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International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming

ICALP 2011: Automata, Languages and Programming pp 539–551Cite as

Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6756))

Abstract

Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the existence of and convergence of natural dynamics to a pure Nash equilibrium. Weighted variants of congestion games that rely on sharing costs proportional to players’ weights do not generally have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We propose a new way of assigning costs to players with weights in congestion games that recovers the important properties of the unweighted model. This method is derived from the Shapley value, and it always induces a game with a (weighted) potential function. For the special cases of weighted network cost-sharing and atomic selfish routing games (with Shapley value-based cost shares), we prove tight bounds on the price of stability and price of anarchy, respectively.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 94305, USA

    Konstantinos Kollias & Tim Roughgarden

Authors
  1. Konstantinos Kollias
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  2. Tim Roughgarden
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. ICE-TCS, School of Computer Science, Reykjavik University, Menntavegur 1, IS 101, Reykjavik, Iceland

    Luca Aceto

  2. Fakultät für Informatik, Universität Wien, Universitätsstraße10/9, 1090, Wien, Österreich, Austria

    Monika Henzinger

  3. Department of Applied Mathematics, Charles University, Malostranské nám. 25, 118 00, Praha 1, Czech Republic

    Jiří Sgall

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Kollias, K., Roughgarden, T. (2011). Restoring Pure Equilibria to Weighted Congestion Games. In: Aceto, L., Henzinger, M., Sgall, J. (eds) Automata, Languages and Programming. ICALP 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6756. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22012-8_43

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22012-8_43

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-22011-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22012-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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