Weg zur Europäischen Privatgesellschaft’, (2010) 56 RIW 111–119.

  213. 213.

    See 6.2.2.5.

  214. 214.

    See 6.6.2.

  215. 215.

    See 6.6.2.

  216. 216.

    Case C-411/03 [2005] ECR I-10805. The decision is also reprinted in (2006) 26 IPRax 596 and in (2006) 17 EWS 27.

  217. 217.

    See no 26 of the judgment: ‘It should be noted in that respect that, whilst Community harmonisation rules are useful for facilitating cross-border mergers, the existence of such harmonisation rules cannot be made a precondition for the implementation of the freedom of establishment laid down by Articles 43 EC and 48 EC …’.

  218. 218.

    See Hartwin Bungert, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzungsmobilität—Anmerkung zur Sevic-Entscheidung des EuGH’ (2006) 61 BB 54 et seq.

  219. 219.

    See Kai-Peter Ott, ‘Die rechtsüberschreitende Verschmelzung nach Centros, Überseering und Inspire Art’ in Otto Sandrock and Christoph Wetzler (eds), Deutsches Gesellschaftsrecht im Wettbewerb der Rechtsordnungen (Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft, Heidelberg 2004) 212; Volker Triebel and Karl von Hase, ‘Wegzug und grenzüberschreitende Umwandlungen deutscher Gesellschaften nach “Überseering” und “Inspire Art”’ (2003) 58 BB 2416.

  220. 220.

    See Peter Behrens in a comment on this case in (2006) 43 Common Market L Rev 1686.

  221. 221.

    Official Journal of the European Union 25 Nov 2005 L 310/1.

  222. 222.

    COM(2003) 703 [2003/0277(COD)].

  223. 223.

    For details see Georg Wenglorz, ‘Die grenzüberschreitende “Heraus”-Verschmelzung einer deutschen Kapitalgesellschaft: Und es geht doch!’ (2004) 59 BB 1061 and further references.

  224. 224.

    See Florian Drinhausen and Astrid Keinath, ‘Die grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzung inländischer Gesellschaften nach Erlaß der Richtlinie zur grenzüberschreitenden Verschmelzung von Kapitalgesellschaften in Europa’, (2006) 52 RIW 81–87; Hans Werner Neye, ‘Die neue Richtlinie zur grenzüberschreitenden Verschmelzung von Kapitalgesellschaften’ (2005) 26 ZIP 1894.

  225. 225.

    See Hans-Friedrich Müller, ‘Die grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzung nach dem Referentenentwurf des Bundesjustizministeriums’ (2006) 8 NZG 286; Christoph Louven and Michael Dettmeier, ‘Optionen grenzüberschreitender Verschmelzungen innerhalb der EU—Gesellschafts- und steuerrechtliche Grundlagen’, (2006) 3 BB Spezial 13 March 2006, 1.

  226. 226.

    COM(2003) 703 [2003/0277(COD)] sub no. 3.3.

  227. 227.

    For details see Hans-Friedrich Müller, ‘Die grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzung nach dem Referentenentwurf des Bundesjustizministeriums’ (2006) 8 NZG 286 at 289 et seq; Louven and Dettmeier (n 226) 15 et seq.

  228. 228.

    Zweites Gesetz zur Änderung des Umwandlungsgesetzes, BGBl. I 542–548. The legislative reasons supporting that Act are stated in the bill by which that Act was introduced into the federal Parliament by the government (see Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung, Drucksache des Bundesrates 548/06 of 11 August 2006).

  229. 229.

    For details see Ralf Frenzel, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Verschmelzung von Kapitalgesellschaften – nach dem Ablauf der Umsetzungsfrist’, (2008) 54 RIW 12–20; Alexander Kollmorgen and Heiner Feldhaus, ‘Probleme der Übertragung von Vermögen mit Auslandsbezug’, (2007) 62 BB 2189–2193.

  230. 230.

    Sec. 1 para 1 of the Umwandlungsgesetz lists four kinds of transformations: those by merger, by spin-offs, by transfer of property, and by change of legal form.

  231. 231.

    See its Art 122a et seq.

  232. 232.

    See 6.2.3.2.

  233. 233.

    See 6.2.3.1.

  234. 234.

