Abstract
We analyse the process of coalition formation in which agents’ expectations evolve through repeated interactions in a large population setting. The selection of equilibrium outcomes strongly depends on agents’ initial beliefs and individual learning speed; the efficient coalition structure is reached starting from a very limited set of initial beliefs.
We thank C. Bianchi, C. Casarosa, E.M. Cleur, L. Fanti, N. Salvadori, P. Vagliasindi and all participants to seminars delivered at the University of Pisa and Venice for helpful comments; none of them is responsible for what is written here. This work has been accomplished with MURST national funds (40%).
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Fiaschi, D., Pacini, P.M. (2004). Coalition Formation with Boundedly Rational Agents. In: Gallegati, M., Kirman, A.P., Marsili, M. (eds) The Complex Dynamics of Economic Interaction. Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, vol 531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17045-4_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17045-4_19
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