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International Conference on Information Security and Cryptology

Inscrypt 2010: Information Security and Cryptology pp 336–349Cite as

Quasi-Dyadic CFS Signatures

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6584))

Abstract

Courtois-Finiasz-Sendrier (CFS) digital signatures critically depend on the ability to efficiently find a decodable syndrome by random sampling the syndrome space, previously restricting the class of codes upon which they could be instantiated to generic binary Goppa codes. In this paper we show how to construct t-error correcting quasi-dyadic codes where the density of decodable syndromes is high, while also allowing for a reduction by a factor up to t in the key size.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Engenharia de Computação e Sistemas Digitais (PCS), Escola Politécnica, Universidade de São Paulo, Brazil

    Paulo S. L. M. Barreto & Rafael Misoczki

  2. CASED – Center for Advanced Security Research Darmstadt, Mornewegstrasse, 32, 64293, Darmstadt, Germany

    Pierre-Louis Cayrel

  3. Fachbereich Informatik Kryptographie und Computeralgebra, Technische Universität Darmstadt, Hochschulstraße 10, 64289, Darmstadt, Germany

    Robert Niebuhr

Authors
  1. Paulo S. L. M. Barreto
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  2. Pierre-Louis Cayrel
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  3. Rafael Misoczki
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  4. Robert Niebuhr
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Dongchuan Road 800, 200240, Shanghai, China

    Xuejia Lai

  2. Columbia University, USA

    Moti Yung

  3. State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China

    Dongdai Lin

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© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Barreto, P.S.L.M., Cayrel, PL., Misoczki, R., Niebuhr, R. (2011). Quasi-Dyadic CFS Signatures. In: Lai, X., Yung, M., Lin, D. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6584. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21518-6_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21517-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21518-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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