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From a Proven Correct Microkernel to Trustworthy Large Systems

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Book cover Formal Verification of Object-Oriented Software (FoVeOOS 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNPSE,volume 6528))

Abstract

The seL4 microkernel was the world’s first general-purpose operating system kernel with a formal, machine-checked proof of correctness. The next big step in the challenge of building truly trustworthy systems is to provide a framework for developing secure systems on top of seL4. This paper first gives an overview of seL4’s correctness proof, together with its main implications and assumptions, and then describes our approach to provide formal security guarantees for large, complex systems.

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Andronick, J. (2011). From a Proven Correct Microkernel to Trustworthy Large Systems. In: Beckert, B., Marché, C. (eds) Formal Verification of Object-Oriented Software. FoVeOOS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6528. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18070-5_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18070-5_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-18069-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-18070-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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