    In the following, we will however not deal with the transfer of seats of companies between those States with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties―treaties in which the two Contracting States agreed on the mutual application of the theory of incorporation like the USA, Japan and Spain (see Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  235. 235.

    European Economic Area, see “A Few Exceptions” in Sect. 6.3.1.2.

  236. 236.

    For further references see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar (vol. I. 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 20.

  237. 237.

    It is repeated again that in this context those States will not be mentioned separately with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties providing, inter alia, for the mutual application of the theory of incorporation (USA, Japan, Spain) (see “A Few Exceptions” in Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  238. 238.

    For further references see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar (vol. I, 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 27.

  239. 239.

    As to such view see ibid Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar (vol. I. 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 27. See also Christoph Teichmann, ‘Cartesio: Die Freiheit zum formwechselnden Wegzug’ (2009) 30 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht ZIP 401 at 401.

  240. 240.

    See Bernhard Großfeld in: Staudinger (ed), Kommentar zum BGB, special volume: Einführungsgesetz zum BGB, Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht (Verlag Sellier – de Gruyter Berlin 1998) marginal note 629.

  241. 241.

    For the convenience of the reader, those States will not be mentioned in this context separately with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties providing, inter alia, for the mutual application of the theory of incorporation (USA, Japan, Spain) (see “A Few Exceptions” in Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  242. 242.

    For further references Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar, (vol. I, 2nd ed, 2010, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 31.

  243. 243.

    Again it has to be noted the seat theory has been abandoned by a judgment of the German Supreme Court in Civil Matters in March 2005, German courts now follow the theory of incorporation (see Sect. 6.3.1.1).

  244. 244.

    See Sect. 6.3.1.1.

  245. 245.

    It is repeated again that those States will not be mentioned separately in this context with which Germany has entered into bilateral treaties providing, inter alia, for the mutual application of the theory of incorporation (USA, Japan, Spain) (see “A Few Exceptions” in Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  246. 246.

    For further references see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar, (vol. I, 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 33.

  247. 247.

    See Sect. 6.3.1.1.

  248. 248.

    See S 262 paragraph 1 No. 2 of the AktG.

  249. 249.

    In the case of a dissolution, codetermination could take place however only during the liquidation proceedings.

  250. 250.

    For further details see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar (vol. I, 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal notes 33–36.

  251. 251.

    See Sect. 6.4.

  252. 252.

    See Sect. 6.5.

  253. 253.

    Sentence 2 of Art 7 the continues: “A Member State may in addition impose on SEs registered in its territory the obligation of locating their head office and their registered office in the same place”. That provision authorizes the Member States to provide that registered seat and real seat of an SE must be situated even in the same local community.

  254. 254.

    See the ‘Gesetz zur Ausführung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2157/2001 des Rates vom 8. Oktober 2001 über das Statut der Europäischen Gesellschaft (SE)’ (SE-Ausführungsgesetz -SEAG)“, BGBl. 2004 I 3675.

  255. 255.

    It is disputed whether this mandatory linkage between registered and real seat is compatible with the freedom of establishment as guaranteed by Arts. 49, 54 of the TFEU. In this respect see Alexander de Diego, Die Mobilität der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft (SE) im EG-Binnenmarkt, (2005) 16 EWS 446–454.

  256. 256.

    I.e. the USA, Japan and Spain (see “A Few Exceptions” in Sect. 6.3.1.2).

  257. 257.

    For further details and references see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar (vol. I, 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 22.

  258. 258.

    For further details and references see ibid at S 45 marginal note 23/24.

  259. 259.

    See the Decision of 16 December 2008, Case C-210/05, [2008] ECR I-09641 at marginal note 111.

  260. 260.

    See ibid, marginal note 109.

  261. 261.

    See ibid, marginal note 112.

  262. 262.

    For further details and references see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt/Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar, (vol. I, 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 28 as well as Christoph Christoph Teichmann, ‘Cartesio: Die Freiheit zum formwechselnden Wegzug’, (2009) 30 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 401 and 402.

  263. 263.

    See Decision of 16 December 2008, Case C-210/05, [2008] ECR I-09641at marginal note 111.

  264. 264.

    See ibid at marginal note 109.

  265. 265.

    With respect to this group of cases, see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar (vol. I, 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 32 referring to notes 21–23.

