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Checking the Paths to Identify Mutant Application on Embedded Systems

  • Ahmadou Al Khary Séré
  • Julien Iguchi-Cartigny
  • Jean-Louis Lanet
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6485)

Abstract

The resistance of Java Card against attack is based on software and hardware countermeasures, and the ability of the Java platform to check the correct behaviour of Java code (by using bytecode verification for instance). Recently, the idea to combine logical attacks with a physical attack in order to bypass bytecode verification has emerged. For instance, correct and legitimate Java Card applications can be dynamically modified on-card using laser beam. Such applications become mutant applications, with a different control flow from the original expected behaviour. This internal change could lead to bypass control and protection and thus offer illegal access to secret data and operation inside the chip. This paper presents an evaluation of the ability of an application to become mutant and a new countermeasure based on the runtime check of the application control flow to detect the deviant mutations....

Keywords

Smart Card Java Card Fault Attack Control Flow Graph 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ahmadou Al Khary Séré
    • 1
  • Julien Iguchi-Cartigny
    • 2
  • Jean-Louis Lanet
    • 2
  1. 1.XLIM LabsUniversité de Limoges, JIDELimogesFrance
  2. 2.Université de Limoges, JIDELimogesFrance

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