Skip to main content

The Weakening of States’ Territorial Sovereignty

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Territorial Integrity in a Globalizing World
  • 1036 Accesses

Abstract

Territorial integrity is, as we have seen earlier, the institutionalization of territoriality, which means the control by the state of a given space and its population, after having succeeded to neutralize internal and external competitors, and its use for political, social, and economic ends to the benefit of the whole population. Translated in juridical terms, territoriality reflects the supreme authority or jurisdiction of the state to control all persons or property within its territorial domain.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    See Fenwick (1965, p. 296).

  2. 2.

    Jennings and Watts (1992, p. 382).

  3. 3.

    See Beale (1923, p. 241).

  4. 4.

    Quoted in Shearer (1994, p. 184)

  5. 5.

    UNRIAA, 1928, vol. II, p. 829.

  6. 6.

    Idem.

  7. 7.

    Thus it is recalled in Oppenheim’s International Law that “Like independence, territorial supremacy does not give an unlimited liberty of action. Thus, every state has a right to demand that its merchant may pass through the territorial sea of other states. Foreign Heads of State and envoys, foreign warships, and foreign armed forces must be granted a certain degree of inviolability and exemption from local jurisdiction. Through the right of protection over citizens abroad, which is held by every state according to customary law, a state cannot treat foreign citizens passing through or residing on its territory arbitrarily according to discretion as it might treat its own nationals. A state, in spite of its territorial authority, may not alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of the territory of a neighbouring state- for instance, to stop or divert or pollute the flow of a river which runs from its own into neighbouring territory…”, Jennings and Watts (1992, p. 391).

  8. 8.

    Idem, p. 384.

  9. 9.

    The move towards increased expansion of International Law domain at the detriment of national jurisdiction has been rightly recalled by Charles G. Fenwick when stating that domestic questions “are, in respect to their objects, the sum total of national interests minus the interests governed by International Law. In one sense, therefore, the scope of domestic questions is in inverse ratio to the scope of international law; the wider the latter the narrower the former, and vice versa. As international law has gradually brought one set of conflicting interests after another within its jurisdiction, it has to a corresponding degree restricted the control of the individual state over those interests and thus converted questions relating to them from national or domestic questions into international questions”, Fenwick (1925, pp. 144–145).

  10. 10.

    Higgins (1994, p. 73).

  11. 11.

    See Ott (1987, p. 137).

  12. 12.

    See O’Connell (1965, p. 656).

  13. 13.

    de Lupis (1974, p. 21).

  14. 14.

    Lotus case, Judgment No 9, 1927, P.C.I.J., Ser A, No 10, 18–19.

  15. 15.

    Idem, p. 19.

  16. 16.

    Higgins (1994, p. 73).

  17. 17.

    American Law Institute (1987, §432 (2)).

  18. 18.

    Quoted by Dugard (2006, p. 233).

  19. 19.

    See, e.g., Rayfuse (1993, p. 882); Glennon (1992, pp. 745–756).

  20. 20.

    ILM, 1992, 31, 900.

  21. 21.

    Idem, pp. 917–918.

  22. 22.

    ILR 1961, 36, 18.

  23. 23.

    See, e.g., Oliver et al. (1994, pp. 135–194); Swords (2002, pp. 494–495).

  24. 24.

    See Akehurst (1972–1973, p. 152).

  25. 25.

    Idem, pp. 156–157.

  26. 26.

    Article 4 the 1931 Resolution of the Institute of International Law.

  27. 27.

    See the critical analysis made by Sahovic and Bishop (1968, pp. 368–372).

  28. 28.

    US v. Aluminum Co. of America case, 148F.443, 1945.

  29. 29.

    Magnarella (1995a, p. 164).

  30. 30.

    See on this Akehurst (1972–1973 p. 145 and seq.); Mann (1964 p. 1 and seq.); Sahovic and Bishop (1968 pp. 354–374).

  31. 31.

    Raustiala (2004, p. 27).

  32. 32.

    See Halleck and Baker (1893, pp. 387–388).

  33. 33.

    See Filder (2000, p. 387).

  34. 34.

    See Franck (2009, p. 443).

  35. 35.

    Raustiala (2004).

  36. 36.

    US v. Aluminum Co. of America case, 148F.443, 1945.

  37. 37.

    See, e.g., Maier (1983, p. 31).

  38. 38.

    See Putmam (2009, p. 484).

  39. 39.

    I.L.M., 1996, 35, 1329, Inter-American Juridical Committee Examining the US Helms-Burton Act, 27 August 1996.

  40. 40.

    I.L.M, 1991, 30, 1487.

  41. 41.

    See Raustiala (2004, p. 36 and seq).

  42. 42.

    See, for instance, Stern (1994, pp. 979–1003), Raustiala (2004, p. 3 and seq).

  43. 43.

    See Magnarella (1995b, p. 160).

  44. 44.

    See Stern (1999, p. 737); de la Pradelle (2000, p. 905); Ratner and Abrams (2001, p. 161); Slaughter (2004, p. 169); O’Keefe (2004).

  45. 45.

    See O’Keefe (2009, pp. 811–812).

  46. 46.

    See Carnegie (1963, p. 405).

  47. 47.

    See Jescheck (1985, pp. 332–333).

  48. 48.

    On the origin of universal jurisdiction, see Guillaume (1992, pp. 23–36); Bassiouni (2004, pp. 42–43); Kraytman (1985, p. 2).

  49. 49.

    See Princeton Project (2001, p. 29). See also American Law Institute (1987) §404, which refers to “certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism”.

  50. 50.

    See Randall (1988, p. 831).

  51. 51.

    Scheffer (2001, p. 233).

  52. 52.

    See Biguma (1998).

  53. 53.

    This was due in particular, notes M. Inazumi, to “the shortcoming of relying on territorial jurisdiction and on the extradition system based on the principle of reciprocity”, Inazumi (2005, p. 81).

  54. 54.

    On the increasing number of national legislations that have provided for the exercise of universal jurisdiction, see Butler (2004, pp. 67–76).

  55. 55.

    See Slaughter (2004, pp. 168–190).

  56. 56.

    Idem, pp. 87–98; Bottini (2004, p. 504).

  57. 57.

    Reydmans (2003, p. 1).

  58. 58.

    Broomhall (2003, p. 112).

  59. 59.

    Introduction of Macedo (2004, p. 4).

  60. 60.

    See Cryer et al. (2010, pp. 61–62).

  61. 61.

    See Kontorovitch (2007). See also Kissinger (2001, pp. 86–96); Dachy and Wajs (2003).

  62. 62.

    Reydmans (2003, p. 1).

  63. 63.

    See Koh (1994, p. 103); Aceves (2000, p. 41); Frydman (2009), vol.77.

  64. 64.

    See Frydman (2009, p. 75).

  65. 65.

    Idem, p. 88.

  66. 66.

    See Florini (2000).

  67. 67.

    See Keck Sikkink (1998).

  68. 68.

    See on this new development Hall (2002), vol.41; Balthazar (1998), vol.29.

  69. 69.

    See Newton (2001; Bottini (2004), p. 546 et seq).

  70. 70.

    Jones (1951, p. 222 et seq).

  71. 71.

    Williams (1929, p. 477).

  72. 72.

    James L. Brierly has written at that time that the incorporation in the Covenant of the domestic jurisdiction clause “ as a new catchword …capable of proving as great hindrance to the orderly development of (International Law) as the somewhat idols of sovereignty, state equality, and the like have been in the past”, Brierly (1925, p. 8).

  73. 73.

    See on this Wilson (1929, pp. 68–93); Ulimubenshi (2003, pp. 27–34). Jackson H. Ralston has noted about the reservation related to what has been called “domestic questions” that “without e definition at least, the exclusion (of domestic questions) seems superfluous. By the very conditions of its existence, an international court (or arbiter) deals with international questions and not those which are domestic”, Ralston (1919, p. 44).

  74. 74.

    See Fincham (1948, p. 20 et seq).

  75. 75.

    PCIJ, Series B, No 4, (7 February 1927), pp. 23–24.

  76. 76.

    Idem, p. 24. It consequently reached the conclusion that in the present state of international law, questions of nationality are in principle within this reserved domain.

  77. 77.

    Conforti (2005, p. 134).

  78. 78.

    U.N.C.I.O., Supplement to Report of Rapporteur, Committee I/1, to Commission I, Doc.1070, I/1/34 (I) (d) (Documents, VI, 486).

  79. 79.

    See Goodrich and Hambro (1946, p. 190).

  80. 80.

    Gilmour (1967a, p. 331).

  81. 81.

