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Resiliency Aspects of Security Protocols

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Security Protocols (Security Protocols 2007)

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Abstract

Current mainstream work on security protocols usually focuses on achieving one instance of some security property, even when composition of smaller components is used in the design. This paper, instead, advocates special attention to internal components and the environment of security protocols in order to implement extra instances of the same security property. These multiple instances would be able to maintain the security property even if one or more of them failed under the attack of an adversary, providing a degrading path for the protocol assurances instead of the usual catastrophic failure.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, 15 JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge, CB3 0FD, United Kingdom

    Marcus C. Granado

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  1. Marcus C. Granado
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Hertfordshire, AL10 9AB, Hatfield, UK

    Bruce Christianson  & James A. Malcolm  & 

  2. University of Trento, Trento, Italy

    Bruno Crispo

  3. Microsoft Research Ltd.,, Roger Needham Building, 7 JJ Thomson Avenue, CB3 0FB, Cambridge, UK

    Michael Roe

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Granado, M.C. (2010). Resiliency Aspects of Security Protocols. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Malcolm, J.A., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols. Security Protocols 2007. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5964. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17773-6_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17773-6_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17772-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17773-6

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