Abstract
Constraining information flow is fundamental to security: we do not want secret information to reach untrusted principals (confidentiality), and we do not want untrusted principals to corrupt trusted information (integrity).
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References
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Rajamani, S.K. (2010). Analyzing Explicit Information Flow. In: Jha, S., Mathuria, A. (eds) Information Systems Security. ICISS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6503. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17714-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17714-9_1
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