    See on Art. 2 (7) Berthoud (1948); Vallindas (1948); Goodrich (1949); Howell (1954, p. 48); See Preuss (1949-I); Rajan (1958); Bindschedler (1963-I, p. 108); Ross (1964); Verdross (1965); Gilmour (1967b, c); Ermacora (1968-II, p. 124); Trindade (1976, p. 25); Watson (1977, p. 71); Jones (1979); Nolte (2002); Conforti (2005); Kawser (2006, pp. 175–197).

  82. 82.

    See Preuss (1949-I, pp. 597–604).

  83. 83.

    Idem, p. 604.

  84. 84.

    Nolte (2002, p. 150).

  85. 85.

    Conforti (2005, p. 141).

  86. 86.

    See, for instance, Nolte (2002, p. 171).

  87. 87.

    See White (2005, p. 91).

  88. 88.

    McClean (2011, p. 28).

  89. 89.

    Idem, pp. 28–29.

  90. 90.

    See Chesterman (2001, pp. 546–548).

  91. 91.

    Secretary-General Report on Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR. U.N. Doc.S/25704 (1993), para 20.

  92. 92.

    See, e.g. with regard to the ICTY, Rubin (1994, pp. 7–17).

  93. 93.

    Tadic ICTY A.Ch.2 October 1995, paras 44–45.

  94. 94.

    A similar view has been expressed by Blakesley (1994, pp. 84–85).

  95. 95.

    See Baroni (2000, p. 235).

  96. 96.

    See Sharga and Zalick (1994, p. 361).

  97. 97.

    See Birdsall (2006, p. 10).

  98. 98.

    See Hoffman (2008, pp. 546–548).

  99. 99.

    Joined Cases C-402/05 P & C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakat v. Council of the European Union, 3.C.M.L.R.41, para 370.

  100. 100.

    Idem, p. 546.

  101. 101.

    See Schepple (2006).

  102. 102.

    See Marschik (2005, p. 460).

  103. 103.

    Harper (1994, p. 14).

  104. 104.

    See Nolte (2000, pp. 320–321).

  105. 105.

    See Schachter (1995, p. 120); Bowett (1997, p. 80).

  106. 106.

    See Arangio-Ruiz (2000, pp. 660–682).

  107. 107.

    See Marschik (2005, pp. 463–464).

  108. 108.

    UN-Doc.S/2004/329, 28 April 2004.

  109. 109.

    Cohen (2011, p. 34).

  110. 110.

    Akram and Shah (2005, p. 455).

  111. 111.

    The two Governments used in fact the term “surrender” which does not exist in International Law instead of “extradite” as they were aware that a request for “extradition” was not appropriate due to the circumstances of the case. Alfred P.Rubin has noted in this respect that “The demand for surrender by the United States and Great Britain presupposed a Libyan legal obligation to surrender the accused. It appears that by changing the word from extradition to surrender the United States and the United Kingdom thought that the complications of extradition law could be avoided. It is very hard to understand their logic in this. There is no known basis for asserting that general international law contains a ‘surrender’ obligation distinct from ‘extradition’ or the expulsion of undesirable aliens”, Rubin (1993, p. 7).

  112. 112.

    For more details on the position taken by the Libya and the US and the UK prior to the submission of the Lockerbie case to the Security Council, see Plachta (2001, pp. 125–129).

  113. 113.

    See on this principle Wise (1998, pp. 15–29).

  114. 114.

    Resolution 883 of 11November 1993.

  115. 115.

    See, e.g., Saint-Aubin (1913, pp. 296–297).

  116. 116.

    M. Bourquin writes in this regard that “According to a generally admitted rule, a state does not extradite its nationals. Formally prohibited by the national law of many countries (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Hungary, Netherlands, etc.), the extradition of nationals is equally not observed by those many states, such as France, who do not possess national rules prohibiting it. There is only two great powers (United States and United Kingdom) which do admit it. However, their doctrine on this issue has no practical consequence as these two states do accept the extradition only to the governments with whom they are contractually committed and that, with the idea of reciprocity, nationals are in fact prevented from extradition due to the fact that one of the contracting parties does not want to handover its nationals”, Bourquin (1927-I, pp. 192–193). See also Chauvy (1981, pp. 44–45). With regard to recent US policy, M. Cherif Bassiouni has underlined that “The official policy of the United States in treaty negotiations has been, until lately, to prevent when possible the surrender of nationals, but this is no longer the case. The Secretary of State can always refuse to surrender a citizen of the United States unless there is an explicit treaty provision providing for reciprocity”, Bassiouni (2002, p. 684).

  117. 117.

    Bassiouni (2002, p. 108).

  118. 118.

    Marcella (1999, p. 94). D.Marcella writes in this regard that “The Montreal Convention applies to the facts of this case (i.e., Lockerbie case)…Libya is a party to the Montreal Convention and is the state where the ‘alleged offenders’ are present. Consistent with the attendant obligations, Libya is not required to extradite the suspects, since extradition would be inconsistent with Libyan national law. However, because extradition is unavailable under Libyan law, Libya is obliged by the Convention to undertake the necessary steps to establish jurisdiction over the suspects, and to prosecute them in the Libyan national courts”, Idem, p. 99.

  119. 119.

    See Lowe et al. (2008, p. 35).

  120. 120.

    Kelsen (1951, p. 294).

  121. 121.

    Idem, p. 37.

  122. 122.

    Dulles (1950, p. 194).

  123. 123.

    Art.24 (2) of the UN Charter.

  124. 124.

    Rubin (1993, op.cit.,11).

  125. 125.

    Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident of Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v United States), Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep.1992, Dissenting Opinion, 153.

  126. 126.

    Reflecting a largely shared feeling, Alfred P. Rubin wrote in this respect “that It is certainly within the legal authority of the Security Council to act irrationally and make ‘decisions’ that reflect its political balance in disregard of the substantive law, morality and facts. But the effect of acting without apparent reason was felt throughout the world in ways apparently not considered seriously by the Security Council members”, Rubin (1993, p. 10).

  127. 127.

    See Hurd (2007, pp. 137–170).

  128. 128.

    The Court has on 27 February 1998 recognized its jurisdiction in the Lockerbie case. However, on 10 September 2003, the Lockerbie case will be removed from the role of the Court at the request of the three parties. This came as a result of the agreement reached between these parties on August 1998 that the two suspected Libyan nationals will be sued in Netherlands under Scottish law by Scottish judges and after the Security Council had on April 1999 suspended the application of sanctions against Libya.

  129. 129.

    Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom), Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep., 1992; Case Concerning Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States), Provisional Measures, ICJ Rep., 1992.

  130. 130.

    See the Dissenting Opinions of Judges Bedjaoui, Weeramantry, Ajibola, El-Kosheri and Ranjeva.

  131. 131.

    See McWhinney (1992); Franck (1992, p. 86); Reisman (1993, p. 87); Macdonald (1931); Bedjaoui (1993, 1994); Gowland-Debbas (1994, p. 88); Brownlie (1994); Gill (1995); Alvarez (1996, p. 90); Bowett (1996); Akande (1997, p. 46); Dupuy (1997); Dochring (1997); Malanczuk (1999); Martenczuk (1999, p. 10); Quigley (2000, p. 35); De Wet (2004); Manusama (2006).

  132. 132.

    See El Ouali (1984, pp. 132–137).

  133. 133.

    Idem, pp. 182–190.

  134. 134.

    D. W. Bowett has rightly recalled in this respect that “It must be conceded that there are few signs that, at present, the members of the Security Council are not prepared to contemplate judicial review by the Court: the Western powers would see this s a hindrance and neither Russia or China display any great confidence in the Court”, Bowett (1996, p. 191).

  135. 135.

    Nigel and White (2002, p. 124).

  136. 136.

    See Holzgrefe (2003, p. 18). However J. L. Holzgrefe adds the “threat of using force”, which is not accurate, as we cannot talk of intervention, and humanitarian intervention is a kind of intervention, without the use of force. See, for a classical definition which excludes the “threat of the use of force”, Badescu (2011, p. 9).

  137. 137.

    See Marchal (1931, p. 79).

  138. 138.

    Hornung (1885, 1886).

  139. 139.

    Pillet (1898, p. 70).

  140. 140.

    Delos (1939, p. 252).

  141. 141.

    These cases of humanitarian intervention have been analyzed by Rougier (1910, p. 472 cont.).

  142. 142.

    Fenwick (1945, p. 645).

  143. 143.

    Brownlie (1963a, p. 340). See also Vervey (1985, p. 399); Malanczuk (1993, p. 9).

  144. 144.

    Finnemore (2003, pp. 65–66).

  145. 145.

    Levene (2005, p. 225).

  146. 146.

    In Rolin-Jacquemyns (1876, p. 673).

  147. 147.

