Abstract
Recently, Fano et al. [2] have studied the evolution of trading strategies for a double auction when the number of traders increases. They provide two main results. First, the competitive outcome obtains under different market architectures, provided that the size of the market is sufficiently large. Second, the choice of the order-clearing rule affects trading behavior. Under simultaneous order-clearing, marginal traders learn to act as price takers and make offers equal to their valuations or costs. Under asynchronous order-clearing, the intramarginal traders learn to act as price makers and make offers equal to the competitive price.
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Hauser, F., LiCalzi, M. (2011). Learning to Trade in an Unbalanced Market. In: Osinga, S., Hofstede, G., Verwaart, T. (eds) Emergent Results of Artificial Economics. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 652. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21108-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21108-9_6
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