Abstract
We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party protocols in the face of malicious fail-stop faults, we first show how the traditional notions of secrecy and correctness of protocols can be captured as properties of Nash equilibria in games for rational players. Next, we concentrate on fairness. Here we demonstrate a Game Theoretic notion and two different cryptographic notions that turn out to all be equivalent. In addition, we provide a simulation based notion that implies the previous three. All four notions are weaker than existing cryptographic notions of fairness. In particular, we show that they can be met in some natural setting where existing notions of fairness are provably impossible to achieve.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
Keywords
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
References
Abraham, I., Dolev, D., Gonen, R., Halpern, J.Y.: Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation. In: PODC, pp. 53–62 (2006)
Asharov, G., Canetti, R., Hazay, C.: Towards a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation (full version) (in ePrint)
Asharov, G., Lindell, Y.: Utility Dependence in Correct and Fair Rational Secret Sharing. Journal of Cryptology 24(1), 157–202 (2011)
Beaver, D., Goldwasser, S.: Multiparty computation with faulty majority. In: 30th FOCS, pp. 468–473 (1989)
Canetti, R.: Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols. Journal of Cryptology 13(1), 143–202 (2000)
Cleve, R.: Limits on the Security of Coin Flips when Half the Processors are Faulty. In: 18th STOC, pp. 364–369 (1986)
Dodis, Y., Halevi, S., Rabin, T.: A Cryptographic Solution to a Game Theoretic Problem. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 112–130. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Dodis, Y., Rabin, T.: Cryptography and Game Theory. In: Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)
Fuchsbauer, G., Katz, J., Naccache, D.: Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks. In: Micciancio, D. (ed.) TCC 2010. LNCS, vol. 5978, pp. 419–436. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Fudenberg, D., Tirole, J.: Game Theory. The MIT Press, Cambridge (1991)
Garay, J.A., MacKenzie, P.D., Prabhakaran, M., Yang, K.: Resource fairness and composability of cryptographic protocols. In: Halevi, S., Rabin, T. (eds.) TCC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3876, pp. 404–428. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography. Basic Applications, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004)
Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to Play any Mental Game – A Completeness Theorem for Protocols with Honest Majority. In: 19th STOC, pp. 218–229 (1987)
Goldreich, O., Kahan, A.: How To Construct Constant-Round Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems for NP. Journal of Cryptology 9(3), 167–190 (1996)
Goldwasser, S., Levin, L.A.: Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In: Menezes, A., Vanstone, S.A. (eds.) CRYPTO 1990. LNCS, vol. 537, pp. 77–93. Springer, Heidelberg (1991)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: Probabilistic Encryption and How to Play Mental Poker Keeping Secret All Partial Information. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 28(2), 270–299 (1984)
Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Rachoff, C.: The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proof Systems. SIAM J. Computing 18(1), 186–208 (1989)
Gordon, S.D., Hazay, C., Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Complete fairness in secure two-party computation. In: STOC, pp. 413–422 (2008)
Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited. In: De Prisco, R., Yung, M. (eds.) SCN 2006. LNCS, vol. 4116, pp. 229–241. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Partial Fairness in Secure Two-Party Computation. In: Gilbert, H. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6110, pp. 157–176. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Gradwohl, R., Livne, N., Rosen, A.: Sequential Rationality in Cryptographic Protocols. In: FOCS, pp. 623–632 (2010)
Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Efficient Rational Secret Sharing in Standard Communication Networks. In: 36th STOC, pp. 623–632 (2004)
Halpern, J., Pass, R.: Game Theory with Costly Computation. In: ICS, pp. 120–142 (2010)
Izmalkov, S., Lepinski, M., Micali, S.: Verifiably Secure Devices. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 273–301. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., Lepinski, M.: Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design. In: 46th FOCS, pp. 585–595 (2005)
Katz, J.: Bridging Game Theory and Cryptography: Recent Results and Future Directions. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 251–272. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Kol, G., Naor, M.: Games for exchanging information. In: 40th STOC, pp. 423–432 (2008)
Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320–339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Lysyanskaya, A., Triandopoulos, N.: Rationality and Adversarial Behavior in Multi-party Computation. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 180–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Ong, S.J., Parkes, D.C., Rosen, A., Vadhan, S.P.: Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 36–53. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Pass, R., Shelat, A.: Renegotiation-Safe Protocols. In: Innovations in Computer Science, ICS 2011 (2011)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2011 International Association for Cryptologic Research
About this paper
Cite this paper
Asharov, G., Canetti, R., Hazay, C. (2011). Towards a Game Theoretic View of Secure Computation. In: Paterson, K.G. (eds) Advances in Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2011. EUROCRYPT 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6632. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_24
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20465-4_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-20464-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-20465-4
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)