Abstract
E-mail brings us lots of conveniences. Especially with help of PGP and S/MIME, it gives both confidentiality and message/origin authentication. However, in some cases for strong privacy, a message sender will not want to let others know even the fact that he sent a message to a recipient. Very recently, Harn and Ren proposed a fully deniable authentication scheme for E-mail where a sender can repudiate his or her signature. In this paper, however, their deniable authentication scheme is proved not to be fully deniable. To resolve this deniability problem, we suggest a designated verifier signature scheme to support strong privacy, and construct a privacy-enhanced deniable authentication E-mail scheme using the designated verifier signature scheme. Compared with the Harn and Ren’s scheme, the proposed scheme has a simple cryptographic structure and can be easily realized with the existing secure E-mail systems.
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References
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Ki, J., Yeong Hwang, J., Nyang, D., Hoon Lee, D., Lim, J. (2011). Privacy-Enhanced Deniable Authentication E-Mail Service. In: Ariwa, E., El-Qawasmeh, E. (eds) Digital Enterprise and Information Systems. DEIS 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 194. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22603-8_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22603-8_2
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