Summary
Since there is no supranational institution which can enforce International Environmental Agreements (IEAs), international cooperation proves difficult in practice. Global emissions exhibit negative externalities in countries other than their country of origin and hence there is a high interdependence between countries and strategic considerations play an important role. Game Theory analyzes the interaction between agents and formulates hypotheses about their behavior and the final outcomes in games. Hence, international environmental problems are particularly suited for analysis by this method. The purpose of this chapter is to present an introduction to the main aspects of the formation and stability of IEAs using Game Theory.
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Cerdá-Tena, E. (2011). International Environmental Agreements and Game Theory. In: Pardo, L., Balakrishnan, N., Gil, M.Á. (eds) Modern Mathematical Tools and Techniques in Capturing Complexity. Understanding Complex Systems. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20853-9_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20853-9_20
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