Abstract
This article characterises stable sets in an abstract game. We show that every stable subset of the pure strategies for the game is characterised as a fixed point of the mapping assigning to each upper boundedly preordered subset of the strategies the set of all its maximal elements.
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Matsuhisa, T. (2010). A Characterisation of Stable Sets in Games with Transitive Preference. In: Wu, W., Daescu, O. (eds) Combinatorial Optimization and Applications. COCOA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6508. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17458-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17458-2_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17457-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17458-2
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