  266. 266.

    Again it has to be noted that the seat theory has been abandoned by a judgment of the German Supreme Court in Civil Matters in March 2005, German courts now follow the theory of incorporation (see section “The General Rule”).

  267. 267.

    See section “The General Rule”.

  268. 268.

    For further details and references see Daniel Zimmer in Karsten Schmidt / Marcus Lutter (eds), Aktiengesetz - Kommentar (vol. I, 2nd ed, Verlag Dr. Otto Schmidt, Köln 2010) at S 45 marginal note 35.

  269. 269.

    See section “The General Rule”.

  270. 270.

    See Sect. 6.4.3.

  271. 271.

    See section “Transfer of the Real Seat of an SE or an SPE from Germany to a State Either Inside or Outside of EU and EEA (Emigration from Germany)”.

  272. 272.

    It is true that some substantive rules on the national commercial registers have been harmonised (see, for example, the very early “First Council Directive 68/151/EEC of 9 March 1968 (!) on co-ordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community” (Official Journal L 065 of 14 March 1968, pp. 00008-0012), amended by Directive 2003/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2003 amending Council Directive 68/151/EEC, as regards disclosure requirements in respect of certain types of companies” (Official Journal of 4 September 2003 L 221/13). But insofar as the problems here under examination are concerned, no such harmonisation has taken place.

  273. 273.

    See section “The General Rule”.

  274. 274.

    See Jean J. du Plessis, Bernhard Großfeld, Claus Luttermann, Ingo Saenger and Otto Sandrock, German Corporate Governance in International and European Context (Springer Verlag, Heidelberg 2007) at 163.

  275. 275.

    Ibid 163

  276. 276.

    Ibid.

  277. 277.

    See the definition in Sect. 6.4.5: A ‘normal’ SE is an SE with operations and more than 5 employees.

  278. 278.

    See the definition Sect. 6.4.5: ‘shelf SEs’ are SEs with neither operations nor employees and ‘UFA SEs’ are SEs which probably operate but, in the absence of enough information, cannot be classified as well as ‘Micro-SEs’ with less than 5 employees.

  279. 279.

    See SE-Ausführungsgesetz-SEAG – see < http://www.bmas.de/portal/15432/seag.html>.

  280. 280.

    See Sect. 6.4.6.

  281. 281.

    See <http://worker-participation.eu/layout/set/print/European-Company/SE-COMPANIES-News/Facts-and-Figures>.

  282. 282.

    See Roland Köstler and Frank Werner, ‘SE zwischen Eiszeit und Europa‘ (Magazin Mitbestimmung, 2007 issue 12, Hans Böckler-Stiftung, available in the Internet). See also Sect. 6.4.6.

  283. 283.

    See <http://worker-participation.eu/layout/set/print/European-Company/SE-COMPANIES-News/Facts-and-Figures>.

  284. 284.

    In 2007, 8 German SEs were reported to have opted for a one-tier system (see Roland Köstler and Frank Werner (supra note 278)). The authors of this Chapter 6 were however not able to explore, as of today (March 2011), the exact number of this category of SEs. Nico Raabe (Die Mitbestimmung im Aufsichtsrat, 2010 Erich Schmidt Verlag Berlin, at p. 314) mentions the following: Donata Holding (2006 organized as shelf SE); the Conrad Electronic SE and the Conrad Holding SE (incorporated 2006); the Sevic Systems SE (incorporated 2007); the Orchestra Services SE (incorporated 2007); the Mensch und Maschine SE (incorporated 2006).

  285. 285.

    See Roland Roland Köstler and Frank Werner, ‘SE zwischen Eiszeit und Europa‘ (Magazin Mitbestimmung, 2007 issue 12, Hans Böckler-Stiftung, available in the Internet).

  286. 286.

    Pursuant to Art 4 para 2 lit. g of the SE Employees’ Directive, the arrangement between the competent organs of the participating companies and the special negotiating body shall cover the number of members in the SEs administrative or supervisory body which the employees will be entitled to elect, appoint, recommend or oppose, the procedures as to how these members may be elected, appointed, recommended or opposed by the employees, and their rights …” (emphasis added).

  287. 287.

    See Sect. 6.7.1.5.

  288. 288.

    Commission of the European Communities (Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament), ‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union—A Plan to Move Forward’ COM (2003) 284 Final <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm>.