    Idem.

  148. 148.

    Mill (1867, pp. 153–178).

  149. 149.

    Hall (1909, p. 284).

  150. 150.

    Oppenheim (1928, p. 271).

  151. 151.

    Despagnet (1905, pp. 215–216).

  152. 152.

    Rougier (1910, p. 526).

  153. 153.

    See Franck and Rodley (1973a, p. 290).

  154. 154.

    Chesterman (2001, p. 43).

  155. 155.

    See Padirac (1953, p. 161 cont.).

  156. 156.

    See El Ouali (1993).

  157. 157.

    Kirsch (2005, p. 371). N. Krisch clarifies in this regard that “Despite the positive use great powers have always made of International law, and despite their successes in flexibilizing and shaping it, the standard structure of international legal rules has always posed obstacles to great power politics. The central obstacle…is the relatively egalitarian character of international law: the right of all to participate in law-making, and their equal subjection to universal norms”, Krisch (2004, p. 27).

  158. 158.

    Krasner (2004, p. 86). Similar views are expressed by Ignatieff (2003) pp. 306–314; Keohane (2003, p. 286 cont). The latter after having declared that “We have to accept that states are differentiated both in their capacities and in legal status (Italics added) : despite the legal fiction of sovereignty, states are not all equal. One person’s double standard is another’s recognition of reality” (p. 277) has concluded with regard to humanitarian intervention and its desired impact on the future legal status of those states that have been subjected to that intervention that “ the political consolidation of gains from humanitarian intervention will depend on institutions that limit and unbundled sovereignty (italics added), permitting troubled societies to exercise some, but not all, aspects of classic sovereignty” (italics added), p. 278.

  159. 159.

    Idem, p. 108.

  160. 160.

    Idem, p. 109.

  161. 161.

    Brownlie (1995, p. 49).

  162. 162.

    Byers and Chesterman (2003, p. 193).

  163. 163.

    Farer (2003, p. 59).

  164. 164.

    Gray (2000, p. 8).

  165. 165.

    See Kirsch (2005, p. 394).

  166. 166.

    Babic (2003, pp. 46–47).

  167. 167.

    12 UNCIO, Commission II, Committee 2, Doc.207, III/2/A/3, 10 May 1945, 179 at 191.

  168. 168.

    Nardin (2000, p. 2). See also George (1998, pp. 54–69); Fixdal and Smith (1998, pp. 283–312).

  169. 169.

    See, for instance, Giovanni da Legnano (1447).

  170. 170.

    de Vitoria (1557).

  171. 171.

    de Las Casas (1552).

  172. 172.

    See Scott (1934); Anghie (1999, 2005).

  173. 173.

    See Fitzpatrick (2003, p. 448).

  174. 174.

    Grotius (1646), para 40(4).

  175. 175.

    See Tuck (1999, p. 103), n. 35.

  176. 176.

    Wolff (1748), para 169.

  177. 177.

    Idem, para 636.

  178. 178.

    de Vattel (1758, para 7).

  179. 179.

    There are some authors who believe that the idea of humanitarian intervention goes back to Thucydides. See, for instance, Bass (2008, p. 4).

  180. 180.

    Nardin (2000).

  181. 181.

    See Kochler (2001, p. 19). He has also written that “Whatever may be the idealistic rhetoric by which military actions are justified, the system of norms ensuring the peaceful co-existence among nations-what has been known essentially as ‘the international rule of law’- will not only be gradually undermined but will finally collapse if an equivalent to the old jus ad bellum is introduced in international relations” (p. 25).He adds that “The revival of the just war concept in the new imperial environment rehabilitates war as a means of foreign policy. The taboo placed on the non-use of force has quickly vanished under the pressures of “humanitarian realpolitik” (i.e. realpolitik in humanitarian clothes), p. 28.

  182. 182.

    Idem, p. 19.

  183. 183.

    See Suzuki (1974, pp. 36–37).

  184. 184.

    See Reisman (2000, p. 15).

  185. 185.

    See Laswell and McDougal (1992). On the application of legal realism to International Law, see McDougal (1953); McDougal et al. (1968); Rosental (1970).

  186. 186.

    See Farer (1991, p. 186).

  187. 187.

    Farer (2003, p. 63).

  188. 188.

    See El Ouali (1984, p. 116 cont). in which we have carried out a critical analysis of the legal realism as applied by Reisman (1971 to international judgments and awards in his book “Nullity and Revision. The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards”, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1971, p. 900).

  189. 189.

    Reisman and McDougal (1973, p. 167, 177).

  190. 190.

    Reisman (1990, p. 866, 875).

  191. 191.

    Reisman (2000, p. 15).

  192. 192.

    See Farer (2003, pp. 62–68).

  193. 193.

    Wheaton (1929, p. 150).

  194. 194.

    Nys (1912, p. 229).

  195. 195.

    Pradier-Fodere (1883, p. 547).

  196. 196.

    Finnemore (2003, pp. 7–8).

  197. 197.

    Idem, p. 19.

  198. 198.

    See Thomas (1985).

  199. 199.

    See Borchard (1951).

  200. 200.

    Olivares Marcos (2005, p. 95).

  201. 201.

    See Oppenheim (1928, p. 267) and for a comprehensive presentation of the legal perceptions at the time, see Williams (1924).

  202. 202.

    C. Calvo has written in this respect that “en Droit International strict, le recouvrement de créances et la poursuite de réclamations privées ne justifient pas ‘de plano’ l’intervention armée des gouvernements, et que, comme les Etats européens suivent invariablement cette règle dans leurs relations réciproques, il n’y a nul motif qu’ils ne se l’imposent pas aussi dans leurs rapports avec les nations du Nouveau Monde”, Calvo (1886, pp. 350–351).

  203. 203.

    Dated 29 December 1902. See the translation of the memorandum in AJIL 1907, Supplement No 1, 1–6. On this memorandum, see Drago (1907, pp. 692–726); Moulin (1907, pp. 417–472).

  204. 204.

    Olivares Marcos (2005, p. 101).

  205. 205.

    Finnemore (2003, pp. 46–47).

  206. 206.

    Kelsen (1951, p. 770).

  207. 207.

    Idem, pp. 8–9.

  208. 208.

    ICJ (1986, para 205).

  209. 209.

    See Ch. Rousseau (1980, p. 35).

  210. 210.

    ICJ (1949).

  211. 211.

    Idem, p. 38.

  212. 212.

    General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX). See also General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) and resolution 36/103.

  213. 213.

    See Charpentier (1961, p. 489 cont.); Bennouna (1974).

  214. 214.

    See Schweisfurth (1980, p. 159 cont).

  215. 215.

    General Assembly resolution 36/103.

  216. 216.

    See Lauterpacht (1955, p. 312); Lillich (1967, p. 334); Fonteyne (1974, p. 203 and seq).; Sornarajah (1981, pp. 57–58); Bazyler (1987, p. 547 cont).

  217. 217.

    A. Rougier has confessed in this regard that “Si l’Europe a mis la Turquie en tutelle (par le biais de l’intervention d’humanité), c’est moins dans l’intérêt des sujets ottomans que pour parer aux conflits d’intérêts de l’Angleterre, de l’Autriche, de la France et de la Russie autour de la mer Noire”, Rougier (1910, p. 525). H. Scott Fairley has also shown in this regard that “The case for humanitarian intervention is essentially misdirected. A history of black intentions clothed in white has tainted most possible applications of the doctrine”, Fairley (1980, p. 63). See also for a comprehensive and critical analysis, see Sean D. Murphy who has shown that the purposes of most of the humanitarian interventions were political and economic ones, Murphy (1996, pp. 33–64).

  218. 218.

    Brownlie (1963b, p. 340).

  219. 219.

    A proponent of humanitarian intervention such as J. L. Holzgrefe has recognized that “such right (of humanitarian intervention) was not invoked, let alone exercised, in the face of the greatest humanitarian catastrophes of the pre-Charter era, including the massacre of 1 million Armenians by the Turks (1914–1919); the forced starvation of 4 million Ukrainians by the Soviets (1930s); the massacre of thousands of Chinese by the Japanese (1931–1945); and the extermination of 6 million Jews by the Nazis (1939–1945)”, Holzgrefe (2003, p. 45).

  220. 220.

    Idem.

  221. 221.

    See I. Brownlie (1973, pp. 220–221); Franck and Rodley (1973b, pp. 279–285); Beyerlin (1982, p. 212); Malanczuk (1993, pp. 7–11); Vervey (1998, p. 191).

  222. 222.

    Reisman and McDougal (1958, p. 95).

  223. 223.

