L–PEP: A Logic to Reason about Privacy–Enhancing Cryptography Protocols

  • Almudena Alcaide
  • Ali E. Abdallah
  • Ana I. González–Tablas
  • José M. de Fuentes
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6514)


In recent years, many cryptography protocols have been designed for many different scenarios, with the purpose of preserving security of communications as well as privacy and anonymity of participant entities. In general, every proposed solution has possed a real challenge to the existing formal methods of protocol analysis and verification. The main goal of this work is the proposal of a logic to reason about privacy-enhancing monotonic and non–monotonic cryptography protocols. The new logic will be called L-PEP and it extends the existing Rubin’s logic of beliefs.


Inference Rule Blind Signature Cryptographic Protocol Protocol Execution Cryptographic Hash Function 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Meadows, C.: Formal methods for cryptographic protocol analysis: emerging issues and trends. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 21(1) (2003)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Privacy and identity management for europe (prime). Privacy and Identity Management for Europe (PRIME),
  3. 3.
    Burrows, M., Abadi, M., Needham, R.: A logic of authentication. ACM Transactions on Computer Systems 8(1), 18–36 (1990)CrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Abadi, M., Tuttle, M.: A semantics for a logic of authentication. In: Proceedings of the ACM Symposium of Principles of Distributed Computing, pp. 201–216. ACM Press, New York (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Moser, L.: A logic of knowledge and belief for reasoning about computer security. In: Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop II, pp. 57–63 (June 1989)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Rubin, A.D.: Nonmonotonic cryptographic protocols. In: Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 100–116 (1994)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Meadows, C., Syverson, P.F.: A Formal Specification of Requirements for Payment Transactions in the SET Protocol. In: Hirschfeld, R. (ed.) FC 1998. LNCS, vol. 1465, pp. 122–140. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Xu, Y., Xie, X.: Analysis of electronic commerce protocols based on extended rubin logic. In: Proceedings of the 9th International Conference for Young Computer Scientists, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 2079–2084. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2008)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Xu, Y., Xie, X.: Analysis of authentication protocols based on rubin logic. In: 4th International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Mobile Computing, WiCOM 2008, pp. 1–5 (2008)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Xu, Y., Xie, X.: Security analysis of routing protocol for manet based on extended rubin logic. In: IEEE International Conference on Networking, Sensing and Control, ICNSC 2008, pp. 1326–1331 (2008)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Teepe, W.: On ban logic and hash functions or: how an unjustified inference rule causes problems. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 19(1), 76–88 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Agray, N., van der Hoek, W., de Vink, E.P.: On ban logics for industrial security protocols. In: Dunin-Keplicz, B., Nawarecki, E. (eds.) CEEMAS 2001. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 2296, pp. 29–36. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Alcaide, A., Estévez-Tapiador, J., Hernandez Castro, J., Ribagorda, A.: Nature–inspired synthesis of rational protocols. In: Rudolph, G., Jansen, T., Lucas, S., Poloni, C., Beume, N. (eds.) PPSN 2008. LNCS, vol. 5199, pp. 981–990. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Almudena Alcaide
    • 1
  • Ali E. Abdallah
    • 2
  • Ana I. González–Tablas
    • 1
  • José M. de Fuentes
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceUniversity Carlos II of MadridSpain
  2. 2.Institute for Computing ResearchLondon South Bank UniversityUK

Personalised recommendations