Detecting Sybil Nodes in Static and Dynamic Networks

  • José Antonio Cárdenas-Haro
  • Goran Konjevod
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 6427)


Peer-to-peer systems are known to be vulnerable to the Sybil attack. The lack of a central authority allows a malicious user to create many fake identities (called Sybil nodes) pretending to be independent honest nodes. The goal of the malicious user is to influence the system on his/her behalf. In order to detect the Sybil nodes and prevent the attack, we use here a reputation system for every node, built through observing its interactions with its peers. The construction makes every node a part of a distributed authority that keeps records on the reputation and behavior of the nodes. Records of interactions between nodes are broadcast by the interacting nodes and honest reporting proves to be a Nash Equilibrium for correct (non-Sybil) nodes. We argue that in realistic communication schedule scenarios, simple graph-theoretic queries help in exposing those nodes most likely to be Sybil.


Distributed Systems Sybil attack Network security 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • José Antonio Cárdenas-Haro
    • 1
  • Goran Konjevod
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computing, Informatics and Decision Systems EngineeringArizona State UniversityTempe

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