    Reisman and McDougal (1973, p. 177). See also D’Amato (1987, pp. 57–73); Teson (1997, p. 151). A similar restrictive interpretation has been initially given by the United Kingdon in the Corfu Channel case when it argued that the minesweeping operation it conducted in Albanian waters “threatened neither the territorial integrity nor the political independence of Albania”, 1948 ICJ Pleadings, Corfu Channel case, vol 3, 296.

  224. 224.

    6 UNCIO 335, Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee I/1,4 June 1945.

  225. 225.

    P. Malanczuk does recall in this respect “that unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegal due to the prohibition of the use of force as the prevalent principle in the present international legal system in the interest on international peace and security”, Malanczuk (1993, p. 30).

  226. 226.

    “It is highly questionable, writes S. Chesterman, that the drafters regarded human rights as of equal importance to peace”, Chesterman (2001, p. 52).

  227. 227.

    The ICJ has, in reply to UK’s claim that its forcible intervention in Albanian waters was only meant to recover evidence of the causes of the destruction of two British warships, stated that “it can only regard the alleged right of intervention as the manifestation of a policy of force such as has in the past given rise to most serious abuses and such as cannot find a place in international law. It is still less admissible in the particular form it would take here-it would be reserved for the most powerful states”, ICJ Reports, 1949, 4 at 34.

  228. 228.

    Among many other UN General Assembly’s resolution, the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations has clarified that “No State or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state” and that “Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another state”.

  229. 229.

    See, e.g., Higgins (1963); Brownlie (1963b, p .267); Mrazek (1989, pp. 86–87); Randelzhofer (1994, pp. 117–118).

  230. 230.

    See, e.g., Murphy (1996, p. 83 cont).; Chesterman (2001, pp. 63–86).

  231. 231.

    See Newman (2009, pp. 28–37).

  232. 232.

    Idem.

  233. 233.

    J. L. Holzgrefe has once again noted that in that period of time “No state or regional organization, for example, intervened to prevent or end the massacre of several hundred thousand ethnic Chinese in Indonesia (mid-1960s); the killing and forced starvation of almost half a million Ibos in Nigeria (1966–1970); the slaughter and forced starvation of over a million black Christians by the Sudanese government (since late 1970s); the murder of tens of thousands of Hutus in Burundi (1972); the slaying of 100,000 East Timorese by the Indonesian government (1975–1999); the forced starvation of up to 1 million Ethiopians by their government (mid-1980s); the murder of 100,000 Kurds in Iraq (1988–1989); and the killings of tens of thousands Hutus in Burundi (since 1993), Holzgrefe (2003, pp. 46–47). From his part, Mohammed Ayoob has noted that what make humanitarian interventions suspect is the fact that they “are undertaken on a selective basis and the same criteria are not applied uniformly in every case, such interventions lose legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of many, if not most members of the international system”, Holzgrefe (2002, p. 86). See also Pattison (2010, pp. 169–173).

  234. 234.

    S. Chesterman has rightly concluded in this respect that “it seems clear that writers who claim that state practice provides evidence of a customary international law right of humanitarian intervention grossly overstate their case…State practice disclosed at most three ‘best cases’ of humanitarian intervention, but even these lack the necessary opinio juris that might transform the exception into the rule”, Chesterman (2001, pp. 86–87).

  235. 235.

    Foreign and Commonwealth Office Paper “Is Intervention Ever Justified?” (internal document dated 1984 and released in 1986, Foreign Policy Document No.148), B.Y.B.I.L., 1986, 619.

  236. 236.

    Idem.

  237. 237.

    Franck (2003, p. 223).

  238. 238.

    Murphy (2001, p. 6).

  239. 239.

    Franck (2003, p. 220).

  240. 240.

    Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) (1999, p. 65).

  241. 241.

    Anthony Aust, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Legal Counsel has recognized in this respect that “Resolution 688, which applies not only to northern Iraq but to the whole of Iraq, was not made under Chapter VII. Resolution 688 recognized that there was a severe humanitarian situation in Iraq and, in particular, northern Iraq; but the intervention in northern Iraq “Provide Comfort” was in fact, not especially mandated by the United nations, but the states taking action in northern Iraq did so in exercise of the customary international law principle of humanitarian principle”, 63 B.Y.B.I.L.(1992), 827.

  242. 242.

    The preamble of Resolution 688 does clearly refer to Security Council concern with regard to “the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which led to massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region”.

  243. 243.

    See Gray (2000, pp. 218–224).

  244. 244.

    Idem, p. 219.

  245. 245.

    See Chesterman (2001, p. 135).

  246. 246.

    Gray (2000, p. 220).

  247. 247.

    NATO Press Release 1999 (040).

  248. 248.

    Pellet (2000, p. 42).

  249. 249.

    Franck (2003, p. 225).

  250. 250.

    See Charney (1999) law.vanderbilt.edu/journal/32-05/32.5.1 html.

  251. 251.

    See Chesterman (2001, pp. 215–216).

  252. 252.

    Simma (1999) has reflected a general view when he wrote that “The legal issues presented by the Kosovo crisis are particularly impressive proof that hard cases make bad law” in “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects”.

  253. 253.

    Charney (1999).

  254. 254.

    See Domagala (2004, pp. 24–31).

  255. 255.

    Idem, p. 16.

  256. 256.

    In a resolution adopted in 1999, the General Assembly has declared that “The General Assembly… Reaffirming…that no state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights…Deeply concerned that, despite the recommendations adopted on this question by the General Assembly…(unauthorized) coercive measures continue to be promulgated and implemented with all their extraterritorial effects…Rejects (unauthorized) coercive measures with all their extraterritorial effects as tools for political or economic pressure against any country”. GA Res.54/172, UNGAOR, 54th sess., UN Doc.A/RES/54/172 (1999). Stronger condemnation has been made by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Group of 77 in a Declaration adopted in 24 September 1999 and in which it has been inter alia said that “The Ministers…rejected the so-called right of humanitarian intervention, which has no basis in the UN Charter or in International Law”. See also the Declaration of the Group of 77 Summit (133 states), Havana, Cuba, 10-14 April 2000.

  257. 257.

    See Hehir (2008, p. 55).

  258. 258.

    Idem.

  259. 259.

    See Roth (2004); Cottey (2008, p. 430).

  260. 260.

    See Pattison (2010, p. 177).

  261. 261.

    Though being of the opinion that states’ practice since 1990 may be seen as evidence of a greater acceptance that humanitarian intervention may be morally justifiable in extreme cases, the Danish Institute of International Affairs has recognized that “In conclusion, state practice after the end of the Cold War(1990-1999) concerning humanitarian intervention is neither sufficiently substantial nor has there been sufficient acceptance in the international community to support the view that a right of humanitarian intervention without Security Council authorization has become part of customary international law”, Dupi (1999, p. 93).

  262. 262.

    See Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996), Lepard (2003).

  263. 263.

    Thomas G. Weiss and Ramesh Thakur (2010 have noted about Canada’s role in favour of R2P that “Within the First United Nations, the norm champion of R2P from start to finish was Canada, a country that is strongly committed to multilateralism and has a history of close engagement with the United Nations, political credibility in both North and South, and a proud tradition of successful initiatives” in “Global Governance and the UN. An Unfinished Journey”, p. 319).

  264. 264.

    Evans (2006, p. 708).

  265. 265.

    The Economist,18 September 1999.

  266. 266.

    ICISS (2001, p. 11).

  267. 267.

    Idem.

  268. 268.

    Idem, p. viii.

  269. 269.

    Charney (1999, p. 1232).

  270. 270.

    Annan (2000, p. 48).

  271. 271.

    An analysis of this issue through a broad historical perspective has been made by Anne Orford (2009, p. 999, 2011).

  272. 272.

    Alkopher (2007, pp. 1–27).

  273. 273.

    Wilkins (2003, p. 37).

  274. 274.

    See Newman (2009, p. 138 and seq).

  275. 275.

    See ICISS (2001, p. vii).

  276. 276.

    Zajadlo (2005, p. 657).

  277. 277.

    ICISS (2001, p. 11).

  278. 278.

    Idem, p. 49.

  279. 279.

    Idem, p. 48.

  280. 280.

    ICIIS admitted in this regard that “An issue which we cannot avoid addressing, however, is that of the veto power enjoyed by the present Permanent Five. Many of our interlocutors regarded capricious use of the veto, or threat of its use, as likely to be the principal obstacle to effective international action in cases where quick and decisive action is needed to stop or avert a significant humanitarian crisis. As has been said, it is unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern. Of particular concern is the possibility that needed action will be held hostage to unrelated concerns of one or more of the permanent members – a situation that has too frequently occurred in the past”, idem, p. 51.

  281. 281.

    Idem, pp. 52–54.

  282. 282.