  289. 289.

    The members of the Commission were Jaap Winter (Chair); Jan Schans Christensen; José Maria Garriddo Garcia; Klaus J Hopt; Jonathan Rickford; Guido Rossis; and Joëlle Simon.

  290. 290.

    Winter Report, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Jan 2002 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/hlg01–2002.pdf>. See Klaus J Hopt, ‘Die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der Corporate Governance’ in Peter Hommelhoff, Klaus J Hopt and Axel von Werder (eds) Handbuch Corporate Governance: Leitung und Überwachung börsennotierter Unternehmen in der Rechts- und Wirtschaftspraxis (Otto Schmidt Verlag, Köln 2003) 38–41 for a to-the-point discussion of these developments.

  291. 291.

    Winter Report, Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids, Jan 2002 <http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/news/hlg01–2002.pdf> 6.

  292. 292.

    Ibid 33.

  293. 293.

    Ibid 74 (Annex 4).

  294. 294.

    See the article ‘Deutsche Bank sichtet Fusionskandidaten’ FAZ 5 June 2004, 14.

  295. 295.

    See Berliner Morgenpost of 26 October 2009 (available in the Internet).

  296. 296.

    See Jens Wagner, ‘Praktische Erfahrungen mit der Europäischen Aktiengesellschaft’, (2005) EWS 548. See also FAZ 2 Feb 2005, 23; and 5 Aug 2005, 11.

  297. 297.

    See Hendrik Kafsack, ‘Studie: Europa AG hebelt die Mitbestimmung aus’, F.A.Z (German nation-wide daily) of 9 April 2009 at p. 12.

  298. 298.

    See Sect. 6.4.9.

  299. 299.

    As to the following see the detailed study by Joachim Möller, ‘The German labor market response in the world recession – demystifying a miracle’, published online in “Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung” on 22 January 2010.

  300. 300.

    Under the headline of “Europe’s engine” of March 13th–19th, 2010 at p. 13.

  301. 301.

    See “Boards behaving badly”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2010 at p. 55.

  302. 302.

    See “The lives of others”, Economist of March 8th–14th, 2010 at p. 62.

  303. 303.

    See “Inside the miracle”, Economist of March 13th–19th, 2010 at p. 5 (6).

  304. 304.

    See “The lives of others”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 61.

  305. 305.

    See “Unbalanced Germany”, The Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 7 and “The lives of others”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 61.

  306. 306.

    See “Unbalanced Germany”, Economist of August 8th–14th, 2009 at p. 7. See also Luca di Leo, ‘No German Jobs Miracle, but there may be a lesson for the US’, The Wall Street Journal, European Edition, online, 17 March 2011; Michael C. Burda (Berlin) and Jennifer Hunt (McGill University), What Explains the German Labor Market Miracle in the Great Recession, 6 March 2010 (online). http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2011_spring_bpea_/2011_spring_bpea_conference_burda.pdf.

  307. 307.

    See the report in the German weekly “Focus” of 16 November 2010.

  308. 308.

    Mr. Studzinski was quoted by the Financial Times Deutschland, a German daily newspaper. See its issue of 27 January 2011 (available in the Internet).

  309. 309.

    See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 29 January 2011 at p. 13.

  310. 310.

    See also the assessment of German codetermination by Harold Meyerson, ‘Business is Booming’, (2011 March issue) The American Prospect, Washington DC 20036 USA, <http://prospect.org/cs/articles?article=business_is booming>) as well as Jordan Meijias, ‘Feuert die Reichen! Warum … Deutschland plötzlich als ökonomischer Musterknabe gilt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (nation-wide German daily newspaper) of 2 April 2011 at p. 35.

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  1. Orrick Hoelters & Elsing Attorneys Düsseldorf, University of Muenster Institute for International Business Law, 1 Birkhahnweg, 48155, Muenster, Germany

    Otto Sandrock

  2. Deakin University, Geelong Waurn Ponds Campus 75 Pigdons Road, Waurn Ponds, VIC, 3216, Australia

    Jean J. du Plessis

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Sandrock, O., du Plessis, J.J. (2012). The Impact of European Developments on German Codetermination and German Corporate Law. In: German Corporate Governance in International and European Context. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23005-9_6

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