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A Geometric Look at Manipulation

  • Jan van Eijck
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6814)

Abstract

We take a fresh look at voting theory, in particular at the notion of manipulation, by employing the geometry of the Saari triangle. This yields a geometric proof of the Gibbard/Satterthwaite theorem, and new insight into what it means to manipulate the vote. Next, we propose two possible strengthenings of the notion of manipulability (or weakenings of the notion of non-manipulability), and analyze how these affect the impossibility proof for non-manipulable voting rules.

Keywords

Social Choice Vote Rule Social Welfare Function Social Choice Function Impossibility Theorem 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan van Eijck
    • 1
  1. 1.CWIAmsterdamNetherlands

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