    On the basis of Art. 10, which gives a general responsibility to the UN General Assembly with regard to any matter within the scope of UN authority, and Art. 11, which gives the General Assembly a fallback responsibility with regard specifically to the maintenance of international peace and security – albeit only to make recommendations, not binding decisions, as well as General Assembly Resolution “Uniting for Peace”.

  283. 283.

    On the basis of Art. 52 of the UN Charter.

  284. 284.

    Idem, p. 32.

  285. 285.

    See Hehir (2008, p. 71).

  286. 286.

    ICISS (2001, pp. 32–37).

  287. 287.

    The Responsibility to Protect, as stated in the Outcome Document, has been further softened when it was endorsed by the Security Council through its Resolution 1674. See Strauss (2009, pp. 291–323).

  288. 288.

    Bellamy (2006, p. 155). See also Welsh (2008, p. 558); McClean (2011, pp. 35–39).

  289. 289.

    See Bellamy (2011, pp. 51–92).

  290. 290.

    See de Vaal (2007, p. 1039).

  291. 291.

    See Mepham (2006). Feinstein (2007) McClean (2011, pp. 36 and 38).

  292. 292.

    See Bellamy (2009, p. 41); Krieg (2009, pp. 24–25); Badescu (June 2009).

  293. 293.

    Anonymous (2007).

  294. 294.

    de Vaal (2007, p. 1043).

  295. 295.

    Evans (2006, p. 716).

  296. 296.

    See Bellamy (2010, p. 153).

  297. 297.

    See Evans (2008, pp. 288–289).

  298. 298.

    Bellamy (2010, p. 166).

  299. 299.

    See Bellamy (2010, p. 153).

  300. 300.

    S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 March 2011.

  301. 301.

    See Reuters, 12 April 2011.

  302. 302.

    Strauss (2009, p. 321).

References

  • Aceves WJ (2000) Liberalism and international legal scholarship: the Pinochet case and the move towards a universal transnational law litigation. Harvard Int Law J

    Google Scholar 

  • Akande D (1997) The international court of justice and the security council: is there room for judicial control of decisions of the political organs of the United nations? ICLQ

    Google Scholar 

  • Akehurst M (1972–1973) Jurisdiction in international law. BYIL:46

    Google Scholar 

  • Akram M, Shah SH (2005) The legislative powers of the United security council. In: Ronald St. John Macdonald and Douglas M Johnston (eds.) Towards World Constitutionalism. Issues in Legal Ordering of the World Community. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Alkopher TD (2007) The role of rights in rights in the social construction of wars: from the crusades to humanitarian interventions. Millennium J Int Stud 36

    Google Scholar 

  • Alvarez JE (1996) Judging the security council. AJIL

    Google Scholar 

  • American Law Institute (1987) Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. American Law Institute Publishers, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Anghie A (1999) Fransisco de Vitoria and the Colonial origins of International law. In: Darian-Smith E, Fitzpatrick P (eds) Laws of the Postcolonial. Michigan University Press, Ann Arbor

    Google Scholar 

  • Anghie A (2005) Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Annan K (2000) We the Peoples. Millennium Report. United Nations, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Anonymous (2007) Ensuring a responsibility to protect: lessons from Darfur. http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/14/2anonymous.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  • Arangio-Ruiz G (2000) On the council law making. Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 83

    Google Scholar 

  • Babic J (2003) Foreign armed intervention: between justified aid and illegal violence. In: Jokic A, Wilkins B (eds) Humanitarian Intervention. Moral and Philosophical Issues. Broadview Press, Toronto

    Google Scholar 

  • Badescu CG (2011) Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. Security and Human Rights. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Badescu CG (June 2009) The responsibility to protect and the conflict in darfur: the big let-down. Security Dialogue 40(3)

    Google Scholar 

  • Balthazar LG (1998) Governments sanctions and private initiatives: striking a new balance for U.S. enforcement of internationally recognized workers rights. Columbia Human Rights Law Rev 29

    Google Scholar 

  • Baroni F (2000) The international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and its mission to restore peace. Pace Int Law Rev 12

    Google Scholar 

  • Bass GJ (2008) Freedom’s Battle. The Origins of Humanitarian Intervention. Alfred A. Knopf, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bassiouni C (2002) International Extradition: United States Law and Practice. Oceana Publications, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Bassiouni C (2004) The history of universal jurisdiction and its place in international law. In: Macedo S (ed) Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Bazyler MJ (1987) Re-examing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in light of the atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia. Stanford J Int Law 23

    Google Scholar 

  • Beale JH (1923) The jurisdiction of a sovereign state. Harvard Law Rev 36

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bedjaoui M (1993) Du contrôle de la légalité des actes du Conseil de Sécurité. In Recueil d’études en l’honneur du Professeur François Rigaux, Brussels

    Google Scholar 

  • Bedjaoui M (1994) The New World Order and the Security Council. Testing the Legality of Its Acts. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Bellamy A (2006) Whither the responsibility to protect? Humanitarian intervention and the 2005 World Summit. Ethics Int Affair 20(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Bellamy AJ (2009) The responsibility to protect or Trojan horse? The crisis in darfur and humanitarian intervention after Iraq. Ethics Int Affairs 19(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Bellamy AJ (2010) The responsibility to protect-five years on. Ethics Int Affairs 24(2)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bellamy AJ (2011) Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect. From Words to Deeds. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Bennouna M (1974) Le consentement a lingerence militaire dans les conflits internes. LGDJ, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Berthoud P (1948) La compétence nationale des Etats. L’Article 2, paragraphe 7 de la Charte de San Francisco. Thesis, Neuchâtel, Brougg

    Google Scholar 

  • Beyerlin U (1982) Humanitarian intervention. In: Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol 3. North-Holland Publishing, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Biguma NF (1998) La reconnaissance conventionnelle de la compétence universelle des tribunaux internes à l’égard de certains crimes et délits. Thesis, Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II

    Google Scholar 

  • Bindschedler L (1963-I) La délimitation des compétences des Nations Unies. RCADI

    Google Scholar 

  • Birdsall A (2006) The international criminal tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.- Towards a more just order? Peace Conflict Dev 8

    Google Scholar 

  • Blakesley CL (1994) Obstacles to the creation of a permanent war crimes tribunal. Fletcher Forum World Affairs 18(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Borchard EM (1951) State Insolvency and Foreign Bondholders, vol 269. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Bottini G (2004) Universal jurisdiction after the creation of the international criminal court. NY Univ J Int Law Politics 36(2–3)

    Google Scholar 

  • Bourquin M (1927-I) Crimes et delits contre la surete des Etats etrangers. RCADI

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowett DW (1996) The court role in relation to international organizations. In: Vaughan L, Fitzmaurice M (ed) Fifty Years of International Court of Justice. Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowett DW (1997) Judicial and political functions of the security council and the international court of justice. In: Changing the Constitution of the United Nations. The British Institute of International and Comparative Law, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Brierly JL (1925) Matters of domestic jurisdiction. BYBIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Broomhall B (2003) International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between Sovereignty and the Rule of Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie I (1963a) International Law and the Use of Force by States. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie I (1963b) International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie I (1973) Humanitarian intervention. In: John Norton Moore (ed.) Law and Civil War in the Modern World. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie I (1994) The decisions of political organs of the United Nations and the rule of law. In: Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht

    Google Scholar 

  • Brownlie I (1995) International law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations. 255 RCADI, I

    Google Scholar 

  • Butler AH (2004) The growing support for universal jurisdiction in national legislation. In: Macedo S (ed) Universal jurisdiction: national courts and the prosecution of serious crimes under international law. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Byers M, Chesterman S (2003) Changing the rules about rules? Unilateral humanitarian intervention and the future of international law. In: Holzgrefe JL, Keohane RO (eds) Humanitarian intervention. Ethical, legal, and political dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Calvo C (1886) Le Droit International Public theorique et pratique, vol 1. Guillaumin/Pedone, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Carnegie R (1963) Jurisdiction over violations of the laws and customs of war. BYIL 39

    Google Scholar 

  • Charney JI (1999) Commentary: anticipatory humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Vanderbilt J Transnational Law 32(5)

    Google Scholar 

  • Charpentier J (1961) Les effets du consentement sur l’intervention, Melanges Seferiades, vol 2

