Abstract
In recent years, the listing service is widely used in search site such as Yahoo!, Google, and MSN. In the service, advertising fee and advertising order are decided by the auction that is called Generalized Second Price Auction (GSP) and the auction is actually employed in a lot of search service sites. There are a lot of researches on GSP in order to analyze and clarify its feature and advantages. However, in those researches, the advertisement is mutually independent. Additionally, the value of advertisement is not considered. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism based on GSP that is used in advertisement auctions. Each advertisement has some value, because users click the advertisement when it may be useful for them. We analyze the auctioneer’s profit in comparison between normal GSP, normal VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism) and our proposed mechanism. The contribution of our research includes to clarify the features and advantages of advertisement auctions and effects to website owner’s profit rate.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Edelman, B., Ostrivsky, M., Schwarz, M.: Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction Selling of Dollars Worth of Keywords. The American Economic Review (2005)
Vickrey, W.: Couterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance (1961)
Krishna, V.: Auction Theory. Academic Press, London (2002)
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., Schwarz, M.: Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords. American Economic Review 9(1), 242–259 (2007)
Brooks, N.: The Atlas Rank Report: How Search Engine Rank Impact Traffic. Insights, Atlas Institute Digital Marketing (2004)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Motoki, Y., Takahashi, S., Saito, Y., Matsuo, T. (2011). Effects of Value-Based Mechanism in Online Advertisement Auction. In: Lee, R. (eds) Computer and Information Science 2011. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 364. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21378-6_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21378-6_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21377-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21378-6
eBook Packages: EngineeringEngineering (R0)