Abstract
Due to the rapid growth of e-commerce technology, secure auction protocols have attracted much attention among researchers. The main reason for constructing sealed-bid auction protocols is the fact that losing bids can be used in future auctions and negotiations if they are not kept private. Our motivation is to develop a new commitment scheme to construct first-price auction protocols similar to proposed solutions in [18,17,19]. Our constructions are auctioneer-free and unconditionally secure whereas those protocols rely on computational assumptions and use auctioneers. As our contribution, we first propose a multicomponent commitment scheme, that is, a construction with multiple committers and verifiers. Consequently, three secure first-price auction protocols are proposed, each of which has its own properties. We also provide the security proof and the complexity analysis of proposed constructions.
Chapter PDF
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Blum, M.: Coin flipping by telephone - a protocol for solving impossible problems. In: Proceedings of the 24th Computer Society International Conference, pp. 133–137. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (1982)
Blundo, C., Masucci, B., Stinson, D.R., Wei, R.: Constructions and bounds for unconditionally secure non-interactive commitment schemes. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 26(1), 97–110 (2002)
Brandt, F.: How to obtain full privacy in auctions. International Journal of Information Security 5(4), 201–216 (2006)
Brandt, F., Sandholm, T.: (im)possibility of unconditionally privacy-preserving auctions. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Joint Conference on AAMAS, pp. 810–817. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2004)
Brandt, F., Sandholm, T.: On the existence of unconditionally privacy-preserving auction protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 11(2), 1–21 (2008)
Franklin, M.K., Reiter, M.K.: The design and implementation of a secure auction service. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering 22(5), 302–312 (1996)
Gathen, J.V.Z., Gerhard, J.: Modern Computer Algebra. Cambridge University Press, New York (2003)
Harkavy, M., Tygar, J.D., Kikuchi, H.: Electronic auctions with private bids. In: Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop on Electronic Commerce, pp. 61–74. USENIX Association (1998)
Jakobsson, M., Juels, A.: Mix and match: Secure function evaluation via ciphertexts. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 162–177. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Kikuchi, H.: (m+1)st-price auction protocol. In: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Financial Cryptography, FC, pp. 351–363. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Kikuchi, H., Harkavy, M., Tygar, J.D.: Multi-round anonymous auction protocols. In: Proceedings of the 1st IEEE Workshop on Dependable and Real-Time E-Commerce Systems, pp. 62–69. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Kikuchi, H., Hotta, S., Abe, K., Nakanishi, S.: Distributed auction servers resolving winner and winning bid without revealing privacy of bids. In: Proceedings of the 7th Int. Conf. on Parallel and Distributed Systems, pp. 307–312. IEEE, Los Alamitos (2000)
Peng, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E.: Optimization of electronic first-bid sealed-bid auction based on homomorphic secret sharing. In: Dawson, E., Vaudenay, S. (eds.) Mycrypt 2005. LNCS, vol. 3715, pp. 84–98. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Peng, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E., Viswanathan, K.: Robust, privacy protecting and publicly verifiable sealed-bid auction. In: Deng, R.H., Qing, S., Bao, F., Zhou, J. (eds.) ICICS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2513, pp. 147–159. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Peng, K., Boyd, C., Dawson, E., Viswanathan, K.: Five sealed-bid auction models. In: Proceedings of the Australasian Information Security Workshop Conference, pp. 77–86. Australian Computer Society (2003)
Rivest, R.L.: Unconditionally secure commitment and oblivious transfer schemes using private channels and a trusted initializer. Tech. rep., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1999)
Sako, K.: An auction protocol which hides bids of losers. In: Imai, H., Zheng, Y. (eds.) PKC 2000. LNCS, vol. 1751, pp. 422–432. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Sakurai, K., Miyazaki, S.: A bulletin-board based digital auction scheme with bidding down strategy. In: Proceedings of the CrypTEC, pp. 180–187. HongKong City University (1999)
Suzuki, K., Kobayashi, K., Morita, H.: Efficient sealed-bid auction using hash chain. In: Won, D. (ed.) ICISC 2000. LNCS, vol. 2015, pp. 183–191. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)
Suzuki, K., Yokoo, M.: Secure combinatorial auctions by dynamic programming with polynomial secret sharing. In: Blaze, M. (ed.) FC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2357, pp. 44–56. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Nojoumian, M., Stinson, D.R. (2010). Unconditionally Secure First-Price Auction Protocols Using a Multicomponent Commitment Scheme. In: Soriano, M., Qing, S., López, J. (eds) Information and Communications Security. ICICS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6476. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_19
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17650-0_19
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17649-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17650-0
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)