    Google Scholar 

  • Chauvy Y (1981) L’extradition, Paris, Q.S.J. No. 1920

    Google Scholar 

  • Chesterman S (2001) Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, vol. 140. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Cohen JL (2011) Security council activism in the age of the war on terror. Implications for human rights, democracy and constitutionalism. In: Peled Y, Lewin-Epstein N, Mundlak G, Cohen JL (eds) Democratic Citizenship and War. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Conforti B (2005) The Law and Practice of the United Nations. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Cottey A (2008) Beyond humanitarian intervention: the new politics of peacekeeping and intervention. Contemporary Politics 14(4)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cryer R, Friman H, Robinson D, Wilmshurst E (2010) An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • D’Amato A (1987) International Law: Process and Prospect. Dobbs Ferry, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dachy E, Wajs M (2003) Compétence universelle. Une loi contre la justice. Filipson édition, Bruxelles

    Google Scholar 

  • Danish Institute of International Affairs (DUPI) (1999) Humanitarian intervention. Legal and political aspects. DUPI, Copenhagen

    Google Scholar 

  • de la Pradelle G (2000) La compétence universelle. In: Asenco H, Décaux E, Pellet A (eds) Droit International Pénal. Pédone, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • de Las Casas B (1552) In Defense of the Indians. Transl. Stafford Poole. Northern Illinois University Press, DeKalb, 1992

    Google Scholar 

  • de Lupis ID (1974) International Law and the Independent State. Gower, Aldershot

    Google Scholar 

  • de Vaal A (2007) Darfur and the responsibility to protect. Int Affairs 83(6)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • de Vattel E (1758) Le droit des gens ou principes de la loi naturelle appliquée a la conduite et aux affaires des nations et des souverains. Classics of International Law, trans. Fenwick. Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1916, II

    Google Scholar 

  • de Vitoria F (1557) De Indis et jure belli relectiones. Classics of International Law. Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1917

    Google Scholar 

  • Delos JT (1939) L'expansion coloniale dans la doctrine de Vitoria et les principes du droit moderne. In: Scott JB (ed) Vitoria et Suarez. Contribution des theÇologiens au Droit International moderne. A. Pedone, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Despagnet F (1905) Cours de Droit International Public, 3rd edn. Librairie de la Societe du Recueil General des Lois et des Arrets, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Dochring K (1997) Unlawful resolutions of the security council and their legal consequences. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations, 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Domagala A (2004) Humanitarian intervention: the Utopia of just war? The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the restraints of Humanitarian Intervention. Sussex European Institute. http://www.sussex.ac.uk/seid/documents/wp76.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  • Drago L (1907) States loans in their relation to international policy. AJIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Dugard J (2006) International law: a South African Perspective, 3rd edn. Juta & Co, Cap Town

    Google Scholar 

  • Dulles JF (1950) War or peace. MacMillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Dupuy PM (1997) The constitutional dimensions of the charter of the United Nations revisited. Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations, 1

    Google Scholar 

  • De Wet E (2004) The Chapter VII Powers of the United Nations Council. HART Publishing, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • El Ouali A (1984) Effets juridiques de la sentence internationale. Contribution à l’étude de l’exécution des normes internationales. LGDJ, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • El Ouali A (1993) Nouvel ordre international ou retour à l’inégalité des Etats ? Approche globale de la nouvelle configuration stratégique, économique et juridique mondiale. Les Editions Maghrébines, Casablanca

    Google Scholar 

  • Ermacora F (1968-II) Human rights and domestic jurisdiction (Article 2 (7) of the charter. RCADI

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans G (2006) From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect. Wisconsin Int Law J 24(3)

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans G (2008) The responsibility to protect: an idea whose time has come…and gone? Int Affairs 22(3)

    Google Scholar 

  • Fairley HS (1980) State actors, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law: reopening Pandora’s box. Georgian J Int Comparative Law 10

    Google Scholar 

  • Farer TJ (1991) An inquiry into the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. In: Damrosch LF, Scheffer DJ (eds) Law and Force in the New International Order. Westview Press, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Farer TJ (2003) Humanitarian intervention before and after 9/11:legality and legitimacy. In: Holzgrefe JL, Keohane RO (eds) Humanitarian intervention. Ethical, legal, and political dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Feinstein L (2007) Darfur and beyond. Council on Foreign Relations, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Fenwick CG (1925) The scope of domestic questions in international law. AJIL 19

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fenwick CG (1945) Intervention: individual and collective. AJIL 39

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fenwick CG (1965) International Law, 4th edn. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Filder DP (2000) A Kinder, gentler system of Capitulations? International law, structural adjustment policies, and the standard of liberal, globalized civilization. Texas Int Law J 35(3)

    Google Scholar 

  • Fincham CBH (1948) Domestic Jurisdiction: Exception to Domestic Jurisdiction as a Bar to Action by the League of Nations and the United Nations. A.W.Sijthoff, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Finnemore M (2003) The Purpose of Intervention. Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force. Cornell University Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Fitzpatrick P (2003) ‘Gods would be needed…’: American Empire and the Rule of (international) Law. Leiden J Int Law 16

    Google Scholar 

  • Fixdal M, Smith D (1998) Humanitarian intervention and just war. Mershon Int Studies Rev 42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Florini AM (ed) (2000) The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington

    Google Scholar 

  • Fonteyne JPL (1974) The customary international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention: its current validity under the UN charter. California Int Law J 4

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck TM (1992) The powers of appreciation: who is the ultimate guardian of UN legality? AJIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck TM (2003) Interpretation and change in the law of humanitarian intervention. In: Holzgrefe JL, Keohane R (eds) Humanitarian intervention. Ethical, legal, and political dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck SD (2009) Development and outcomes of investment treaty arbitration. Harvard Int Law J 50(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck T, Rodley N (1973a) After Bangladesh: The law of humanitarian intervention by military force. AJIL 67

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Franck TM, Rodley NN (1973b) After Bangladesh: the law of humanitarian intervention by military force. AJIL 67

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frydman B (2009) Le contentieux transnational des droits de l’homme: Une analyse stratégique. Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen: 77

    Google Scholar 

  • George RP (1998) Natural law and international order. In: Mapel DR, Nardin T (eds) International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • Gill TD (1995) Legal and some political limitations on the power of the UN security council to exercise its enforcement powers under chapter VII of the charter. Netherland Yearbook of International Law, vol. 26

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilmour DR (1967a) The meaning of ‘Intervene’ within Article 2 (7) of the United Nations charter. An historical perspective. ICLQ 16

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilmour DR (1967b) Article 2 (7) of the United Nations charter and the practice of the permanent members of the security council. Australian YIL: 3

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilmour DR (1967c) The meaning of ‘Intervene’ within Article 2 (7) of the United Nations Charter. An historical perspective. ICLQ: 16

    Google Scholar 

  • Giovanni da Legnano (1447) Tractatos de bello, de represaliis et de duello. Classics of International law, transl Brierly. Carnegie Institution, Washington, 1917

    Google Scholar 

  • Glennon MJ (1992) State-sponsored abduction: a comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain. AJIL 4

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodrich LM (1949) The United Nations and domestic jurisdiction. Int Org: 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodrich LM, Hambro E (1946) The Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents, 1st edn. World Peace Foundation, Boston

    Google Scholar 

  • Gowland-Debbas V (1994) The relationship between the International Court of Justice and the security council in the light of the Lockerbie Case. AJIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Gray C (2000) International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Grotius H (1646) De jure belli ac pacis. Classics of International Law, trans. Kelsey, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1927, II, xx

    Google Scholar 

  • Guillaume G (1992) La compétence universelle, formes anciennes et nouvelles. In: Mélanges offerts à, G.Levasseur. Paris, Litec

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall WE (1909) A Treatise on International Law, 6th edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall SM (2002) Multinational corporations’ post-unocal liabilities for violations of international laws. George Washington Int Law Rev:41

    Google Scholar 

  • Halleck HW, Baker GS (1893) Halleck’s International Law, or, Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, vol 1, 3rd edn. K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Harper K (1994) Does the United Nations security council have the competence to act as court of Legislature. NY Univ J Int Law Politics 27(1)

    Google Scholar 

  • Hehir A (2008) Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo: Iraq, Darfur and the Record of Global Society. McMillan, Palgrave

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Higgins R (1963) The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Higgins R (1994) Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman J (2008) Terrorism blacklisting: putting european human guarantees to the test. Constellations 15(4)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Holzgrefe JL (2002) Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. Int J Human Rights 6(1)

    Google Scholar 

  • Holzgrefe JL (2003) The Humanitarian Intervention Debate. In: Holzgrefe JL, Keohane R (eds) Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Hornung J (1885, 1886) Civilisés et barbares. RDILC

    Google Scholar 

  • Howell JM (1954) Domestic Jurisdiction in International Law. Proc Am Soc Int Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurd I (2007) After Anarchy. Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council. Princeton University Press, Princeton

    Google Scholar 

  • ICISS (2001) The Responsibility to Protect. The International Development Research Centre, Ottawa

