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Electoral Systems pp 305–326Cite as

Approval Balloting for Fixed-Size Committees

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Part of the book series: Studies in Choice and Welfare ((WELFARE))

Abstract

Approval voting is a well-known voting procedure for single-winner elections. Voters approve as many candidates as they like; a candidate wins if and only if no other candidate receives more approvals (Brams and Fishburn 1978, 1983, 2005). But approval votes can be aggregated in different ways to serve different purposes, so it is reasonable to distinguish between approval balloting, in which each voter submits a ballot that identifies the voter’s approved candidates, and approval voting, the single-winner procedure that selects the most-approved candidate(s) (Merrill and Nagel 1987).

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Acknowledgements

Valuable suggestions from Steven J. Brams and Arkadii Slinko are gratefully acknowledged. Thanks also for helpful comments from a referee and the editors.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, ON, Canada, N2L 3C5

    D. Marc Kilgour & Erica Marshall

Authors
  1. D. Marc Kilgour
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  2. Erica Marshall
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Correspondence to D. Marc Kilgour .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. , School of Political Sciences, University of Haifa, Mount Carmel, Haifa, 31905, Israel

    Dan S. Felsenthal

  2. , Department of Philosophy, King's College London, Strand, London, WC2R 2LS, United Kingdom

    Moshé Machover

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Kilgour, D.M., Marshall, E. (2012). Approval Balloting for Fixed-Size Committees. In: Felsenthal, D., Machover, M. (eds) Electoral Systems. Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_12

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_12

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-20440-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-20441-8

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