Abstract
We consider a network of agents involved in a common project. Resulting project common cost allocation problem can be modeled as a cooperative game with empty core possible. From social point of view, achievement of subsidy-free allocation may play important role, even at a cost of allocation efficiency. Subsidy-free and α-efficient allocation can be obtained by solving linear programme MASIT. However, to find an unique MASIT solution we use notion of equitable rational preference relation and apply column generation technique. We also show, that there are interesting cases of unbalanced games, and for one of them, TP-game, we present numerical results of our approach.
The research was supported by the Polish National Budget Funds 2010-2013 for science under the grant N N514 044438.
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Kaleta, M. (2010). Computing α-Efficient Cost Allocations for Unbalanced Games. In: Bolc, L., Makowski, M., Wierzbicki, A. (eds) Social Informatics. SocInfo 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6430. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16567-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16567-2_8
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