    Google Scholar 

  • ICJ (1949) Corfu channel case. ICJ Reports, 4

    Google Scholar 

  • ICJ (1986) Case concerning military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits). ICJ Reports

    Google Scholar 

  • Ignatieff M (2003) State failure and nation-building. In: Holzgrefe JL, Keohane RO (eds) Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Inazumi M (2005) Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law. Intersentia, Antwerp

    Google Scholar 

  • Jennings R, Watts A (eds) (1992) Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th edn. Longman, Harlow

    Google Scholar 

  • Jescheck H (1985) International crimes. In: Bernhardt R (ed) Encyclopedia of Public International Law, vol 8. North-Holland, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones HH (1951) Domestic jurisdiction: from the covenant to the charter. Illinois Law Rev 46

    Google Scholar 

  • Jones GJ (1979) The United Nations and the Domestic Jurisdiction of States: Interpretations and Applications of the Non-intervention Principle. University of Wales Press, Cardiff

    Google Scholar 

  • Kawser A (2006) The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the United Nations Charter. A historical view. Singapore Yearbook of International Law 10

    Google Scholar 

  • Keck Sikkink ME (1998) Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Relations. Cornell University Press, Ithaca

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelsen H (1951) The Law of the United Nations. Stevens and Sons, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Keohane RO (2003) Political authority after intervention: gradations in sovereignty. In: Holzgrefe JL, Keohane RO (eds) Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Krisch N (2004) Imperial International Law, Global Law and Justice, Global Law Working Paper 01/04, NYU School of Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirsch N (2005) International law in times of Hegemony :unequal power and the shaping of the international legal order. Eur J Int Law 16(3)

    Google Scholar 

  • Kissinger H (2001) The pitfalls of universal jurisdiction: risking judicial tyranny. Foreign Affairs 80(4)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kochler H (2001) Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics. International Progress Organization, Vienna, Stud Int Relat XXV

    Google Scholar 

  • Koh HH (1994) The ‘Haïti Paradigm’ in United States Human Rights Policy. Yale Law J

    Google Scholar 

  • Kontorovitch E (2007) “The inefficiency of universal jurisdiction”, Public international law and economics: the power of rational choice methodology in guiding the analysis and the design of public international law institutions (Symposium). Working Paper, University of St. Gallen Law School

    Google Scholar 

  • Krasner S (2004) Sharing sovereignty. New institutions for collapsed and failing states. Int Security 29(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Kraytman YS (1985) Universal jurisdiction. Historical roots and modern implications. BSIS J Int Studies

    Google Scholar 

  • Krieg A (2009) The responsibility to protect- how history could repeat itself in Darfur’. PICA, A Global Research Organization

    Google Scholar 

  • Laswell HD, McDougal MS (1992) Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy, vol 1. Martinus/Nijhoff/Kluwer Academic Publishers, Hingham

    Google Scholar 

  • Lauterpacht H (1955) in L. Oppenheim “Oppenheim’s International Law”, 8th edn. Longman, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Lepard BD (2003) Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: a fresh approach based on fundamental ethical principles in international law and world religions. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Levene M (2005) Genocide in the age of the nation-state. the rise of the West and the coming of genocide. Palgrave Macmillan, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Lillich RB (1967) Forcible self-help by states to protect human rights. Iowa Law Rev 53

    Google Scholar 

  • Lowe V et al (eds) (2008) Introduction of “The United Nations Security Council and War. The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Macdonald R (1931) Changing relations between the International Court of Justice and the Security Council of the United nations. The Canadian Yearbook of International Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Macedo S (ed) (2004) Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious crimes under International Law. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Magnarella PG (1995a) Universal Jurisdiction and Universal Human Rights: A Global Progression. J Third World Studies 12(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Magnarella PG (1995b) Universal jurisdiction and universal human rights: a global progression. J Third World Studies 7(2)

    Google Scholar 

  • Maier H (1983) Interests balancing and extraterritorial jurisdiction. Am J Comparative Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Malanczuk P (1993) Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force. Het Spinhuis, Amsterdam

    Google Scholar 

  • Malanczuk P (1999) Reconsidering the relationship between the ICJ and the security council. In: Heere WP (ed) International Law and the Hague’s 750th Anniversary. TMC Asser, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Mann A (1964) The doctrine of jurisdiction in international law. RCADI 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Manusama K (2006) The United Nations Security Council in the Post-cold era. Applying the Principle of Legality. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Marcella D (1999) Passport to justice: internationalising the political question doctrine for application in the world court. Harvard Int Law J 40

    Google Scholar 

  • Marchal A (1931) La conception de l’économie nationale et des rapports internationaux chez les mercantilistes français et leurs contemporains. Sirey, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Marschik A (2005) Legislative powers of the security council. In: Ronald St. John Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston (eds) Towards World Constitutionalism. Issues in Legal Ordering of the World Community. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden

    Google Scholar 

  • Martenczuk B (1999) The security council, the international court of justice and judicial review: what lessons from Lockerbie? Eur J Int Law

    Google Scholar 

  • McClean E (2011) The dilemma of intervention: human rights and the UN security council. In Odello M, Canvadoli S (eds) Emerging Areas of Human Rights in the 21st Century. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • McDougal MS (1953) International law, power and policy: a contemporary conception. RCADI, vol 82

    Google Scholar 

  • McDougal MS, Laswell HD, Reisman M (1968) Theories about international law: prologue to a configurative jurisprudence. Virginia J Int Law 8

    Google Scholar 

  • McWhinney E (1992) The international court as emerging constitutional court and the co-ordinate UN institutions. Especially the security council: implications of the aerial incident at Lockerbie. The Canadian Yearbook of International Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Mepham D (2006) Darfur: The Responsibility to Protect. Institute for Public Policy Research, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Mill JS (1867) A Few Words on Non-intervention. Dissertations and Discussions, vol 3, 2nd edn. Longmans, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Moulin HA (1907) La doctrine de Drago, RGDIP

    Google Scholar 

  • Mrazek J (1989) Prohibition on the use and threat of force: self-defence and self-help in international law. Canadian Yearbook of International Law 27

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy SD (1996) Humanitarian intervention: the United Nations in an evolving world order. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Murphy SD (2001) Calibrating global expectations regarding humanitarian intervention. Harvard University Conference on “After Kosovo: humanitarian intervention at the crossroads, January 2001, 6

    Google Scholar 

  • Nardin T (2000) The moral basis of humanitarian intervention. Symposium on the norms and ethics of humanitarian intervention, Center for Global Peace and Conflict Studies, University of California, Irvine, May 26, 2000

    Google Scholar 

  • Newman M (2009) Humanitarian Intervention; Confronting the Contradictions. Columbia University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Newton MA (2001) Comparative complementarity: domestic jurisdiction consistent with the Rome statute of the international criminal court. Military Law Rev 167

    Google Scholar 

  • Nigel AR, White D (2002) The United Nations System: Towards International Justice. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Nolte G (2000) The limits of the security council’s powers and its functions in the international legal system: some reflections. In: Byers M (ed) The Role of Law in International Politics. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Nolte G (2002) Article 2 (7). In: Simma B et al (eds) The Charter of the United Nations. A Commentary, vol. 1, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Nys E (1912) Le Droit International Public. Les principes, les théories, les faits, vol 2. M. Weissenbrush, Bruxelles, New edit.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connell DP (1965) International Law, vol. 1. Stevens, London

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Keefe R (2004) Universal jurisdiction. Clarifying the basic concept. J Int Criminal Justice 2(3)

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Keefe R (2009) The grave breaches regime and universal jurisdiction. J Int Criminal Justice 7(4)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olivares Marcos GA (2005) The legal practice of the recovery of states external debts, Thesis, these. Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationalse, Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • Oliver CT et al (1994) The International Legal System. Foundation Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Oppenheim L (1928) International law. A treatise, vol 1, Peace, 4th edn. Longmans, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Orford A (2009) Jurisdiction without jurisdiction: from the Holly Roman empire to the responsibility to protect. Michigan J Int Law 30

    Google Scholar 

  • Orford A (2011) International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ott DH (1987) Public International Law and the Modern World. Pitman Publishing, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Padirac R (1953) Légalité juridique des Etats et l’organisation internationale. L.G.D.J., Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Pattison J (2010) Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect. Who Should Intervene? Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Pellet A (2000) State sovereignty and the protection of fundamental human rights: an international law perspective. Pugwash Occasional Papers 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Pillet A (1898) Recherches sur les droits fondamentaux des Etats dans l'ordre des rapports internationaux et sur la solution des conflits quils font naıtre. RGDIP

