“Multiple Individual” Moralities: Is “Moral Disengagement” in the Perpetration of Inhumanities a Reengagement of Another Morality?
An important research in the area of psychology that can enrich our perspective on the relationship between morality and violence concerns the so-called moral disengagement illustrated by Bandura (1999). The neglect of moral conduct is widespread in moral agents: moral standards, even if previously adopted as guidelines for self-sanctioning and to avoid self-condemnation or self-devaluation, are often contravened. The moral behavior, Bandura says, is both inhibitive – refraining from certain behaviour – and proactive – behaving according to that particular idea of humanity, which is embedded in the adopted moral standard. Unfortunately, the activation of the moral standard can be deactivated – that is what moral disengagement is about – so that the alternative behavior is no longer viewed as immoral, the possible consequent harm is minimized, expected positive consequences are overemphasized and victims are devaluated in their very nature as human beings. What is important to note from our perspective is that to “engage moral disengagement” people often construct moral justifications of the new actions so that the conduct is made personally and socially acceptable “by portraying it as serving a socially worthy or moral purpose” (Bandura, 1999, p. 195). The redefinition of killing is an amazing example of disengagement: shifts in destructive people’s behavior is seen in military conduct, where a new conduct “is achieved not by altering their personality structures, aggressive drives or moral standards” (ibid.) Usually this justification also consists in a legitimation of violence!
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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Magnani, L. (2011). Multiple Individual Moralities May Trigger Violence. In: Understanding Violence. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistomology and Rational Ethics, vol 1. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21972-6_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21972-6_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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