    Google Scholar 

  • Plachta M (2001) The Lockerbie case: the role of the security council in enforcing the principle Aut Dedere Aut judicare. Eur J Int Law 12(1)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pradier-Fodere P (1883) Traite de Droit International Public europeen et americain suivant le progres de la science et de la pratique internationale, vol 1. G. Pédone-Lauriol, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Preuss L (1949-I) Article 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and matters of domestic jurisdiction. RCADI:74

    Google Scholar 

  • Princeton Project (2001) Principles on Universal Jurisdiction. Princeton, New Jersey

    Google Scholar 

  • Putmam TL (2009) Courts without borders: domestic sources of U.S. extraterritoriality in the regulatory sphere. Int Org 63

    Google Scholar 

  • Quigley J (2000) The United Nations security council: Promethean protector or helpless Hostage? Texas Int Law J

    Google Scholar 

  • Rajan MS (1958) United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction. Orient Longmans, Bombay

    Google Scholar 

  • Ralston JH (1919) International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno. Stanford University Press, California

    Google Scholar 

  • Ramsbotham O, Woodhouse T (1996) Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict. Polity, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Randall K (1988) Universal jurisdiction under international law. Texas Law Rev 66

    Google Scholar 

  • Randelzhofer A (1994) Article 2(4). In: Simma B (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ratner SR, Abrams JS (2001) Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Raustiala K (2004) The evolution of territoriality: international relations and American law. In: Kahler M, Walter B (eds) Globalization, Territoriality and Conflict. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Rayfuse R (1993) International abduction and the united states supreme court: the law of the jungle reigns. ICLQ 42

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reisman M (1971) Nullity and Revision. The Review and Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards. Yale University Press, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Reisman M (1990) Sovereignty and human rights in contemporary international law. 84 AJIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Reisman WM (1993) The constitutional crisis in the United Nations. AJIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Reisman M (2000) Unilateral action and the transformation of the world constitutive process: the special problem of humanitarian intervention. Eur J Int Law 11

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reisman M, McDougal MS (1958) Aggression and World Order: A Critique of United Nations’ Theories of Aggression. Stevens, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Reisman M, McDougal MS (1973) Humanitarian intervention to protect the Ibos. In: Lillich RB (ed) Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations. University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville

    Google Scholar 

  • Reydmans L (2003) Universal Jurisdiction. International and Municipal Perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Rolin-Jacquemyns G (1876) Note sur la théorie du droit d’intervention, à propos d’une lettre de M. Le Professeur Arntz. RDILC VIII

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosental B (1970) Etude de l'oeuvre de Myres Smith McDougal en matiére de Droit International. LGDIP, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross A (1964) La notion de compétence nationale dans la pratique des Nations Unies. In: Mélanges offerts à Henri Rolin. Pédone, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Roth K (2004) War in Iraq: not a humanitarian intervention. http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/402ba99f4.pdf

    Google Scholar 

  • Rougier A (1910) La théorie del’intervention d’humanite. RGDIP

    Google Scholar 

  • Rousseau Ch (1980) Droit International Public. Paris, Sirey 4

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubin AP (1993) Libya, Lockerbie and the law. Diplomacy Statecraft 4(1)

    Google Scholar 

  • Rubin AD (1994) An international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia? Pace Int Law Rev 6(1)

    Google Scholar 

  • Sahovic M, Bishop WW (1968) The authority of the state: its range with respect to persons and places. In: Sorensen M (ed) Manual of Public International Law. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Saint-Aubin J (1913) L’extradition et le droit extraditionnel théorique et pratique. A.Pédone, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Schachter O (1995) Law-making in the United Nations. In: Nandasiri Jasentuliyana (ed) Perspectives on International Law. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheffer DJ (2001) Symposium: universal jurisdiction. myths, realities and prospects: opening address. New Engl Law Rev 35

    Google Scholar 

  • Schepple KL (2006) International State of Emergency: Challenges to Constitutionalism after September 11, paper was originally prepared for the Yale Legal Theory Workshop, 21 September 2006, Princeton University, 1, digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/schmooze. . ./49/ - United States

    Google Scholar 

  • Schweisfurth T (1980) Operations to rescue nationals in third states involving the use of force in relation to the protection of human rights. GYIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Scott JB (1934) The Spanish Origin of International Law: Fransisco de Vitoria and His Law of Nations. Clarendon Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Sharga D, Zalick R (1994) The international criminal tribunal for former Yugoslavia. EJIL 5

    Google Scholar 

  • Shearer IA (1994) Starke’s International Law, 11th edn. Butterworths, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Simma B (1999) NATO, the UN and the use of force: legal aspects. Eur J Int Law. http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol10/No1/abl.html

    Google Scholar 

  • Slaughter A-M (2004) Defining the limits: universal jurisdiction and national courts. In: Macedo S (ed) Universal Jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes Under International Law. University of Pensylvania Press, Philadelphia

    Google Scholar 

  • Sornarajah M (1981) Internal colonialism and humanitarian intervention. Ga J Int Comp L

    Google Scholar 

  • Stern B (1994) Vers la mondialisation juridiques. Les lois Helmes-Burton et d’Amato-Kennedy. RGDIP 4:979–1003

    Google Scholar 

  • Stern B (1999) A propos de la compétence universelle. In: Yakpo E, Boumédra T (eds) Liber Amicorum Mohammed Bedjaoui. Kluwer Law International, The Hague

    Google Scholar 

  • Strauss E (2009) A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush – on the assumed legal nature of the responsibility to protect. Global Respons Protect 1(3)

    Google Scholar 

  • Suzuki E (1974) The New Haven school of international law: an invitation to a policy-oriented jurisprudence. Yale Stud in World Pub Order 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Swords C (2002) Canadian practice in international law at the department of foreign affairs in 2001-2002: jurisdiction and territorial sovereignty, extraterritorial evidence gathering. Canadian Yearbook of International Law

    Google Scholar 

  • Teson FR (1997) Humanitarian Intervention : An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2nd edn. Transnational Publishers, Irvington-on-Hudson

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomas C (1985) New States, Sovereignty and Intervention. Gover, VII cont

    Google Scholar 

  • Trindade AAC (1976) The domestic jurisdiction of states in the practice of the United Nations and regional organizations. ICLQ

    Google Scholar 

  • Tuck R (1999) The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from Grotius to Kant. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Ulimubenshi PC (2003) L’exception du domaine réservé dans la procedure de la Cour Internationale. Thesis, University of Geneva

    Google Scholar 

  • Vallindas P (1948) The concept ‘matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction’ in Art.2 section 7 of the United Nations Charter. RHDI: 1

    Google Scholar 

  • Verdross A (1965) La ‘compétence nationale’ dans le cadre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies et l’indépendance des Etats. RGDIP

    Google Scholar 

  • Vervey VD (1985) Humanitarian intervention under international law. Netherlands ILR 32

    Google Scholar 

  • Vervey WD (1998) Humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and beyond: an international law perspective. In: Pieterse JN (ed) World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond. St. Martin’s Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson JS (1977) Autointerpretation, competence, and the continuing validity of Article 2 (7) of the UN charter. AJIL

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiss TG, Thakur R (2010) Global Governance and the UN. An Unfinished Journey. Indiana University Press, Bloomington

    Google Scholar 

  • Welsh JM (2008) The security council and humanitarian intervention. In: Lowe V, Roberts A, Welsh J, Zaun D (eds) The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Wheaton H (1929) Wheatons's Elements of International Law, vol I, 6th edn. Stevens and Sons, London

    Google Scholar 

  • White ND (2005) The Law of International Organizations. Lynne Rienner, Boulder

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilkins B (2003) Humanitarian Intervention: some doubts. In: Jokic A (ed) Humanitarian Intervention. Moral and Philosophical Issues. Broadview Press, Toronto

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams JF (1924) International Law and International Financial Obligations Arising from Contract, vol 4. Bibliotheca Visseriana, Leyden

    Google Scholar 

  • Williams JF (1929) Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations. Longmans, Green, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Wilson RR (1929) Reservations clauses in treaties of obligatory arbitration. AJIL 23

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wise EM (1998) Aut Dedere Aut judicare: the duty to prosecute or extradite. In: Cherif Bassiouni M (ed) International Criminal Law. Procedural and Enforcement Mechanisms, vol II, 2nd edn. Transnational Publishers, Irvington

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolff C (1748) Jus gentium methodo scientifica pertractatum. Classics of International Law, Trans. Drake. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1934

    Google Scholar 

  • Zajadlo J (2005) Legality and legitimization of humanitarian intervention. New challenges in the age of the war on terrorism. Am Behav Sci 48(6)

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Abdelhamid El Ouali .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ouali, A.E. (2012). The Weakening of States’ Territorial Sovereignty. In: Territorial Integrity in a Globalizing World. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22869-8_4

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics